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Preface 
“…chance only favours the mind which is prepared.”  
–Louis Pasteur 
The act of creativity, as encountered, for example, in scientific discoveries, does favour 
the prepared mind, as famously coined by Louis Pasteur (Vallery-Radot, 1901/1960: 
76). Being prepared not only helps in solving the problem, but also in finding the prob-
lem in the first place! Indeed, acts of creativity often include solving problems that are 
ill-defined, and hence to “regard old problems from a new angle, [requiring] creative 
imagination” (Einstein & Infeld, 1938: 95). 
The similarity to corporations and to emerging strategic issues that they face is striking. 
Strategic issues, which threaten the profitability and even the very existence of the com-
pany, emerge to the attention of the company only sporadically. More often than not, 
the strategic issues themselves are complex and messy when they emerge. Therefore the 
problem must be found and interpreted before it can be dealt with. Moreover, because of 
the inherent complexity of the strategic issues, the solutions themselves may require 
creative approaches both in their making and in their contents.  
None of this, though, typically happens in a straightforward manner. To date, academic 
research is unfortunately able to offer only a few meaningful concepts that can support 
companies in their efforts to manage emerging strategic issues. Not much more exists in 
terms of systematic knowledge and procedures on the practitioner side, either, even 
though the gravity of the problem has long been recognised. 
The following discussion opens up the black box of strategic issue management in a 
large corporation by (i) analysing how individual strategic issues are processed longitu-
dinally in the organisation, (ii) investigating the cognitive space of strategic issue proc-
essing on the corporate level, and (iii) linking organisational attention allocation with 
strategic issue management system performance.  
Based on the empirical research, the dissertation contributes to the extant literature by 
introducing the concept of attentional saturation in the strategic issue management sys-
tem, as well as links the company’s cognitive space into its strategic issue management 
practices. For managers, the findings provide further support to the notion that emerging 
strategic issues can and should be managed systematically – ad hoc does not need to be 
ad hoc! 
 
  8
Acknowledgements 
Throughout the research process that has culminated into this dissertation, I have re-
ceived support, encouragement, ideas and constructive criticism from several people, 
both researchers as well as practitioners. To all of them I wish to express my sincerest 
gratitude. 
First and foremost, I want to thank my supervisor, Professor Tomi Laamanen, for pro-
viding the long-term vision for my research process as well as guiding me in developing 
the research and this dissertation. His perseverance, enthusiasm and constructive feed-
back have been instrumental in crystallising the theoretical framework, developing the 
analyses and building conclusions throughout the process. 
I am thankful for Professor Yves Doz of INSEAD for acting as my opponent. I also 
want to thank Professor Christoph Lechner of University of St. Gallen and Professor 
Thomas Hutzschenreuter of WHU - Otto Beisheim School of Management who acted as 
my external examiners. 
The empirical part of this dissertation rests on the unprecedented access to the case or-
ganisation and its members. For reasons of confidentiality they cannot be thanked by 
name here. Dr “Richard White” has been particularly essential for this research. He has 
been instrumental in providing the access to strategy discussions, documents and people 
for the purposes of the research. He has also provided sustained support in developing 
the research as well as enabling to link it into the practice of management in corpora-
tions. Moreover, my thanks go to all the interviewees who have devoted their time for 
this research.  
I wish to thank Professor Markku Maula for his valuable comments that have helped to 
develop the manuscript further. His comments have significantly contributed to increas-
ing the overall clarity of the empirical part of the research and making the methodology 
more rigorous. I also wish to thank the late Dr Matti Keijola for his continuous support 
throughout the research process and his valuable comments.  
In addition, the Management of Emerging Strategic Issues (MESI) research project un-
der the auspices of Tekes, the Finnish Funding Agency for Technology and Innovation, 
has been a stimulating context to develop this dissertation. My thanks go to all the pro-
ject participants who have supported me with their insights during the project. 
Finally, I would like to express my appreciation to my family and friends for their sup-
port throughout the process.  
 
Helsinki, Finland, October, 2009 
Peter Kunnas 
 
  9
Contents 
Preface ............................................................................................................................. 7 
Acknowledgements ......................................................................................................... 8 
Contents........................................................................................................................... 9 
List of Figures ............................................................................................................... 12 
List of Tables................................................................................................................. 13 
1 Introduction............................................................................................................ 15 
1.1 Background..................................................................................................... 15 
1.2 Research Problem and Objectives .................................................................. 17 
1.3 Research Approach and Methods................................................................... 19 
1.4 Scope and Limitations .................................................................................... 19 
1.5 Definitions ...................................................................................................... 20 
1.5.1 Strategic Issue .................................................................................... 20 
1.5.2 Strategic Issue Management .............................................................. 21 
1.5.3 Strategy Process ................................................................................. 22 
1.6 Structure of Dissertation................................................................................. 23 
2 Theory Review........................................................................................................ 25 
2.1 Rational Schools of Strategic Planning .......................................................... 25 
2.2 Information Processing and Sensemaking Dynamics .................................... 26 
2.2.1 Cognitive Theory and Knowledge Structures .................................... 27 
2.2.2 Carnegie School of Bounded Rationality........................................... 30 
2.2.3 Social-Psychological Perspective....................................................... 35 
2.2.4 Attention-Based View of the Company ............................................. 39 
2.3 Strategic Issue Management........................................................................... 44 
2.3.1 Scanning, Undirected Research and Problem Recognition................ 44 
2.3.2 Directed Research and Gaining Understanding ................................. 47 
2.3.3 Planning for Action ............................................................................ 51 
2.4 Conclusions .................................................................................................... 53 
3 Research Methodology .......................................................................................... 57 
3.1 Scientific Paradigm ........................................................................................ 57 
3.1.1 Ontological and Epistemological Underpinnings .............................. 57 
3.1.2 Meaning and Theory of Process......................................................... 58 
3.1.3 Concluding Remarks on Scientific Paradigm of Present Study......... 60 
3.2 Research Approach......................................................................................... 60 
3.2.1 Real-Life Research Problem .............................................................. 61 
3.2.2 Joint Academic and Practitioner Research Team............................... 61 
3.2.3 Longitudinal Research ....................................................................... 62 
 
  10
3.2.4 Multi-Method and Multi-Level .......................................................... 62 
3.3 Research Design ............................................................................................. 64 
3.3.1 Research Setting................................................................................. 64 
3.3.2 Data Collection................................................................................... 67 
3.3.3 Data Analysis ..................................................................................... 72 
4 Evolution of a Strategic Issue................................................................................ 76 
4.1 Theoretical Background ................................................................................. 76 
4.2 Analysis .......................................................................................................... 77 
4.2.1 Period 1: “Early Investigations” (Months 1…25).............................. 78 
4.2.2 Period 2: “First Attempt to Address Market” (Months 25…35)........ 79 
4.2.3 Period 3: “A New Approach” (Months 35…51)................................ 79 
4.2.4 Period 4: “Towards Formation of Independent Business” 
(Months 51…60)................................................................................ 83 
4.3 Discussion and Conclusions ........................................................................... 85 
4.3.1 Cyclicality of Strategic Issue Processing ........................................... 86 
4.3.2 Strategic Issue Urgency and Timing .................................................. 88 
4.3.3 Multiplicity in Strategic Issue Categorisation.................................... 89 
4.3.4 Social, Distributed Process................................................................. 90 
4.3.5 Shifting Taskforce Composition ........................................................ 91 
5 Cognitive Space of Strategic Issue Processing..................................................... 93 
5.1 Theoretical Background ................................................................................. 93 
5.2 Analysis .......................................................................................................... 95 
5.2.1 Strategic Issue Categorisation ............................................................ 95 
5.2.2 Strategic Issues in the Cognitive Space of the Company................... 99 
5.3 Discussion and Conclusions ......................................................................... 107 
6 Attention Allocation as Determinant of Strategic Issue Management 
System Performance ............................................................................................ 110 
6.1 Theoretical Background ............................................................................... 110 
6.2 Hypotheses ................................................................................................... 111 
6.2.1 Attention Allocation in Strategic Issue Management Meetings ...... 112 
6.2.2 Attention Allocation on Strategic Issue Management System 
Level................................................................................................. 114 
6.2.3 Attention Allocation on Organisational Level ................................. 116 
6.3 Methods ........................................................................................................ 117 
6.3.1 Dependent Variables ........................................................................ 117 
6.3.2 Independent and Control Variables.................................................. 118 
6.4 Results .......................................................................................................... 119 
6.5 Discussion and Conclusions ......................................................................... 127 
7 Discussion and Conclusions ................................................................................ 129 
7.1 Discussion of Results ................................................................................... 129 
7.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions ..................................................... 131 
7.3 Managerial Implications............................................................................... 136 
7.4 Limitations.................................................................................................... 139 
 
  11
7.5 Directions for Further Research ................................................................... 140 
References ................................................................................................................... 141 
 
Appendix A: Empirical Findings on Strategic Issue Management 
Appendix B: Key Events in the Evolution of the Case 
 
 
  12
List of Figures 
Figure 1.1 Main research question and associated sub-questions of the study ........ 17 
Figure 1.2 Framework for the study linking strategic issue management and 
attention allocation and sensemaking dynamics ..................................... 18 
Figure 1.3 Structure of the study.............................................................................. 23 
Figure 2.1 Model of situated attention and company behaviour in the 
attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997)....................................................... 42 
Figure 3.1 Breakdown of 16 strategic issues into 92 topics over time..................... 66 
Figure 4.1 Four separate periods comprising the evolution of the strategic 
issue used as the case .............................................................................. 77 
Figure 5.1 Dichotomies for categorising strategic issues in cognitive space 
derived with text analysis........................................................................ 96 
Figure 5.2 Strategic issue I02 in cognitive space: Formulating approach for a 
new market segment ............................................................................. 101 
Figure 5.3 Strategic issue I03 in cognitive space: Dealing with long-term 
profit pool options................................................................................. 102 
Figure 5.4 Strategic issue I06 in cognitive space: Monitoring industry 
technology adoption.............................................................................. 104 
Figure 5.5 Strategic issue I15 in cognitive space: Reaching new growth 
through business development.............................................................. 106 
Figure 6.1  Overview of logic applied for hypotheses building.............................. 112 
Figure 7.1 Summary of theoretical and empirical contributions............................ 132 
Figure 7.2 Risk of saturation in the strategic issue management system based 
on inherent uncertainty and implementation challenge of a strategic 
issue (adapted from Kajanto et al., 2004) ............................................. 134 
 
 
  13
List of Tables 
Table 3.1 Interviewees and their positions.............................................................. 68 
Table 3.2 Classification scheme for topics ............................................................. 69 
Table 5.1 Summary statistics for strategic issue categories.................................... 98 
Table 5.2 Summary statistics for case issues ........................................................ 100 
Table 6.1 Means, standard deviations, and correlations of the studied 
variables ................................................................................................ 120 
Table 6.2 Ordered logistic regression results on strategic issue management 
system performance with ex post decision rightness as the 
dependent variable ................................................................................ 122 
Table 6.3 Ordered logistic regression results on strategic issue management 
system performance with ex post decision impact as the dependent 
variable.................................................................................................. 124 
Table 6.4 Summary of results of regression analyses........................................... 125 
Table 7.1 Nine research-based recommendations for improving corporate 
strategic issue management practices ................................................... 137 
 
 
  
 
14
 
  15
1 Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Anticipating and responding to emerging strategic issues can undoubtedly be argued to 
be at the heart of corporate strategy-making. By making timely adjustments and revi-
sions to the corporation’s strategy, top management can attempt to create a (sustainable) 
competitive advantage1 for the company. Yet, the business press can cite numerous ex-
amples where companies have failed to respond to their strategic issues. Two of these 
occurrences are provided as a way of illustrating the situation:  
[Compaq] won its spurs in the late 1980s as an IBM-killer, but then its sales fell 
after it failed to react quickly to a rapidly changing American PC market. (Pope 
& Hamilton, 1993; emphasis provided)  
AT&T (---) understood that the convergence of telecommunications and comput-
ing would transform not only the company’s own markets but much of business 
life. It was a perceptive vision, not widely shared. But the company failed to see 
(---) that the internet was the specific vehicle through which the vision would be 
realised, or that its merger with NCR, the US business machines manufacturer, 
was an irrelevant and inappropriate response. (Financial Times, 1999; emphases 
provided) 
The two examples above are no singular incidents, and a plethora of similar tales could 
have easily been provided. Nonetheless, these two examples underline a number of im-
plications of utmost importance for corporations. First, by not being able to act deci-
sively, a phenomenal success story can turn into demise almost overnight. Second, even 
an appreciation of impending changes in the environment is not a sufficient condition 
for success (although it should be a necessary one), for the nuances of the situation may 
nonetheless be overlooked. Third, and somewhat self-evidently, even a timely response 
to a perceived strategic issue may not produce propitious outcomes if the premises are 
incorrect. 
However, the right approach in assessing the strategic issue and responding to it may 
provide marked results. A good example of this is how BellSouth, the US telecommuni-
cations carrier, foresaw the pending implications of regulatory changes, which allowed 
it to seize opportunities before competitors:  
“What we thought would be a complete threat, a destroyer of value, resulted in 
being a value creator. You should never come to conclusions about competition, 
                                                 
1  The notion of competitive advantage has aroused much criticism recently. For example, Powell 
(2001) argues that the concept cannot be postulated without being tautologous and that it is merely a 
metaphor. Moreover, Powell asserts that the concept cannot be empirically proven. 
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partnerships, [or] alliances before really looking into them. When this [strate-
gic] issue came up we thought we knew what it was all about. As people moni-
tored its progress and researched additional [strategic] issues surrounding it, 
we began to see other aspects that led to our implementation strategy and in the 
long-term served us well.” (Vice President, Regulatory Issues, BellSouth Corpo-
ration; in CSB, 1999: 219) 
The above quote not only suggests that managing emerging strategic issues can provide 
benefit for corporations (Camillus, 2003; as suggested by, e.g., Ramanujam et al., 
1986), but it also underscores the role of interpretation of the strategic issue within the 
company. Interpretation is not a one-off event, but an evolutionary process where the 
strategic issue can change, for example, from representing a threat to representing an 
opportunity for the company. 
Academic research has attempted to provide its share of material to deepen the under-
standing of management of strategic issues. Early contributions in the domain of organ-
isational decision making (Cohen et al., 1972; Cyert & March, 1963/1992; March & 
Simon, 1958/1993) have been complemented with research specifically in the area of 
strategic issue management (e.g., Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Dutton & Ot-
tensmeyer, 1987). These later contributions, with the attention-based view of Ocasio 
(1997), have formalised the notion of strategic issue management as well as under-
scored the role of managerial cognition and attention allocation. At the same time, some 
inroads have been made in other areas of research into managerial cognition (e.g., Gil-
bert, 2006; Kaplan, 2004, 2008; Kaplan et al., 2003; Yu et al., 2005).  
Notwithstanding the progress thus far, understanding of strategic issue management in 
corporations still remains somewhat limited. From a managerial standpoint, the solu-
tions to tackle the problem of managing emerging strategic issues are still almost non-
existent (Kajanto et al., 2004). There are only a few practical approaches to capture the 
relevant information in the front-line, interpret the information amongst top and middle 
management, and to make informed judgements and elicit responses. This is not least 
due to the lack of research in real-life organisational contexts. 
From the academic perspective, the extant research has taken a piecemeal approach to 
strategic issue management: It has tended to study strategic issues as occurring as sin-
gle, isolated incidents. In so doing, the research has failed to appreciate a number of as-
pects in the strategic issue management process. First, the extant research has over-
looked the fact that strategic issues, which by their very nature are inherently complex, 
ambiguous and equivocal, cannot be identified, interpreted and resolved instantane-
ously. Rather, truly strategic issues may need time to develop in the minds of the organ-
isational decision makers, before their resolution can even be attempted. Furthermore, 
the same strategic issue may continue to exist for the organisation even if actions are 
taken to resolve it – in fact, resolution of a strategic issue can come in incremental steps 
rather than in a discontinuous fashion. 
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Second, by looking at solitary strategic issues, the extant research has not fully taken 
into account the limited capacity of organisational decision makers to attend to strategic 
issues. A plethora of accounts have discussed the limited capacity of information proc-
essing both on the individual and organisation levels (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963/1992; 
March & Simon, 1958/1993; Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 1947/1997; Weick, 1969/1979, 
1995), yet there has been few attempts to research how the scant cognitive resources of 
particularly top management are allocated to the repertoire of strategic issues that the 
organisation faces (notable exceptions include, e.g., Gilbert, 2006; Kaplan, 2004, 2008; 
Kaplan et al., 2003). Moreover, this allocation of attention and resources is by no means 
static, but changes over time as the environment and internal context for the strategic 
issues changes. 
This dissertation contributes to the limitations of earlier research by studying strategic 
issue processing on multiple levels (including a strategic issue portfolio and individual 
strategic issues) in a longitudinal manner based on unprecedented access to the strategic 
issues of a real-life corporation. 
1.2 Research Problem and Objectives 
Figure 1.1 presents how the main research question breaks down into sub-questions of 
the study. 
How do corporations deal 
with strategic issues that 
emerge outside their regular 
strategy processes?
How do individual strategic issues evolve 
over time as they are processed in the 
strategic issue management system of 
the company?
How does the cognitive space of the 
company affect how strategic issues are 
processed on a system level as part of a 
portfolio of strategic issues?
How is attention allocation in the 
strategic issue management system 
linked to its performance?
 
Figure 1.1 Main research question and associated sub-questions of the study 
The main research problem of this dissertation can be defined as a question as follows: 
 How do corporations deal with strategic issues that emerge outside their regular 
strategy processes? 
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In detail, the fundamental research questions can be articulated as follows: 
 How do individual strategic issues evolve over time as they are processed in the 
strategic issue management system of the company? 
 How does the cognitive space of the company affect how strategic issues are 
processed on a system level as part of a portfolio of strategic issues? 
 How is attention allocation in the strategic issue management system linked to 
its performance? 
The first sub-question aims at analysing how a single strategic issue evolves over time 
as it is being processed in the strategic issue management system.  
The second sub-question focuses on the interaction of the cognitive space of the com-
pany and processing of strategic issues within the entire portfolio of strategic issues pre-
sent to the company. 
The third sub-question focuses the research on the attention allocation of top manage-
ment within the strategic issue management system, and explores the linkages between 
various strategic issue characteristics on strategic issue outcomes. 
The dissertation approaches strategic issue management from two different perspectives 
as outlined in Figure 1.2. On the one hand, the research looks at how attention allocation 
and sensemaking dynamics underpin the process. On the other hand, the study explores 
how strategic issues are processes from scanning through directed research and planning 
for action towards implementation (Kajanto et al., 2005). 
Scanning, 
undirected 
research and 
problem 
recognition
Directed 
research and 
gaining 
understanding
Planning 
for action Implementation
Attention allocation and 
sensemaking dynamics
Strategic issue 
management
• Strategic issue and topic characteristics
• Attention allocation in the strategic issue 
management system
• Strategic issue and topic outcomes
 
Figure 1.2 Framework for the study linking strategic issue management and attention alloca-
tion and sensemaking dynamics 
The objective of the research is to integrate thus far detached theoretical domains de-
scribing the various aspects of strategic issue management into a coherent whole. Fur-
thermore, by investigating current managerial practices, the research aims at furthering 
the theoretical understanding of strategic issue management with the insights obtained. 
Finally, the research aims at providing tangible recommendations for practitioners as to 
how to manage their ongoing strategy making in a more systematic fashion. 
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1.3 Research Approach and Methods 
Strategy process research (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992; Chakravarthy et al., 2003; Petti-
grew, 1992a) has traditionally been dominated by the debate between emergent and 
planned perspectives of strategy-making (Ansoff, 1991; Mintzberg, 1990). However, 
over the past few years the research has started to converge towards an integrative syn-
thesis where decisions and actions drive positional and capability advantages, organisa-
tional context determines decisions made and actions taken, and a dynamic equilibrium 
is created by top management through its continuous redefinition of the relevant strate-
gic dynamics of the company (Chakravarthy et al., 2003).  
Consequently, the research approach and methods used to study strategic issue man-
agement should also be as varied as its underlying theoretical domains. Strategy re-
search overall has been criticised for analytically separating content research and proc-
ess research from each other. Chakravarthy and White (2001: 183; emphasis provided) 
argue that “in their preoccupation with the journey, process researchers too often lose 
track of the destination, the strategy outcome. (---) [T]he work in the strategy process 
area has been more about process and less about strategy.” A similar notion was al-
ready raised by Huff and Reger (1987: 211), who remarked that the distinction between 
process and content “is (---) becoming an impediment to progress in strategic manage-
ment research”. To this end, this study leverages the engaged scholarship approach that 
allows “intellectual arbitrage” (Van de Ven, 2007; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006) and 
thereby a thorough study into the dynamics of strategic issue management in a corpora-
tion. In particular, this allows an intimate understanding of the strategy substance to also 
be gained, rather than merely the process used to reach the decisions. 
Moreover, Rouleau and Séguin (1995) argue that a similar distinction once made be-
tween strategy and organisational theories needs to be removed. This opinion is sec-
onded also by Huff, albeit from a cognitive standpoint: “[C]reating an organizational 
cognitive science requires that we ground our work in organizational issues” (1997: 
948; original emphasis). In particular, this means linking organisational cognition into 
the larger weave of organisational activity, including strategy-making. 
Finally, as noted by Chakravarthy and Doz, “Good strategy process research is neither 
theorizing and modeling in the abstract, nor observation and recording of events in a 
theoretical vacuum.” (1992: 9). By leveraging a real-world corporate context as the re-
search setting, the study aims to enhance the understanding of strategic issue manage-
ment equally from the academic and practitioner perspectives.     
1.4 Scope and Limitations 
Even though the concept of strategic issue management can be readily adapted and ap-
plied to describe strategic management on the functional and business level, the focus in 
this research is on the corporate level. This approach is consistent with the view that 
portrays top level decision makers as being of consequence in determining organisa-
tional action (Child, 1972), as well as with the notion that a relatively small group of 
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people at the middle-to-upper levels of the organisation play a substantial role in inter-
pretation  and organisational action (Aguilar, 1967; Daft & Weick, 1984).  
The corporate-level perspective on strategic issue management is also likely to be more 
rewarding from a research point of view, by being able to provide a richer description of 
the cognitive dynamics that underpin the process. Not only are the stakes regarding spe-
cific strategic issues likely to be higher on the corporate level, but also the strategic is-
sues themselves are likely to be more complex and indeed more strategic in nature, 
thereby compounding the influence of the cognitive limitations of the key decision 
makers.  
The scope of the dissertation is limited to an exploration of the strategic issue manage-
ment process, ending at the planning for action phase. Thereby the study looks at phe-
nomena that precede the coverage of the strategic initiative research (e.g., Lechner & 
Floyd, 2005). These two fields of research are nonetheless well linked, as the strategic 
initiative can be seen as the implementation vehicle of a strategic issue.  
In terms of empirical work, the research is limited to exploring strategic issue manage-
ment in one company, albeit on multiple levels. Whereas this raises the question of gen-
eralisability, the single case design with access to unique corporate data allows the de-
velopment of a rich picture of strategic issue management practices in a real-life corpo-
rate setting. 
1.5 Definitions 
1.5.1 Strategic Issue 
Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines an issue in a general sense as “a matter the 
decision of which involves important consequences”. Ansoff defines a strategic issue as 
a “forthcoming development, either inside or outside the organization, which is likely to 
have an important impact on the ability of the enterprise to meet its objectives” (1980: 
133). In a similar vein, Dutton et al. define it as an “emerging development which in the 
judgement of some strategic decision makers is likely to have a significant impact on the 
organization’s present or future strategies” (1983: 308). Dutton and Duncan (1987b: 
103) extend the definition in the scope of events while maintaining the focus on corpo-
rate strategy: “Strategic issues are defined as developments, events and trends having 
the potential to impact an organization’s strategy”. 
A later definition by Dutton and Dukerich (1991: 518) highlights the importance of 
cognitive mental processes that are present when strategists identify and deal with stra-
tegic issues: “[Strategic] issues are events, developments, and trends that an organiza-
tion’s members collectively recognize as having some consequence to the organization. 
[Strategic] issues can arise from changes inside the organization (---) or changes origi-
nating externally.” This definition also emphasises that strategic issues can not only 
emerge from the environment, but also from within the organisation, a conception un-
derlined already by Ansoff (1980), yet somewhat overlooked by later contributors. 
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From a slightly different perspective, Smith discusses the concept of problems as fol-
lows: 
Since a problem is an “undesirable situation,” it does not exist strictly as an ob-
jective state-of-the-world, nor as a subjective state of dissatisfaction. A problem 
is a relationship of disharmony between reality and one’s preferences, and be-
ing a relationship, it has no physical existence. Rather, problems are conceptual 
entities or constructs. The term is an abstraction from the world of observables 
and is applied because it serves a useful function. Essentially the term is an at-
tention allocation device. Marking a situation as problematic is a means of in-
cluding it in one’s “stack” of concerns, placing it on an agenda for future atten-
tion and solution efforts. Thus, there is an element of arbitrariness in labeling a 
situation as problematic. (1988: 1491; emphases provided) 
Smith essentially implies that problems are conceptual entities that are designed rather 
than discovered. Reflecting on the discussion on sensemaking in organisations, one can 
directly extend Smith’s definition of problem to apply also to strategic issues. Strategic 
issues are, indeed, problematic to companies, since they are inherently difficult to man-
age. They are ambiguous, complex and fluid, hence, making their identification and di-
agnosis an ongoing, interpretive and politically charged activity (Dutton et al., 1983). 
Strategic issues progress in the strategic issue management system through episodes2 of 
topical work typically performed by a task group and ending in consequential decisions. 
In this dissertation these episodes are called strategic issue topics or topics for short. 
1.5.2 Strategic Issue Management 
Ansoff’s (1980) framework for strategic issue management is a formalised system for 
monitoring developments, assessing their impact and urgency, and assigning actions and 
responsibilities. Ansoff proposes his strategic issue management framework as a com-
plement to periodic strategic planning. In fact, strategic issue management allows the 
company to react to departures from historical dynamics of the organisation’s develop-
ment, but it does not allow the management to rethink and redefine these dynamics (as 
periodic planning does). This is clearly the essential limitation of Ansoff’s framework, a 
notion that subsequent contributors to the field of strategic issue management have chal-
lenged. 
Moreover, Ansoff (1980) distinguishes his concept of strategic issue management from 
responding to weak signals (Ansoff, 1975), which he reserves only for environments “in 
which very fast changes are frequent” (1980: 136). 
Dutton and Duncan (1987b) extend Ansoff’s (1980) notion of strategic issue manage-
ment by linking it intrinsically with strategic planning processes. Whereas the planning 
                                                 
2  In this context, an episode represents a particular “‘passage’ (---) in the history of (---) an institution, 
etc.” (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989) 
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process serves both symbolic and instrumental functions, strategic issues are particu-
larly relevant at the instrumental level, where information critical to the organisation’s 
survival is received (Aguilar, 1967; Daft et al., 1988; Hambrick, 1982) and interpreted 
(Daft & Weick, 1984). Organisational decision makers exist, then, in a market for stra-
tegic issues where different internal and external trends and developments compete for 
decision makers’ attention. Moreover, strategic issues serve as vehicles for translating 
individuals’ concerns into organisational action, and can be seen to have political, as 
well as informational, consequences. 
Ansoff (1980) calls the collection of key strategic issues that the company has at any 
given time as the key strategic issue list. In his thinking, strategic issues are develop-
ments that require management attention outside the annual planning cycle – as a means 
of reacting to deviations from basic guidelines provided by periodic planning. However, 
this view appears to be significantly limiting, as was posited by Dutton et al. (1983) and 
Dutton and Duncan (1987b). Dutton (1986b) introduces the concept of the strategic 
agenda as the set of strategic issues receiving collective attention in the organisation, 
highlighting the social forces within the organisation affecting strategic issue manage-
ment. Dutton and Duncan (1987b) extend the notion by discussing the concept of a stra-
tegic issue array, which is a set of strategic issues that emerge as a result of strategic 
planning (and again feeding back into strategic planning) and as input to the initiation 
and implementation of strategic change (which then also feeds back in to planning).  
1.5.3 Strategy Process 
In a general sense, Oxford English Dictionary (1989) defines a process as “something 
that goes on or is carried on” or as “a series of actions or events”, with the most stan-
dard current meaning referring to “a continuous and regular action or succession of 
actions, taking place or carried on in a definite manner, and leading to the accom-
plishment of some result”.  
In the strategic management literature, the term ‘process’ is used typically in three dif-
ferent meanings: (i) a logic that explains causal relationships between independent and 
dependent variables in a variance theory, (ii) a category of concepts or variables that 
refers to actions of individuals or organisations, and (iii) a sequence of events that de-
scribes how things change over time. Of the three typical meanings, this study uses the 
third one. That is, a process is defined as “a sequence of events or activities that de-
scribes how things change over time, or that represents an underlying pattern of cogni-
tive transitions by an entity in dealing with an issue” (Van de Ven, 1992: 170).   
Within this definition, strategy processes are concerned with “how effective strategies 
are shaped within the [company] and then validated and implemented efficiently” 
(Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992: 5). In this sense, strategy processes are about choice and 
change in companies (Pettigrew, 1992a). Employing a broader definition, strategy proc-
esses comprise antecedent factors (environmental context, strategic context, static or-
ganizational characteristics, dynamic organisational characteristics, and performance), 
process factors (strategists’ static characteristics, strategists’ personal and cognitive con-
text, issue characteristics, process characteristics, and process-outcome characteristics), 
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and outcomes (same as antecedent factors), all linked with various interrelationships 
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 2006). In the classification of Chakravarthy et al. 
(2003) this dissertation is focussed on uncovering the co-evolutionary interplay of con-
text, process and outcomes over time.  
1.6 Structure of Dissertation 
Figure 1.3 presents the structure of this dissertation. First, an introduction to the study is 
presented in this chapter (i.e., Chapter 1). Second, the theoretical part (Chapter 2) re-
views the literature pertaining to the field of study, namely the early theoretical founda-
tions for strategic issue management (Section 2.1), the multiple theories which underpin 
organisational information processing, attention allocation and sensemaking dynamics 
(Section 2.2), and the strategic issue management process in itself (Section 2.3). Third, a 
summary of methodological aspects of the research is presented (Chapter 3).  
Theory review
(Ch. 2)
Introduction
(Ch. 1)
Research methodology
(Ch. 3)
Discussion and conclusions
(Ch. 7)
Evolution of a 
strategic issue
(Ch. 4)
Attention allocation as 
determinant of strategic 
issue management 
system performance 
(Ch. 6)
Cognitive space of 
strategic issue 
processing 
(Ch. 5)
 
Figure 1.3 Structure of the study 
Fourth, the empirical part comprises Chapters 4-6. Chapter 4 examines a single strategic 
issue, providing a description of how the strategic issue progresses through multiple it-
erations over a prolonged period of time. Here the focus is primarily on the strategic is-
sue management process, from scanning via directed research to planning for action. 
However, the chapter also demonstrates how attentional processes influence the strate-
gic issue management process. 
Chapter 5 links the company’s cognitive space and how strategic issue management op-
erates on a system-level, that is, describing how the portfolio of strategic issues is proc-
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essed within the corporation. The viewpoint in this chapter is on the holistic strategic 
issue management system, taking into consideration both the strategic issue manage-
ment process as well as the attention allocation and sensemaking dynamics (see Figure 
1.2). This chapter, along with Chapter 4, forms the inductive part of the empirical study.  
Chapter 6 introduces the concept of saturation by examining how various characteristics 
of the strategic issues themselves, as well of the system they are processed within, influ-
ence attention allocation and thus the performance of the system. This chapter explores 
in detail how the attention allocation and sensemaking dynamics affect strategic issue 
processing. This chapter takes a deductive approach to test and verify theoretical hy-
potheses developed based on the literature review and the preceding, inductive empiri-
cal chapters. 
Fifth and finally, the study is then concluded by drawing together the findings of the 
research in Chapter 7. This chapter also provides further discussion and conclusions of 
the study as well as implications for practitioners and future research. 
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2 Theory Review 
This chapter reviews the relevant received literature in three parts. First, the review pro-
vides an introduction in the way of covering an important antecedent for strategic issue 
management, namely the rational schools of strategic planning. The second section of 
the theory review presents, perhaps as the most substantial theoretical backdrop, the 
various theories on organisational information processing and sensemaking dynamics. 
These theories, and in particularly the attention-based view that represents the apex of 
this stream of research, act as the key theoretical foundation. Moreover, the attention-
based view of the company serves as the foundation for the empirical part of this re-
search. Third, some of the main strands of research pertaining specifically to the domain 
of strategic issue management are presented.  
2.1 Rational Schools of Strategic Planning 
Information processing and decision making in economies and economic organisations 
has traditionally been assumed to be perfectly rational. The main theoretical foundation 
has been the neoclassical economic theory, founded in the 1870s by Jevons 
(1871/1970), Menger (1871) and Walras (1874/1954), subsequently synthesised into a 
coherent theory by Marshall (1890/1961). Marshall’s economic theory is an example of 
a closed equilibrium system, in which the economy is described as static and in equilib-
rium, until an outside force such as a technology shift unsettles the system. Due to the 
change brought by an exogenous shock, the system must find itself another state in 
which it is in equilibrium.  
Marshallian economic theory makes three important assumptions (Beinhocker, 1997). 
First, it assumes that the industry structure is known. Second, it assumes that diminish-
ing returns apply. Third, and most significantly from the point of view of information 
processing and decision making, it assumes that all economic actors (both individuals 
and companies) are perfectly rational and have complete information. Indeed, Mill, for 
example, defines his economic man “as a being who desires to possess wealth and who 
is capable of judging the comparative efficacy of means for obtaining that end” 
(1821/1826: 137-8). Decision making under perfect rationality, then, occurs with a 
“given” set of options that correspond to discrete and ranked consequences. Thus, deci-
sion making is a process of optimisation, in which the task is to find, select and imple-
ment the single best solution to a problem.  
The core concepts of Marshall’s economic theory have substantially influenced theories 
of business strategy. The industrial organisation (IO) view of business strategy that 
emerged in the first half of the 20th century (Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939) uses Marshallian 
economic theory as its theoretical foundation. Of the prevalent managerial tools still 
used today, including the early concept of cost curves (Wright, 1917) as well as the later 
five-forces framework (Porter, 1980), many are grounded on Marshallian thinking. 
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Decision making in a Marshallian economy reflects Taylor’s (1911) thinking that a “one 
best way” exists in dealing with managerial issues. Classical IO strategy works (e.g., 
Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965a; Chandler, 1962; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980) 
emphasise concepts such as goals, resource allocation, and plans. Strategy, then, has 
been thought of as an “integrated plan” (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984), and its execu-
tion has necessitated well-developed hierarchies and formalised systems of control 
(Mintzberg & McHugh, 1985), even to the extent of ideal-type, machine-like bureaucra-
cies as described by Weber (1922/1980). 
The dominant school of thought for strategy making processes well into the 1980s was 
the well-known rational model (Hart, 1992), which calls for comprehensive and exhaus-
tive analysis prior to a decision being made (Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). The intro-
duction of the resource-based view (e.g., Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Teece 
et al., 1997; Wernerfelt, 1984, 1995) to complement the IO view (e.g., Andrews, 1971; 
Ansoff, 1965a; Chandler, 1962; Hofer & Schendel, 1978; Porter, 1980) has not reduced 
the requirement for thorough analysis. In these views, the main actor in the strategy 
making process is the company in its entirety. Rationality in decision making implies (i) 
consideration of all available options, (ii) identification and evaluation of all of the con-
sequences that would follow from the adoption of each option, and (iii) selection of the 
option that would be preferable in terms of the most valued ends (Hart, 1992). In equal 
conditions, companies should make the same strategic decisions, and the process of stra-
tegic management is both rational and formal (Mintzberg, 1998). 
However, empirical observations often failed to correspond with these received theories. 
The assumptions of rationality were being challenged by the emerging behavioural the-
ory (Cyert & March, 1963/1992). This theory posits that individuals and organisations 
can achieve, at best, only bounded rationality (Simon, 1947/1957). In essence, cognitive 
limits cause decision makers to adopt simplified models of the world, to limit search 
behaviour, and to accept the first satisfactory outcome. Behavioural theory has conse-
quently forced scholars of strategic management to rethink some of their theories and 
concepts. By challenging the cognitive and motivational assumptions inherent in the 
rational model of strategy making and underlining the role played by organisational 
members (Mintzberg, 1978), the behavioural model has, in part, paved the way for re-
search on strategic issue management. In a similar vein, Schwenk (1989) suggests that 
strategic change is influenced by cognitive, organisational and political factors. As Tho-
mas and Pruett (1992: 6) note, “while economic incentives may still be the best single 
predictor of business transactions, deals and decisions are negotiated and made by 
people”. 
2.2 Information Processing and Sensemaking Dynamics 
Perhaps the largest contextual backdrop to strategic issue management theory has been 
drawn from the organisational information processing research. In order to comprehend 
what underpins strategic issue management activities in corporations, one has to under-
stand how companies go about collecting, analysing and drawing inferences from in-
formation as well as making decisions based on that information.  
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In addition to an introduction of cognitive theory and knowledge structures, this section 
reviews three strands of theory on organisational information processing, namely the 
Carnegie school of bounded rationality, the social-psychological perspective, and the 
attention-based view of the company. Whereas each of the strands takes a distinctively 
different viewpoint of organisational information processing, overall they complement 
each other, and, in so doing, provide a basis for the subsequent discourse on strategic 
issue management process. 
2.2.1 Cognitive Theory and Knowledge Structures 
Cognitive Theory and Strategic Issue Management 
The significance of cognitive theory for strategic issue management lies in its relation-
ship to the information processing of individuals. According to Walsh (1995), individu-
als can approach information processing in two dominant ways: Either they use a “top-
down” (Abelson & Black, 1986) or “theory-driven” (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) approach, 
or, alternatively, they use a “bottom-up” or “data-driven” approach. In the former case, 
the cognitive structures generated from experience affect individuals’ abilities to attend 
to, encode, and make inferences about new information, whereas in the latter case, the 
information itself shapes individuals’ responses to it. Hence, knowledge structures can 
be seen as mental templates that individuals impose on an information environment to 
give it form and meaning, and that they affect information processing in predictable 
ways (Walsh, 1995). Empirically, for example, Haley and Stumpf (1989) demonstrate 
how different personality types (Jung, 1921/1950) employ distinct heuristics to gather 
data, to generate and to evaluate options.  
The meaning that the strategist gives to a strategic issue depends on the knowledge 
structures and categories used to describe it: “[C]ognitive categories are used by strate-
gic decisions makers because they help to store information more efficiently and aid 
communication with others about ambiguous strategic issues” (Dutton & Jackson, 
1987: 77-8; cf. Smith, 1995). The concept of cognitive categories is assumed to strategic 
issue management from categorisation theory (Mervis & Rosch, 1981; Rosch, 1975, 
1978; Rosch & Mervis, 1975) of cognitive psychology. For example, Porac and Thomas 
(1990) discuss how decision makers use cognitive processes to simplify the competitive 
environment. Through cognitive taxonomies, organisations make sense of the environ-
mental diversity and define, among others, competition (cf. Porac et al., 1989).3 Deci-
sion makers may also alter their perceptions of the environment so that it appears more 
certain (Michael, 1973; cf. Weick, 1995), because the psychological state of uncertainty 
regarding an important decision is extremely painful (Schwenk, 1984). Fahey and Nara-
yanan’s (1989) empirical work suggests that cognitive structures and the environment 
are not necessarily congruent, leading to both under-identification as well as over-
identification of environmental factors.  
                                                 
3  This research on competitor analysis in cognitive terms is subsequently adopted to Chen’s (1996) 
study on competitor analysis and intercompany rivalry. 
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Cognitive simplification processes have been labelled as heuristics as well as biases 
within in the research community, depending on the intended connotation. They may 
indeed be referred to as biases, given that they affect strategic decision making, yet this 
infers a negative undertone. In contrast, they can also be reasonably called heuristics. 
Tversky and Kahneman (1974: 1125) propose that “[i]n general, these heuristics are 
quite useful, but sometimes they lead to severe and systematic errors”. Das and Bing-
Sheng (1999) reconcile this debate by suggesting that cognitive biases are the potential 
negative consequences of adopting heuristics. However, these heuristics can enable ex-
perienced managers to make sense of strategic issues quickly, and respond in an effi-
cient and effective manner (Day & Lord, 1992). 
Automatic interpretation relies extensively on the schema that individuals have in mem-
ory and the strategic issue categories embedded in organisational routines and proce-
dures (Dutton, 1993; March & Simon, 1958/1993; Normann, 1975; Weick, 1969/1979). 
The schema, then, serve as important predictors of how decision makers will interpret 
and respond to newly detected strategic issues. Moreover, Dutton hypothesises that an 
automatic strategic issue interpretation mode leads to faster diagnosis of strategic issues 
and more rapid responses to strategic issues on the one hand, but to less resilient strate-
gic issue diagnosis on the other.  
Allinson and Hayes (1996) support the notion of automatic interpretation through their 
discussion on intuition in decision making. Allinson and Hayes (1996: 132) assert that 
the need exists to “recognize situations in which the intuitive way of thinking is appro-
priate”. Intuition and analysis do not need to be mutually exclusive, however, even 
though people seem to have rather permanent stylistic orientations (cf. Jung, 
1921/1950). Clarke and Mackaness provide some empirical evidence on intuition, yet 
their research can be described as more tentative in nature. Nonetheless, their findings 
suggest that the differences in cognitive maps between senior and less senior executives 
are not so much of structure as they are of content. Hence, they propose that intuition 
comes into play “as a means of ‘going beyond’ the rational data and information, by 
using experiences to ‘cut through’ to the essence of a situation, helping to make sense of 
it, and as a test of its validity” (2001: 166). 
Cognitive Change 
Argyris and Schön (1978) suggest that organisations are fundamentally cognitive enter-
prises that learn and develop knowledge, and that the knowledge structure serves to de-
fine expected relationships, behaviours and actions of organisational members. In ac-
cordance, Lant et al. describe the process of strategy making as “fundamentally a proc-
ess of managerial learning that is affected by an organization’s performance history, the 
nature of an organization’s context, and managers’ interpretive or sense-making proc-
esses” (1992: 600; emphasis provided). This definition underlines the role of manage-
rial and organisational learning, that is, cognitive change, in strategy process research.  
Hence, strategic issue management research is not only concerned with understanding 
why managers select one action over others, but also with identifying what processes 
occur after the actions have been undertaken. In this light, Gioia and Chittipeddi define 
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strategic change to involve “an attempt to change current modes of cognition and ac-
tion to enable the organization to take advantage of important opportunities or to cope 
with consequential environmental threats” (1991: 433). Similarly, Barr et al. closely 
associate organisational renewal with the update of knowledge structures: 
“[O]rganizational renewal hinges on learning – a process that necessarily requires ad-
ditions to or changes in mental models” (1992: 17). 
Organisational change and development can occur via two distinct avenues, partly de-
pending on the level of analysis (Weick & Quinn, 1999). Episodic change, in which 
change is intermittent and discontinuous, is complemented by continuous change that is 
evolving and incremental in nature (cf. Reger et al., 1994). Conceptualisations of inertia 
are seen to underlie the choice of viewing organisational change as episodic or continu-
ous. 
Despite its relevance to strategic issue management, organisational cognitive change has 
not been extensively studied as a separate concept. The essential part of the strategic 
issue management literature appears to be concerned with the analysis of determinants 
for making strategic decisions, but only implicitly deals with the question of cognitive 
change. As Thomas et al. note, “the cyclical link between performance outcomes and 
scanning activities has been, with some exceptions (---), ignored in the literature” 
(1993: 262). 
Barr et al. (1992) discuss the importance of cognitive change, strategic action, and or-
ganisational renewal. Specifically, they investigate the link between changes in mental 
models and changes in organisational actions. Nonetheless, strategic action represents 
only an intermediate outcome for Barr et al., as the research ultimately focuses on or-
ganisational renewal. These three domains are essentially intertwined, as 
“[o]rganizational renewal requires that (---) top managers make timely adjustments in 
their mental models following significant changes in the environment” (1992: 15). The 
fundamental problem with mental models is that they may be erroneous and inaccurate, 
or become so over time. Given cognitive limitations, mental maps will be, at best, in-
complete.  
Past organisational performance does not influence only the scanning and interpretation 
of strategic issues, but it also has an effect on decisions and action triggering. For ex-
ample, Bateman and Zeithaml (1989) found that prior decisions, the psychological con-
text, and the strategic decision are interrelated (cf. Martins & Kambil, 1999). Specifi-
cally, present conditions (level of perceived organisational slack), past events (success 
and failure feedback), and future outlook (positive or negative decision frame) shape the 
decision. Moreover, the study of Audia et al. (2000) reveals that past success makes or-
ganisations confident in their current strategies, and, hence, reluctant to change even 
when confronted with environmental changes. Audia et al. found that (i) greater past 
success, (ii) greater satisfaction with past performance, (iii) more confidence in the cor-
rectness of current strategies, (iv) higher goals, (v) higher self-efficacy, and (vi) less 
seeking of critical information were found to be associated with greater strategic persis-
tence. This persistence was also found to lead to subsequent declines in performance. 
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Fiol (1994) elaborates on the concept of cognitive change by examining the role of con-
sensus and diversity, which have traditionally been regarded as mutually exclusive in 
the organisational learning process. By breaking the notion of consensus into two com-
ponent parts, Fiol demonstrates how simultaneous agreement and disagreement are not 
only possible, but also advantageous to organisational learning. Specifically, Fiol dis-
tinguishes between consensus around interpretations embedded in the content and in the 
framing of communications. Whereas both the content and framing of communications 
reflect meaning, they are not equivalent constructs. Consequently, group consensus 
around one does not necessarily imply consensus around the other. For organisations, 
the implications of this “learning paradox” are quite clear: Managers must actively en-
courage the development of different and conflicting views of what is thought to be 
true, while striving for a shared framing of the strategic issues that is broad enough to 
encompass those differences. 
Managers often fail to adjust their mental maps in response to changing environments, 
which eventually leads to flawed strategic decisions. As Barr et al. note, “[m]ental 
models that can no longer accommodate or explain occurrences in the environment 
must be altered and new understanding of the environment must be developed” (1992: 
17). Hodgkinson (1997) demonstrates this cognitive inertia in his study of the UK resi-
dential estate agents, who failed to notice changes in the material conditions of their 
business environment. Gilbert (2005) develops the concept of organisational inertia fur-
ther by distinguishing between resource vs. routine rigidity. Whereas the former refers 
to a failure to change resource investment patterns (Christensen & Bower, 1996; Hen-
derson, 1993), the latter connotes the failure to change the organisational processes that 
use those investments (Leonard-Barton, 1992; Nelson & Winter, 1982). According to 
Gilbert, threat perception releases constraints on resource rigidity, but amplifies prob-
lems with routine rigidity. 
2.2.2 Carnegie School of Bounded Rationality 
From Limitedly Rational Individuals… 
Before Simon’s (1947/1997) groundbreaking contribution, decision making was consid-
ered to be almost a non-issue, at least from a procedural standpoint. Substantial deci-
sions were made in all fields of society, yet the process of reaching the single best deci-
sion was not considered problematic at all. However, enter limited rationality, and all 
decision making, be it in public administration, business corporations or any other or-
ganisations, was prone to all kinds of problems that can be traced back to the character-
istics of individuals. 
The fundamental thrust of Simon’s argument is that there are limits to human rational-
ity, and that this obviously has implications for decision making. First, whereas rational-
ity implies complete knowledge of consequences attached to each choice, humans are 
incapable of mastering more than fragmentary knowledge. Second, since the conse-
quences of current decisions lie in the future, values need to be assessed ex ante, a proc-
ess which can happen only imperfectly. Third, rationality requires the consideration of 
all possible behaviours, but, in fact, only a small subset of them ever comes to one’s 
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mind. These considerations are at the heart of Simon’s concept of an “administrative 
man”, with which he substitutes the certainly omniscient and perhaps even omnipotent 
“economic man” of the past. As described by Simon in the introduction to the second 
edition of his book, human behaviour is “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” 
(1947/1957: xxiv; original emphases). Moreover, Simon posits that organisational fac-
tors such as authority (cf. Barnard, 1938/1954), formal organisation structure, commu-
nications, and efficiency criteria influence the administrative process. 
The notion of limited rationality was, by no means, accepted lightly, especially amongst  
mainstream economists, as Simon (1991) in his autobiography points out. Interestingly, 
however, economists contemporary to Simon discuss similar ideas of unmanageable 
amounts of information in decision making. For example, Hayek (1944/1986) and von 
Mises (1949) discuss the limits of information available to humans and their abilities to 
use information in their computations to economics while arguing for the need of decen-
tralisation in economic decision making. Writes Hayek: 
It is only as the factors which have to be taken into account become so numerous 
that it is impossible to gain a synoptic view of them, that decentralisation be-
comes imperative. (---) As decentralisation has become necessary because no-
body can consciously balance all the considerations bearing on the decisions of 
so many individuals, the co-ordination can clearly not be effected by “conscious 
control,” but only by arrangements which convey to each agent the information 
he must possess in order effectively to adjust his decisions to those of others. 
(1944/1986: 36; emphasis provided) 
However, Simon’s treatise is not restricted to the limited capabilities and characteristics 
of individuals. Rather, Simon portrays the organisation in the light of a decision process 
that is affected by decision premises. Behaviour in the organisation is influenced by 
these decision premises, which can in turn be modified by the behaviour. In addition, 
organisational structure can influence the decision premises of the individuals within it. 
Specifically, Simon’s realist4 approach assumes a fact-value dichotomy, in which the 
value statements are regarded as non-cognitive and not susceptible to empirical testing.  
In sum, Simon’s work captures the interplay of individual and organisational elements 
in decision making. At the macro level, decision premises can be used to explain why 
the organisation engages in certain actions. At the micro level, decision premises serve 
as a tool for understanding the individual’s relationship to the company. 
…To Bounded Rationality in Organisations 
Building on Simon’s (1947/1997) work on administrative behaviour, the work of March 
and Simon (1958/1993) reflects the information processing capabilities of humans in 
                                                 
4  Simon’s work could also be regarded as positivist in the sense suggested by Friedman (1953). How-
ever, Moldoveanu and Baum argue that Friedman’s interpretation of positivism as a form of instru-
mentalism is “peculiar”, and that “economics (---) is definitely not a positivist science” (2002: 736); 
in this light, Simon’s work could best be described under the label of scientific realism.  
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decision making. March and Simon succinctly describe on a high-level how the 
“boundedly rational” individual attends to decision making: 
It is a picture of a choosing, decision making, problem-solving organism that 
can do only one or a few things at a time, and that can attend to only a small 
part of the information recorded in its memory and presented by the environ-
ment. (1958/1993: 30) 
March and Simon coin their concept of rationality as “subjective” rather than “objec-
tive” as seen in the classical decision making theory under perfect rationality. Subjectiv-
ity implies that rationality can be defined only relative to some specified frame of refer-
ence. Moreover, human decision making is typically aimed at discovering and selecting 
satisfactory rather than optimal options.5 Hence, the real decision making process is 
more about “satisficing” than of optimising,6 and involves substituting the complex re-
ality with a model of reality that is limited, approximate, and simplified.  
Even though March and Simon (1958/1993) are usually credited with the concept of 
bounded rationality, the notion is deeply rooted in an earlier work by Simon 
(1947/1997), albeit with a slightly different usage of limited rationality. In the same 
way, the idea of ‘satisficing’ was popularised by March and Simon’s (1958/1993) book, 
yet it was featured for the first time by Simon (1956) in a journal article. 
The organisational and social environment in which the decision maker acts determines 
what consequences he will anticipate and which ones he will not, as well as what op-
tions he is likely to consider and which ones he will ignore. Cognitive aspects play a 
role in formation of sub-goals: when task allocation facilitates formation of sub-goals, 
the sub-unit tends to focus its attention on the specific sub-goal while ignoring other 
sub-goals and other aspects of the goals of the larger organisation (cf. Ocasio, 1997). 
Focus of attention, then, can be seen as a function of the differentiation of sub-goals, the 
persistence of sub-goals, and the span of attention of the individual. 
Concurrently with March and Simon (1958/1993), the notion of cognitive limitations in 
decision making had begun to gain ground also outside the Carnegie school. Penrose’s 
(1959) seminal work explicitly views limited managerial resources (not only in num-
bers) as a constraint on company growth (i.e., the Penrose effect; Rugman & Verbeke, 
2002). In a similar vein, Rhenman’s (1964/1967; Rhenman & Stymne, 1965) work 
draws heavily on the Carnegie school contributions (March & Simon, 1958/1993; 
                                                 
5  March and Simon (1958/1993) define an option as optimal if (1) a set of criteria that permits all op-
tions to be compared exists and (2) the option in question is preferred (based on said criteria) to all 
other options. In contrast, an option is satisfactory if (1) a set of criteria describing minimally satis-
factory options exists and (2) the options in question meets or exceeds the said criteria. 
6  The verb to satisfice is formed as a combination of verbs to satisfy and to suffice, to highlight that 
“organisms adapt well enough to ‘satisfice’; they do not, in general, ‘optimise’”, and was introduced 
by Simon (1956: 129). (Nonetheless, OED (1989) also recognises to satisfice also as an obsolete 
synonym for to satisfy.) 
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Simon, 1947/1997).7 Nonetheless, Rhenman extends his discussion on information 
processing to also cover the individual within the organisation. Moreover, the work of 
Norman (1971) describes how cognitive processes affect how individuals within the or-
ganisation obtain information about the environment, and how they perceive events 
within it (cf. Dean & Sharfman, 1993). In his subsequent work Norman (1975) argues 
that the misfit between the company‘s dominating ideas (cf. Bettis & Prahalad, 1995; 
Prahalad & Bettis, 1986) and its growth situation is the fundamental hurdle to company 
growth. 
Interestingly, Foss (2001) argues that in spite of the notion of bounded rationality hav-
ing become a fundamental proposition in modern organisation theory, it has not been 
extensively used in theorising in the economics of organisations. Indeed, argues Foss, 
bounded rationality is “not used in an essential way in the modern economics of organi-
zation” but as a “background assumption that is introduced to help explaining other, 
more central, insights and concepts” (2001: 1).  
Towards the Behavioural Theory of the Company 
Cyert and March (1963/1992) elaborate on the earlier contributions of Simon 
(1947/1997) and March and Simon (1958/1993), and formulate a behavioural theory of 
the company.8,9 Cyert and March’s theory is fundamentally based on the three variables 
of goals, expectations and choice, and on the four relational concepts of the quasi-
resolution of conflict, uncertainty avoidance, problemistic search and organisational 
learning. Cyert and March’s contribution to organisation theory is not so much in devel-
oping novel premises of organisational behaviour, but in leveraging the extant work10 in 
                                                 
7  It is important to note that Rhenman’s (1964/1967; Rhenman & Stymne, 1965) portrayal of the or-
ganisation has been quite significantly influenced by the works of Simon (1947/1997) as well as 
March and Simon (1958/1993), especially as regards the information processing aspects of organisa-
tions. This is no surprise, given that Rhenman, while studying in Carnegie in 1959-60, came in con-
tact with both Simon and March, among others. 
8  Cyert and March’s (1963/1992) theory of the company is conceptually similar to the theory put for-
ward by Coase (1937) and augmented by Williamson (1975; 1981; 1991; 1999), since both theories 
strive to explain what a business organisation (i.e., the company) is all about, and how it makes (eco-
nomic) decisions.  
However, as far as the substance of the theory is concerned, Cyert and March’s behavioural theory is 
substantively different from Coase’s transaction cost theory. Transaction cost theory is concerned 
mainly with market factors, thus treating the insides of the company largely as given. In contrast, 
Cyert and March’s behavioural approach is concerned with, as the designation already implies, with 
internal factors such as organisation structure and goals, expectations, and execution of choices. 
9  The reader is advised of the following distinction as regards the terminology employed. Both lines of 
research originating from Cyert and March as well as from Coase discuss theories of the firm, where 
the noun firm denotes any business organisation. This work, however, treats these theories as theories 
of the company, reserving the word firm to refer to actual business partnerships (Oxford English Dic-
tionary, 1989). 
10  Cyert and March build their work primarily on contributions by Simon (1947/1997) and March and 
Simon (1958/1993), which provide the overall theoretical foundations for their treatise. Furthermore, 
Cyert and March acknowledge that much of the development of their theory of the company has oc-
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an attempt to develop an “empirically relevant, process-oriented, general theory of eco-
nomic decision making by a business firm” (1963/1992: 3; emphasis provided). 
In the behavioural theory, organisational goals are seen as constraints imposed on the 
organisation through bargaining by organisational members. Even though they are stabi-
lised by internal processes, goals exhibit gradual change over time brought about by 
change with experience, aspiration level change as a function of organisation’s past 
goals, the organisation’s past performance and past performance of “peer” organisa-
tions. To evaluate options as part of decision making, individuals generally need to form 
expectations about likely outcomes. Expectations, then, are seen as the result of drawing 
inferences from available information, whereby both conscious and unconscious biases 
are introduced. Organisational choice takes place in response to a problem, uses stan-
dard operating rules, and involves identifying an option that is acceptable in respect to 
evoked goals (cf. March & Simon, 1958/1993).  
Conflict resolution has been thought to happen traditionally through payments as a way 
of inducing conformity to organisational goals (March & Simon, 1958/1993). Cyert and 
March, however, propose a different view of conflict resolution: Rather than trying to 
resolve all existing conflicts, “most organisations most of the time exist and thrive with 
considerable latent conflict of goals” (1963/1992: 164), implying that conflicts are only 
“quasi-resolved” in the company. Moreover, organisations avoid uncertainty by avoid-
ing decision situations that require anticipating future events and by arranging a negoti-
ated environment that reduces the need to anticipate future reactions of others in the en-
vironment.  
Search behaviour for acceptable options is assumed to be problemistic. This implies that 
search behaviour is triggered by a problem and is directed towards finding a solution to 
that particular problem. The search process is primarily simple-minded, taking place in 
the neighbourhood of the problem symptom and in the neighbourhood of the current 
options (cf. Lindblom, 1959). Finally, organisations learn over time: organisational 
goals and the aspirations associated with them change over time, as do also the rules for 
allocating organisational attention and for search behaviour. 
In summary, Cyert and March set aside the assumption of a single or unified decision 
maker, and, instead, develop a concept of a loose and shifting coalition that selects or-
ganisational goals. Moreover, Cyert and March emphasise the role of rules, procedures, 
and routines in response to external shocks. Many of these ideas were, at least in part, 
indeed foreshadowed by March and Simon (1958/1993), yet were not explicitly and 
thoroughly developed by them. Nonetheless, whereas March and Simon focussed 
largely on the individual decision maker and his limited capabilities, Cyert and March 
extend the notion of bounded rationality also to the organisational level. 
                                                                                                                                               
curred through articles in Administrative Science Quarterly, Management Science, American Eco-
nomic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics and Behavioral Science (Cyert & March, 1963/1992: 
x). 
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2.2.3 Social-Psychological Perspective 
Organisations and Enacted Environments 
In contrast to the Carnegie school (Cyert & March, 1963/1992; March & Simon, 
1958/1993; Simon, 1947/1997) that views organisations as decision making systems 
that guide the behaviours of members through decision premises and performance pro-
grammes, Weick’s model portrays organisations as “loosely coupled” systems. In these 
loosely coupled systems, individual participants have great latitude in interpreting and 
implementing directions.  
Weick (1969/1979) considers organising from a different vantage point by taking a so-
cial-psychological approach. In so doing, he discards the concepts of unilateral causa-
tion, independent and dependent variables, origins, and terminations, which he claims as 
endemic yet misguided. Weick substitutes linear causality with circular causality, im-
plying that if behaviour is embedded in causal circuits, then “whatever [people] do will 
come back to haunt and control [them]” (1969/1979: 87). Furthermore, deviation-
amplifying loops in cause maps (Eden et al., 1992) tend to reinforce minor deviations.11 
Weick portrays the processes involved in organising as resembling the processes associ-
ated with natural selection, thus giving an evolutionary account of organisations. The 
Weick model of “organising as natural selection” comprises four elements: (i) ecologi-
cal change, (ii) enactment, (iii) selection, and (iv) retention.12 In essence, according to 
                                                 
11  The concept of deviation-amplification has also been established in the economics discourse under 
the label positive feedback. In economics, positive feedbacks are the tendency for that which is ahead 
to get further ahead, and for that which loses advantage to lose further advantage. Positive feedbacks, 
put differently, reinforce that which gains success or aggravate that which suffers loss (Arthur, 1996).  
The notion of positive feedbacks (and resulting increasing returns) is in stark contrast to conventional 
economic theory that presupposes diminishing returns, implying a single equilibrium point for the 
economy, whereas positive feedbacks generate instability and multiple potential equilibrium points. 
Further, positive feedbacks are characterised by the accumulation of small, “random” events that 
eventually determine the outcome, non-linearity, and non-ergodicity (Arthur, 1994). Positive feed-
backs are idiosyncratic to knowledge-based industries, and are brought about by up-front costs, net-
work externalities and learning curve effects (Shapiro & Varian, 1999). 
12  The classical socio-cultural evolution model by Campbell (1970; 1972; 1974) consists of three proc-
esses of (i) variation, (ii) selection, and (iii) retention, thus closely resembling models of natural se-
lection. In Campbell’s model, socio-cultural variations can occur between social groups, between 
members in a single group, or across the different occasions when a single group acts.  
 In socio-cultural evolution, selection can take place by means of six different selective systems: (i) 
selective survival of complete social organisations, (ii) selective diffusion among groups, (iii) selec-
tive perpetuation of temporal variations, (iv) selective imitation of inter-individual variations, (v) se-
lective promotion to leadership roles, and (vi) rational selection. 
 Retention not only acts as a repository for interpretations that have been selected. In addition, the 
interpretations affect subsequent actions, are frequently edited, are protected in ways that may con-
flict with variation and selection, are coercive only to the degree that members are informed of their 
contents, and contain items that frequently are opposed to the self-interest of persons who must im-
plement these items. 
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Weick, organisational members create the environments that subsequently impose on 
them through enactment, select them by applying various categorisation schemes to re-
duce their equivocality, and store the product of successful sensemaking in the organisa-
tional memory. 
In the context outlined by Weick, meaningful environments are the outputs of organis-
ing rather than inputs to it. Environments are created by organisations out of “puzzling 
surroundings” (1969/1979: 132). Interestingly enough, Penrose, a decade earlier, fore-
bode the concept of Weick’s enacted environment: 
In the last analysis, the ‘environment’ rejects or confirms the soundness of the 
judgements about it, but the relevant environment is not an objective fact dis-
coverable before the event. (Penrose, 1959: 41; emphasis provided) 
Due to the reciprocity of ecological change and enactment in Weick’s organising model, 
organisational realities can be regarded as being of subjective origin. People invent 
rather than discover part of what they think they see. In practical terms, enactment im-
plies that organisations should be self-conscious about and reflect their actions, and, that 
organisations need to discover ways to partial out the effects of its own interventions 
from effects that would have happened anyway. 
Weick also introduces a novel research approach to organisations, as he disregards the 
realist epistemology of the Carnegie school. In contrast, Weick’s account is decidedly 
constructivist in nature, given that it stems from social psychological discourse. More-
over, whereas the Carnegie school contributions can be regarded as prescriptive, 
Weick’s musings can be described as more descriptive in nature. 
In addition to a new philosophical perspective, Weick significantly advances the theory 
on organisational information processing. Rather than directed at problem-solving or 
decision making, organisational information processing is directed at reducing the 
equivocality of information about the external environment. This view proposed by 
Weick (1969/1979) is subsequently elaborated on by Daft and Weick (1984), who in-
troduce a model of organisations as interpretation systems. 
Organisations as Interpretation Systems 
One of the early references to organisations as interpretive systems was made by Burns 
and Stalker (1961/1968). In their discussion on management of innovation, Burns and 
Stalker describe companies they studied not only as “receiving” and “acting on” in-
formation, but as well “altering, rearranging, or recomposing information” 
(1961/1968: 78). They even introduce the notion of organisations as “interpretive sys-
tems”. 
Ansoff (1965b) and Ansoff and Brandenburg (1969) provided a rather similar account a 
few years later than that of Burns and Stalker’s. While predicting the characteristics of 
the corporation towards the end of the 20th century, they underline the new competence 
base for general managers necessitated by the changing business environment. In doing 
so, they draw implications for the management of the corporation, and portray the gen-
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eral manager of the future as one “whose skills are in perceiving and interpreting the 
broader environment” (Ansoff & Brandenburg, 1969: 66; emphasis provided).  
Daft and Weick argue that interpretation is a central function of both individuals and 
organisations: “People are trying to interpret what they have done, define what they 
have learned, solve the problem of what they should do next. Building up interpretations 
about the environment is a basic requirement of individuals and organizations. (---) In-
terpretation is a critical element that distinguishes human organizations from lower 
level systems.” (1984: 284-5). Hence, organisations can be conceptualised as interpreta-
tion systems that act as highly specialised information receptors interacting with the en-
vironment. 
Daft and Weick’s model of organisations as interpretation systems rests on four assump-
tions. First, organisations are assumed to be open social systems that process informa-
tion from the environment (cf. Weick, 1969/1979). Second, organisational interpretation 
is “something more than what occurs by individuals” (1984: 285), although it takes 
place by means of individual interpretation (cf. Bougon et al., 1977; Cyert & March, 
1963/1992; Weick, 1969/1979). Third, only a limited group of “strategic-level” manag-
ers formulate the organisation’s interpretation (Aguilar, 1967). Fourth, systematic dif-
ferences exist between companies in the ways that they interpret the environment.13  
Daft and Weick define interpretation as the “process of translating events and develop-
ing shared understanding and conceptual schemas among members of upper manage-
ment” (1984: 286). Resembling Weick’s (1969/1979) enactment-selection-retention 
model, Daft and Weick propose a model comprising (i) scanning (data collection), (ii) 
interpretation (data given meaning), and (iii) learning (action taken). Feedback from or-
ganisational action may provide new collective insights for coalition members, and thus 
influence future scanning-interpretation-learning cycles. 
Against this background, organisational differences in interpretation can be seen as 
stemming from (i) management’s beliefs about the extent to which the external envi-
ronment can be analysed (Daft & Macintosh, 1981) and (ii) the extent to which the or-
ganisation intrudes into the environment to understand it. According to Daft and Weick, 
four categories to characterise various interpretation modes of organisations can be de-
rived: (i) enacting, (ii) discovering, (iii) conditioned viewing, and (iv) undirected view-
ing. 
Walsh and Fahey (1986), however, criticise the theories based on the information proc-
essing perspective from social-psychology (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 
1969/1979) as being one-sided. Hence, they introduce the political perspective (e.g., 
Burns, 1961; Narayanan & Fahey, 1982; Pettigrew, 1977) into the discussion, and arrive 
at the concept of negotiated belief structures. They are the juxtaposition of beliefs and 
                                                 
13  The ontological assumption underpinning Daft and Weick’s organisational interpretation model is 
that issues exist separate from organisations and the epistemological assumption is that organisations 
interpret those issues (Bansal, 2003). 
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self-interests of organisational participants, representing the configuration of power and 
beliefs establishing the decision premise within the strategy making group (cf. Lang-
field-Smith, 1992). 
Extending Daft and Weick’s (1984) discourse, Daft and Lengel (1986) present a model 
that ties together organisational information processing requirements and the structural 
mechanisms that fulfil them. Essentially, Daft and Lengel argue that the former is af-
fected by uncertainty and equivocality, whereas the latter depends on meetings, integra-
tors, planning and the likes. 
Organisational Sensemaking 
Weick’s (1995) contribution continues the work initiated by his earlier (1969/1979) 
book. At the heart of Weick’s conceptualisation of sensemaking are ethno-methodology 
(Garfinkel, 1967) and cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957). Garfinkel’s contri-
bution emphasises the role of retrospective accounts of decisions, whereas Festinger’s 
theory emphasises post-decisional efforts to revise meanings of decisions. Even though 
both of these already underpinned Weick’s earlier, yet somewhat cursory, treatise on 
sensemaking, it is really in his later contribution that he develops the concept of sense-
making further. 
The concept of sensemaking literally refers to the making of sense, that is, to creating or 
constructing meanings (Oxford English Dictionary, 1989). Stated more elaborately, sen-
semaking is about “placement of items into frameworks, comprehending, redressing 
surprise, constructing meaning, interacting in pursuit of mutual understanding, and pat-
terning” (Weick, 1995: 6). When seen in this way, sensemaking is creation as much as 
it is discovery, and it is grounded in both individual and social activity.  
Weick stresses that sensemaking is a social process, occurring in an organisation char-
acterised by “a network of intersubjectively shared meanings that are sustained through 
the development and use of a common language and everyday social interactions” 
(Walsh & Ungson, 1991: 60). As one’s conduct is contingent on the conduct of others 
(be they imagined or physically present), social processes constantly shape interpreta-
tions and interpreting. Moreover, according to Weick, sensemaking is based on identity 
construction, is retrospective, enactive (cf. Weick, 1969/1979), ongoing, reliant on ex-
tracted cues, and driven by plausibility rather than accuracy. 
Sensemaking commonly takes place under conditions of ambiguity or uncertainty.14 
Ambiguity refers to an ongoing stream that supports different interpretations at the same 
time, caused by literary ambiguity (Levine, 1985), or high complexity, paradoxicalness 
                                                 
14  Weick emphasises the distinction between ambiguity and equivocality. Writes Weick: “I think it is 
important to retain the word equivocal because it explicitly points to the presence of two or more in-
terpretations as a trigger to sensemaking. Although ambiguity also means the presence of two or 
more interpretations, it can also mean something quite different, namely, a lack of clarity, which (---) 
makes it quite similar to uncertainty” (1995: 95; original emphases). 
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or lack of clarity (Martin, 1992). Uncertainty is about “an individual’s perceived inabil-
ity to predict something accurately” (Milliken, 1987: 136). 
Sense is made in language, from language, and by using language, because meaning and 
communication are inherently linked to the use of language. For Weick, the substance 
of sensemaking are ideologies (Meyer, 1982; Trice & Beyer, 1993), third-order con-
trols,15 paradigms (Martin & Meyerson, 1998), theories of action, traditions, and stories. 
Similarly, as Wittgenstein (1951) points out, the meaning of a concept is its use in lan-
guage, and language is used in social contexts. 
At least four ways exist for people to impose frames on ongoing flows and link frames 
with cues in the interest of meaning. On the belief-driven side, sensemaking can take the 
form of arguing and expecting, whereas on the action-driven side, sensemaking can take 
the form of committing or manipulating. Processes of arguing, expecting, committing, 
and manipulating develop generic subjectivity.  
Weick’s (1969/1979; esp. 1995) notion of sensemaking may be construed somewhat too 
narrowly, however. First, according to Weick, sensemaking is a purely conscious, con-
trolled process, in which automatic, unconscious cognitive processes are relegated to the 
margins. For ambiguous situations involving novelty, surprise and unprecedented ex-
perience, sensemaking is quite understandably a conscious effort. However, much of 
organisational life is filled with situations that are quite the opposite, that is, neither 
novel nor surprising. These common situations do, however, require sensemaking, 
which is likely to take place in an unconscious manner in the background (Daft & 
Weick, 1984; cf. Dutton, 1993; Ocasio, 1997). If one were to take Weick’s point to the 
letter, routine organisational life would be devoid of any meaning whatsoever! 
Second, Weick views sensemaking as purely retrospective by implicitly dismissing for-
ward-looking prospective sensemaking. Instead, for Weick, all sensemaking processes 
are involved with some variation of retrospection, either real or artificially imposed. The 
latter takes place in what Weick calls “future perfect thinking” – imagining that future 
events have already occurred, and then infusing this “elapsed” experience with mean-
ing. Gioia and Mehra underline this point by noting that organisational experience in-
volves making sense of the past, but “it also involves speculating on possible futures” 
(1996: 1229). 
2.2.4 Attention-Based View of the Company 
Organisations as Distributed Systems of Attention 
Everyone knows what attention is. It is the taking possession by the mind, in 
clear and vivid form, of one out of what seem several simultaneously possible 
                                                 
15  Third-order controls are assumptions and definitions that are taken by people as given, and, hence, 
provide control in organisations. In addition to third-order control, Perrow (1986) identifies two other 
forms of control: first-order control by direct supervision and second-order control by programmes 
and routines. 
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objects or trains of thought. Focalization, concentration, of consciousness are of 
its essence. It implies withdrawal from some things in order to deal effectively 
with others, and is a condition which has a real opposite in the confused, dazed, 
scatterbrained state which in French is called distraction, and Zerstreutheit in 
German. (James, 1890/1907: 403-4) 
Ocasio (1997) discusses organisations as systems of structurally distributed attention in 
which the cognition and action of individuals are not predictable from the knowledge of 
individual characteristics. Rather, they are derived from the specific organisational con-
text and situations that individual decision makers find themselves in (cf. Denison et al., 
1996). Ocasio essentially links structure and cognition, and facilitates the convergence 
of the research stream of satisficing and bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 
1963/1992; March & Simon, 1958/1993; Simon, 1947/1997) with that of loose coupling 
and enacted environments (Weick, 1969/1979, 1995). 
Ocasio defines attention to encompass “the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and focus-
ing of time and effort by organizational decision makers on both issues (---) and an-
swers” (1997: 189).16 Ocasio’s definition can be seen as extending James’s (1890/1907) 
definition from the individual into the organisational context. Nonetheless, it is not Oca-
sio who brought the notion of organisational attention into the discourse of decision 
making. In fact, already Simon in his seminal work underscores that attentional proc-
esses guide organisational decision making: 
Organizations and institutions provide the general stimuli and attention-
directors that channelize the behaviors of the members of the group, and that 
provide the members with the intermediate objectives that stimulate actions. 
(Simon, 1947/1997: 110) 
However, Ocasio modifies and extends Simon’s original formulation by treating atten-
tional processing explicitly as a multilevel process shaped by individuals, organisations, 
and the environment. The key characteristic of Ocasio’s systems view of organisations 
is the relationship between individual and organisational information processing. This 
contrasts to the earlier perspectives of organisational cognition that emphasise the 
shared cognitions of organisational members or its top management team.17 For exam-
ple, Lyles and Schwenk (1992) proposed a model where organisational knowledge 
structures develop and shape the strategic actions of the company, and where the 
knowledge structures are updated based on experiences of current actions. However, the 
model of Lyles and Schwenk emphasises the role of top management in the process.  
                                                 
16  Ocasio (1997: 189) defines issues as the “available repertoire of categories for making sense of the 
environment: problems, opportunities, and threats” and answers as the “available repertoire of ac-
tion alternatives: proposals, routines, projects, programs, and procedures”. 
17  Bougon (1992) makes a valid point by drawing a distinction between aggregate and congregate cog-
nitive maps. Whereas the former are no more than the combination of individual maps, the latter re-
flect the shared social constructs between the individuals. 
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Ocasio’s model comprises three interrelated meta-theoretical premises for information 
processing that underlie the perspective on how companies distribute and regulate the 
attention of its decision makers. First, at the level of individual cognition, the principle 
of focus of attention links attentional processing to individual cognition and behaviour. 
Second, at the level of social cognition, the principle of situated attention highlights the 
importance of the situational context in explaining what decision makers attend to. 
Third, at the organisational level, the principle of structural distribution of attention ex-
plains how the company’s economic and social structures regulate and channel issues, 
answers, and decision makers into the activities, communications, and procedures that 
constitute the situational context of decision making. 
The principle of focus of attention indicates, first, that decision makers will be selective 
in the issues and answers they attend to at any given time, and, second, that what deci-
sion makers do depends on what issues and answers they focus their attention on. At the 
level of individual cognition, attentional processes focus the energy, effort, and mind-
fulness of organisational decision makers on a limited set of elements that enter into 
consciousness at any given time. Hence, focussed attention facilitates perception and 
action towards those issues and activities being attended to, as well as inhibits percep-
tion and action towards those that are not. 
At the individual level, two modes of processing can be distinguished: controlled and 
automatic processing. In the latter, actions are routinised and habitual. In the former, the 
action of decision makers is triggered by those issues and answers they are mindful of. 
However, given their selective focus of attention, decision makers are limited in the 
number of issues and answers they can attend to in any particular situation. 
The principle of situated attention indicates that what decision makers focus on and 
what they do depends on the particular context they are located in. The focus of atten-
tion of individual decision makers is triggered by the characteristics of the situations 
they confront. Consequently, individual decision makers vary their focus of attention 
depending on the situational context. The principle of situated attention operates at the 
level of social cognition. Furthermore, it provides a link between how individuals think 
and decide in a given situation, and how the organisation and its environment shape the 
situations that individuals find themselves in.  
The principle of structural distribution of attention indicates that the particular context 
decision makers find themselves in and how they attend to it depends on how the or-
ganisation distributes and controls the allocation of issues, answers, and decision mak-
ers. According to Ocasio, attentional processes of individual and group decision makers 
are distributed throughout the multiple functions that take place in organisations, with 
different foci of attention in each local procedure, communication, or activity (cf. 
Simon, 1947/1997). 
Model of Situated Attention and Company Behaviour 
Figure 2.1 presents Ocasio’s model of situated attention and company behaviour. Ac-
cording to Ocasio, the model is “not a full-fledged theory of [company] behavior, but a 
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set of constructs and a set of mechanisms (---) that outline how attentional processing at 
the individual, social cognitive, and organizational levels interact to shape [company] 
behavior” (1997: 192). 
Issues and 
answers
Attention 
structures
Procedural and 
communication 
channels
Decision-
makers
Organisational 
moves
Environment of 
decision
 
Figure 2.1 Model of situated attention and company behaviour in the attention-based view 
(Ocasio, 1997) 
The environment of decision consists of the multiple material, social, and cultural fac-
tors, both internal and external to the company, that impinge upon the environment of 
decision and provide a set of stimuli for decision making (cf. Weick, 1969/1979). Also, 
cultural and institutional processes at varying levels of the environment provide deci-
sion makers with a repertoire of issues and answers from which to construct actions. 
Moreover, the company’s rules, resources, and social relationships are embedded in, 
and shaped by, its economic, social, and institutional environment. 
Issues and answers are the cultural and cognitive repertoire of schemata available to de-
cision makers in the company to make sense of, and to respond to, environmental stim-
uli (i.e., issues and answers, respectively). Issues and answers are embodied in the cul-
tural products and artefacts used to construct the company’s activities and communica-
tions (cf. Weick, 1995).  
Procedural and communication channels are the formal and informal concrete activities, 
interactions, and communications set up by the company to induce organisational deci-
sion makers to act on a selected set of issues. This is the situational context in which 
attention and action takes place. By focussing the attention of decision makers, proce-
dural and communication channels serve a significant function in allocating attention 
and serving as conduits for processing of issues and answers. The procedural and com-
munication channels have an impact on when, whether, and how decision makers focus 
their attention, and how the attention of various decision makers interacts within the 
channel. Put differently, the spatial, temporal, and procedural dimensions of the com-
pany’s communication and procedural channels affect the availability and saliency of 
issues and answers that decision makers will attend to. 
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Attention structures are the social, economic, and cultural structures that govern the al-
location of time, effort, and attentional focus of organisational decision makers in their 
decision making activities. Attention structures exist in four forms: (i) rules of the game 
(i.e., formal and informal principles of action, interaction, and interpretation), (ii) play-
ers, (iii) structural positions (i.e., roles and social identifications that specify the func-
tions and orientations of decision makers and their interrelationships with other struc-
tural positions internal and external to the company), and (iv) resources (i.e. human, 
physical, technological, and financial capital available). 
Attention structures work through three separate mechanisms. First, they govern the 
valuation and legitimisation of the repertoire of issues and answers available to decision 
makers. These values are not uniform throughout the company (cf. Cyert & March, 
1963/1992; March & Simon, 1958/1993; Simon, 1947/1997), but are differentiated ac-
cording to the division of labour inherent in the company’s rules, positions, players, and 
resources. Second, attention structures channel and distribute the decision making ac-
tivities of the company into a set of procedural and communication channels. Third, 
they provide decision makers with a structured system of interests and identities to mo-
tivate their action and to structure their decision premises. Child and Smith (1987), for 
example, show an instructive case of attention structures influencing organisational 
transformation.  
Decision makers are the concrete individuals who jointly participate, within any specific 
procedural and communication channel, in the enactment of the environment and the 
social construction of organisational moves (cf. Weick, 1969/1979). Decision making, 
then, will be the product of interactions amongst participants in the company’s proce-
dural and communication channels. The structuring of participation is, in turn, condi-
tional on the time, energy, interests, and identities of organisational decision makers, 
and on the demands placed on decision makers by other channels. Moreover, decision 
makers will enact the environment of decisions (cf. Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 
1969/1979; Weick, 1995) by focussing their attention on a limited number of issues and 
answers. This attentional focus is shaped by the characteristics of the situation as well as 
by the structural determinant of attention. 
Organisational moves are the myriad of actions undertaken by the company and its de-
cision makers in response to, or in anticipation of, changes in its external and internal 
environment. Further, organisational moves include both the plans for actions implied in 
an organisational decision and the actions themselves. Moves are not necessarily, how-
ever, implemented or lead to strategic change.  
Decision makers will select among a choice of organisational moves depending on 
which issues and answers they attend to. The attention to issues and answers results 
both from a passive response to environmental stimuli and preparatory attention and ef-
fort, and will vary depending on the procedural and communication channel where deci-
sion making is situated. Finally, organisational moves, once enacted, become part of the 
company’s environment of decision and are inputs to the construction of subsequent or-
ganisational moves. 
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2.3 Strategic Issue Management 
The following presents different strands and aspects of the strategic issue management 
literature, and provides an understanding of how individual strategic issues are proc-
essed in various stages of the strategic issue management process. Strategic issues are 
often addressed under considerable ambiguity, where almost nothing is given or easily 
determined. Hence, strategic decision processes usually begin with little understanding 
of the decision situation or the route to its solution, and only a vague idea about the so-
lution and its eventual evaluation (Mintzberg et al., 1976).  
The discussion looks at the different phases of the strategic issue management process 
as outlined in Figure 1.2. Notwithstanding the linear description of the process, the 
process is not likely to progress in a perfectly linear or undisturbed manner. (Mintzberg 
et al., 1976). Rather, dynamic factors brought about by environmental forces (e.g., inter-
ruptions), by a decision maker (e.g., scheduling delays, timing delays, and speedups), 
and by factors inherent in the decision process itself (e.g., feedback delays, comprehen-
sion cycles, and failure recycles) (e.g., Ocasio, 1997; Walsh, 1995; Weick, 1995). 
Much of the discourse follows the research of Jane Dutton and her colleagues, who have 
focussed on creating an understanding of the cognitive basis of strategic issue interpre-
tation in the organisational context. This research has advanced the area significantly. In 
the following section, this research has been augmented substantially with other re-
search findings.  
2.3.1 Scanning, Undirected Research and Problem Recognition 
The scanning, undirected research and problem recognition phase of the strategic issue 
management process can be described as the activity of acquiring information “about 
events and relationships in a company’s outside environment, the knowledge of which 
would assist top management in its task of charting the company’s future course of ac-
tion” (Aguilar, 1967: 1). Scanning does not need to be directed only to the external en-
vironment, though: potential strategic issues can equally be endogenous or exogenous to 
the company (Ansoff, 1980).  
The role of this phase of strategic issue management in companies has also been duly 
emphasised in the literature as having the potential to substantially influence the success 
or demise of businesses. For example, note Kiesler and Sproull: “A crucial component 
of managerial behavior in rapidly changing environments is problem sensing, the cog-
nitive processes of noticing and constructing meaning about environmental change so 
that organizations can take action” (1982: 548).18 However, Hambrick (1982) for ex-
ample, argues that scanning itself is no basis for competitive advantage, but success fol-
lows from the propensity and ability to act upon certain environmental information. In-
terestingly, then, organisations with a history of good performance are more proactive in 
                                                 
18  One should note, however, that the comment of Kiesler and Sproull (1982) extends also to the issue 
analysis phase, rather than discussing merely scanning. 
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their scanning behaviour, implying that organisational slack allows the better-
performing companies to devote more resources to scanning (Lant et al., 1992). None-
theless, it has been argued that despite its relevance, scanning has been poorly inte-
grated into planning in practical business organisations (Fahey & King, 1977).  
Attentional Underpinnings 
Individuals need to use existing interpretive schemes or to formulate new ones to trans-
form input data into information. Cognitive maps (Cossette & Audet, 1992; Eden, 
1992a; Fiol & Huff, 1992) provide an interpretive lens that selects certain aspects of a 
strategic issue as being important, ignores others, and links them to certain actions and 
consequences. Scanning can be seen as a probabilistic process of matching current per-
ceptions to stored schemas (Jackson & Dutton, 1988). Identification of the specific in-
stance, then, depends upon the degree of overlap between the strategic issue characteris-
tics associated with the schema, and the salient characteristics of the specific instance 
(Tversky, 1977). In addition to cognitive factors, political activities influence these 
processes and outputs, determining the participants’ degree of interest and stakes. Stra-
tegic issue –specific factors also have an influence: the strategic issue context acts as the 
arena in which individuals’ cognitive maps and political interests come to life, serving 
to motivate participants in different directions (Dutton et al., 1983; Dutton et al., 1989). 
The process of scanning depends both on individuals’ perceptions as well as on organ-
isational activities influencing organisational perception. On the individual level, the 
process of perceptual selection determines to which strategic issues in their environment 
top-level decision makers will devote their scarce cognitive processing capabilities 
(Dutton, 1986b). On the organisational level, various characteristics of the strategic 
planning process systematically influence characteristics of the strategic issues that de-
cision makers attend to (Dutton, 1988; Dutton & Duncan, 1987b). Each organisation has 
a unique collection of strategic issues that they isolate and explicate for further study. 
The collection of strategic issues can be described along the dimensions of array size 
(number of strategic issues), array variety (diversity of strategic issues at one time), ar-
ray turnover (frequency of strategic issue replacement), and strategic issue scope. 
Furthermore, planning and control systems beyond just the strategic issue array can be 
used to channel attention allocation in the organisation. Simons (1991; 1994) demon-
strates how control systems can be used as instruments to direct the attentional proc-
esses in the organisation. Simons considers these systems as instrumental in advancing 
the organisational agendas. Overall, both the individual perspective, as well as the or-
ganisational perspective, appear to be quite in congruence with Ocasio’s (1997) atten-
tion-based view. 
Scanning Modes 
Scanning can be executed in organisations by employing multiple modes. The choice of 
scanning mode is made by using a collection of scanning rules pertaining to, for exam-
ple, how information can be acquired and what the strategic issue characteristics are 
(Aguilar, 1967). As long as the “right” information is being acquired, scanning behav-
iour remains unchanged. However, if scanning fails, change rules dictate changes to the 
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(i) scanning rules and (ii) scanning procedures followed under each mode. This corre-
sponds with earlier accounts on organisational search (Cyert & March, 1963/1992; 
March & Simon, 1958/1993) that emphasise the role of routines which guide search be-
haviour.19  
The choice of scanning mode is made based on managerial perceptions about the or-
ganisation’s position in the environment. For example, Daft and Weick (1984) posit that 
the less the perceived external environment can be analysed, the greater the tendency for 
managers to use external information gained from personal contact with other managers 
(cf. Geletkanycz & Hambrick, 1997). Further, in environments difficult or impossible to 
analyse, data acquisition will be irregular and casual. Similarly, as Milliken (1987: 139) 
notes, “[i]t is likely that organizational administrators who are uncertain about the 
state of their environment will spend a greater amount of time and resources on envi-
ronmental scanning and forecasting than administrators who are more confident that 
they understand their environment”.   
Environmental characteristics have empirically been found to influence scanning behav-
iour in organisations, in particular in terms of frequency and mode of scanning. This 
implies that executives can tailor their scanning practices to perceived environmental 
uncertainty (Daft et al., 1988; Garg et al., 2003). However, the influence of perceived 
environmental factors may not be universal, but may vary depending on the cultural 
background, as May et al. (2000) and Elenkov (1997) suggest, based on their respective 
studies in transitional Eastern European economies. One explanation to the discrepan-
cies described may lie in cultural variations (cf. Sallivan & Nonaka, 1988; Schneider & 
de Meyer, 1991, on the influence of cultural factors in strategic issue analysis). 
Scanning modes can be classified as either retrospective or prospective (Fahey & Nara-
yanan, 1986).20 In the retrospective mode, strategic issues come to the attention of the 
organisation only when they are already mature. This approach to scanning is largely 
reactive and ad hoc in nature, building on irregular studies into the environment. Alter-
natively, the process can be quite regular, systematic and issue-oriented, but by building 
on current state analyses and its extrapolation, it remains largely retrospective (Fahey & 
King, 1977).  
Prospective scanning aims at identifying strategic issues when they still are inchoate, 
thus giving the organisation pre-warnings about potential strategic issues. It often rests 
on continuous monitoring of various environmental systems rather than specific events. 
The key characteristic of the continuous model is that scanning is organisationally struc-
tured. In other words, the responsibility for scanning is clearly allocated, channels for 
information sharing are established, and an explicit linkage between scanning and plan-
                                                 
19  However, these earlier accounts make no distinction between the diverse modes of scanning, as 
Aguilar’s contribution does. 
20  Fahey and Narayanan’s (1986) prospective and retrospective scanning seems to be closely related to 
Daft and Weick’s (1984) concept of organisational intrusiveness, which describes how actively the 
organisation performs searches in its environment. 
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ning has been created. In this model, scanning supports the “variety of choices inherent 
in strategic planning” (Fahey & King, 1977: 63), rather than supporting specific 
choices per se.  
2.3.2 Directed Research and Gaining Understanding 
Following the scanning phase, this stage of the process refers to the phase in which stra-
tegic issues are recognised and isolated for further consideration (Mintzberg et al., 
1976). Interpreting strategic issues is not entirely straightforward, for, as Dutton and 
Duncan (1987a: 280) express it, “[s]trategic issues do not activate decision makers’ 
attention in packaged form”, but rather need to be made sense of before they can be 
acted upon. 
However, in limited capacity models of information processing (Lord & Maher, 1990), 
individuals have scant information processing capabilities, and, thus tend to simplify 
their information processing and generate adequate, yet suboptimal, behaviour (cf. 
Cyert & March, 1963/1992; Ocasio, 1997; Weick, 1969/1979, 1995). Indeed, top man-
agers “selectively ignore certain [strategic] issues while focusing attention on others” 
(Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994: 733). Consequently not all strategic issues receive the 
attention of managers. Furthermore, the meaning of a strategic issue depends on the 
knowledge structures and categories that are employed in describing it. 
On the organisational level, as Dutton and Ashford (1993: 397) note, “[n]o issue is in-
herently strategic. Rather, an issue becomes strategic when top management believes 
that it has relevance for organizational performance”. Therefore, the managerial sen-
semaking process (Weick, 1995) shapes the set of issues that top management see as 
being strategic (cf. Ocasio, 1997). Put differently, the process is one of social construc-
tion (cf. Weick, 1995), in which contextual influences shape the outcomes of the inter-
pretation process. Interpretation can be defined as the process “of translating (---) 
events, of developing models for understanding, of bringing out meaning, and of assem-
bling conceptual schemes among key managers” (Daft & Weick, 1984: 286).  
Strategic Issue Categorisation 
The framing of strategic issues shapes and directs subsequent strategic issue –relevant 
activity. Dutton and Jackson (1987), for example, suggest that the categorisation of stra-
tegic issues and subsequent actions are related. Specifically, they propose that managers 
most frequently use two main categories of threat and opportunity for labelling strategic 
issues, each of which has its own distinctive characteristics and subsequent implica-
tions. Opportunities typically refer to positive situations, in which gain is likely and 
which one can (at least to a certain extent) control. In contrast, threats carry a negative 
connotation, being associated with negative situations, in which loss is likely and over 
which one has relatively little control. Dutton and Jackson (1987: 85) argue that “[t]he 
simple labeling of [strategic] issues not only determines decision makers’ affective re-
sponses to [strategic] issues, but also it sets into place predictable, cognitive, and moti-
vational processes that move decisions and organizations in predictable directions”. 
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These hypotheses of Dutton and Jackson (1987) were subsequently validated by Jack-
son and Dutton (1988) in their empirical study of opportunity-threat labelling. The study 
not only confirmed that categorisation influences organisational actions, but it also re-
vealed the presence of a threat bias. This implies that individuals are more sensitive to 
threat-consistent information, and consequently identify strategic issues more easily as 
threats than as opportunities. In a similar way, strategic issues perceived (and conse-
quently labelled) as crisis and non-crisis issues are processed differently in organisa-
tions (George et al., 2006; Sharma, 2000). Strategic issues perceived as crises are likely 
to be allocated more resources and handled under increased centralisation of authority, 
coupled with more argumentation or explanation (Dutton, 1986a). In particular, threats 
seem to have the main and moderating effects on organisational action, whereas oppor-
tunities do not (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001), although crises may help to reframe the 
negotiated order of belief structures about creativity (Drazin et al., 1999). 
Dutton and Jackson proposed that individual and organisational factors influence strate-
gic issue diagnosis (Dutton, 1986a; Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988). 
Providing further evidence to the hypotheses and results of Dutton and Jackson, Thomas 
and McDaniel (1990) demonstrate that both strategy and information processing struc-
tures are related to how managers label strategic situations and the range of variables 
they consider in their interpretation efforts. Similarly, Jackson (1992) suggests that the 
composition of the top management team which processes strategic issues has conse-
quences to the interpersonal dynamics, and hence also the strategic issue processing per 
se. In addition, categorisation and attribution processes play a complementary in inter-
preting strategic issues (Gooding & Kinichi, 1995). 
However, some research suggests that cognitive biases could, at least partially, be re-
duced in strategic issue processing. First, certain personality types appear to exhibit pre-
dispositions to certain cognitive biases in decision making (Haley & Stumpf, 1989). Al-
ready a simple acknowledgement of these biases can help in avoiding being debilitated 
in decision making. Second, by increasing the number of interpretations in the process, 
the validity of interpretations made should increase: To this end, Rindova (1999) pro-
poses that by including non-executive directors of the board into the process, the variety 
of interpretations is increased, internal biases are reduced, and the representativeness of 
perspectives and interests on which corporate strategies are based is broadened.21  
Interpretation Process 
Making sense of the strategic issue can be seen as starting from triggering (Dutton & 
Duncan, 1987a). Triggering is pivotal for subsequent strategic issue diagnosis activity, 
as it serves to focus attention upon a strategic issue that demands further scrutiny. Trig-
gering can be seen to involve an “action threshold” that represents the magnitude of 
                                                 
21  Traditional research on corporate governance has viewed the contribution of corporate boards to 
strategy-making as limited, with governance research retaining a rather narrow research focus 
(Pettigrew, 1992b). For example, the influential agency theory has tended to view boards as a mecha-
nism for monitoring the managers on behalf of the investors (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Fama & Jensen, 
1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
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stimuli that triggers subsequent action (Mintzberg et al., 1976). It is important to note 
that the system that generates a strategic issue may be formal or informal. In general, a 
perceived performance gap, be it real or imagined, can often serve as a trigger, as can 
various stakeholder demands (cf. Dutton, 1983). 
After the diagnosis has been activated by some kind of triggering mechanism, decision 
makers engage in attempts to assess the urgency and feasibility of the strategic issue 
(Dutton & Duncan, 1987a). Strategic issue urgency indicates the perceived cost of not 
taking action with respect to a strategic issue (Miller, 1982). Urgency, hence, captures 
the perceived importance of taking action on a strategic issue. The urgency of a strategic 
issue derives from a number of salient dimensions of the issue, including time pressures 
arising from deadlines, the visibility of the issue to important internal and external con-
stituents, and how responsible management believes it is for the issue’s occurrence (at-
tribution of responsibility).  
Strategic issue feasibility involves making gross judgements about the possibility of re-
solving it. These judgements systematically affect how a strategic issue is interpreted. 
Two dimensions are particularly important in forming an assessment of strategic issue 
feasibility: perceived strategic issue understanding and perceived strategic issue capabil-
ity. Strategic issue understanding refers to the perception that decision makers could 
identify the means for resolving the strategic issue, whereas strategic issue capability 
describes the perception that the means for resolving the strategic issue are available 
and accessible. Depending on the relative scores on these two dimensions, the decision 
maker may feel, according to Dutton and Duncan, anything from being powerless to 
being propelled. The significance of the interpretation of strategic issue feasibility is 
that it affects the definition of a strategic issue and the adaptive responses of the organi-
sation.  
The diagnosis process is recursive in nature, meaning that the judgements will be re-
vised a number of times over the course of the diagnosis (Dutton et al., 1983). These 
revisions are likely to be intermittently divergent and convergent, reflecting the fluidity 
of participants and data available. It is precisely the influx of data and participants that 
stimulates the revision of judgements. Further, the process is likely to be characterised 
by retroductivity, that is, the coexistence and interplay of deductive and inductive think-
ing. On the collective level, diagnosis outputs emerge from the interaction of multiple 
organisational actors with differing cognitive maps, political interests, and strategic is-
sue –related data (cf. Weick, 1995). The process is analogous to an array of recursive 
procedures cyclically calling on each other, yet rarely having a single highest level (i.e., 
“heterarchy” as described by Dutton et al.).  
The processes involved in the interpretation are not ends in themselves; they result in 
specifiable outputs. Dutton et al. (1983) identify four types of strategic issue –specific 
outputs, three of which are instrumental, whereas the fourth one is symbolic in nature – 
these outputs occur at both the individual and collective levels. On the content-related 
side of outputs, due to data insufficiency and ambiguity, and absence of interpretive 
schemes, a number of assumptions are typically formed during strategic issue diagnosis. 
These assumptions may be implicitly or explicitly formed, yet regardless of their forma-
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tion, they can affect the range of options considered and developed through their impact 
on information collection and interpretation. Furthermore, in the course of strategic is-
sue resolution, individuals generate understandings that relate various events or con-
cepts together in a causal manner. These cause-effect understandings allows participants 
to impose a logic for understanding a strategic issue and a logic for resolving it if neces-
sary, in effect framing a strategic issue in a particular way, thus affecting subsequent 
interpretations and actions (cf. Gilbert, 2006; Kaplan, 2004, 2008; Kaplan et al., 2003; 
Weick, 1969/1979, 1995). Assumptions and cause-effect understandings are then crys-
tallised into predictive judgements that involve assessments about future events sur-
rounding a strategic issue. The occurrence of divergent predictive judgements may at 
least partly account for the heterarchic nature of the diagnosis process. Finally, on the 
symbolic side, the output of the diagnosis process is language and labels that reflect the 
understanding of a strategic issue from the perspective of the process participants, as 
well as serve to communicate understanding to the rest of the organisation. Conse-
quently, the labelling of a strategic issue is likely to affect subsequent considerations by 
influencing involvement, commitment, divergent or convergent thinking, and risk-
taking behaviour.  
Most of the accounts (e.g., Dutton & Duncan, 1987a; Dutton et al., 1983) of strategic 
issue interpretation presuppose that managers “actively try to make sense of [events]” 
(Daft & Weick, 1984: 286). Put differently, they assume that diagnostic processes oper-
ating in organisations involve the active, conscious, and intentional efforts of decision 
makers. However, this does not necessarily need to be the case: an automatic mode of 
interpretation could, in fact, be the dominant form (Dutton, 1993). 
Contextual Influences on Strategic Issue Interpretation 
As with scanning behaviour, factors both endogenous and exogenous to the organisation 
influence the interpretation process. Organisational characteristics have a significant and 
systematic effect on the interpretation process (Daft & Weick, 1984). Specifically, or-
ganisational beliefs shape strategic issue interpretation (cf. Chattopadhyay et al., 1999; 
Cyert & March, 1963/1992; March & Simon, 1958/1993; Ocasio, 1997; Simon, 
1947/1997; Weick, 1969/1979, 1995). Dutton and Duncan (1987a) propose that the 
more differentiated the organisational belief structure (cf. Abrahamson & Fombrun, 
1994) is in terms of degree of consensus and complexity, the more frequently strategic 
issue diagnosis will be triggered. Further, they propose that under a more differentiated 
belief structure, the perceived feasibility of change and the perceived momentum for 
change will be greater. Indeed, group and organisational contexts may overshadow in-
dividual context during strategic interpretation, with group context being often the more 
dominant of the two (Thomas et al., 1994). 
Organisational resources can also affect strategic issue diagnosis (Dutton & Duncan, 
1987a; cf. Kaplan, 2008), in a much similar way as in the scanning phase (Lant et al., 
1992). On the one hand, slack organisational resources decrease the perceived degree of 
urgency, consequently reducing the perceived need to change and the momentum for 
change (cf. Cyert & March, 1963/1992; March & Simon, 1958/1993). On the other 
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hand, increased slack is likely to increase the perceived feasibility of resolving a strate-
gic issue, hence increasing the momentum for change.  
In addition, environmental factors have been shown to influence strategic issue diagno-
sis. For example, varying levels of perceived uncertainty and feasibility affect the or-
ganisation’s response to strategic issues (Dutton & Duncan, 1987a; Dutton & Webster, 
1988). Both certainty in the strategic issue’s context and perceptions of the strategic is-
sue’s feasibility in part determine how decision makers attend to it. Specifically, uncer-
tainty may repel, rather than encourage, broad and varied interest in strategic issues. 
Also, strategic issues whose resolution is perceived as being feasible also attract wider 
interest or a greater number of decision makers than infeasible ones. Furthermore, peo-
ple tend to gravitate towards strategic issues that they perceive as having a high prob-
ability of resolution, and they are likely to pursue strategic issues more readily in certain 
rather than in uncertain contexts.  
Consistent with the findings for scanning behaviour, Barr and Glynn (2004), Sallivan 
and Nonaka (1988), Schneider and De Mayer (1991) find that there are cultural differ-
ences in strategic issue interpretation. All find significant differences as to how strategic 
issues are categorised differently based on the cultural context that the company is situ-
ated.  
2.3.3 Planning for Action 
Decisions taken on strategic issues typically involve a specific commitment to action 
that usually, but not necessarily, involves a commitment of resources (Bower, 1970; 
Mintzberg et al., 1976; Noda & Bower, 1996). However, decisions “may or may not be 
implemented and lead to strategic change” (Ocasio, 1997: 201). Nonetheless, underly-
ing managerial cognition matters in shaping implementation (Kaplan, 2008).   
Meanings that strategic issues create induce momentum for change in the organisation. 
Dutton and Duncan define momentum for change as “the level of effort and commit-
ment that top-level decision makers are willing to devote to action designed to resolve 
[a strategic] issue” (1987a: 286). Furthermore, Dutton and Duncan suggest that mo-
mentum for change increases when (i) decision makers perceive that they understand 
the strategic issue and perceive the organisation as capable to deal with it, (ii) diagnose 
the strategic issue as being urgent and feasible to resolve, and (iii) when the organisa-
tion has a differentiated belief structure. Assessments of urgency and feasibility act in 
concert to create the momentum for change in response to a particular strategic issue. 
Dutton and Duncan (1987b) link the content and form of the strategic issue array with 
strategic change in the organisation. In so doing, they depict strategic change compris-
ing two main phases – initiation and implementation – that exhibit certain political and 
informational dynamics. During initiation, political dynamics are all about building suf-
ficient interest in the strategic issue (i.e., strategic issue selling; e.g., Andersson & Bate-
man, 2000; Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton et al., 2001; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991), 
whereas the informational dynamics are mostly concerned with gathering sufficient in-
formation to assess the strategic issue (i.e., search and issue diagnosis; e.g., Cyert & 
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March, 1963/1992; Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton & Duncan, 1987a; Gilbert, 2006; Kap-
lan, 2004, 2008; Kaplan et al., 2003). During the implementation phase, political inter-
est and personal commitment are needed to make the implementation happen, whereas 
information on the change is needed so that necessary modification can be made as ap-
propriate. 
Once a strategic issue has been identified and diagnosed, the proponents of the particu-
lar issue need to gain buy-in from other organisational participants, so as to gain mo-
mentum for the strategic issue and ensure that progress is made. This is the process of 
strategic issue selling, and it is directed toward affecting others’ attention to and under-
standing of strategic issues. Strategic issue selling can be seen as central in explaining 
how and where top management allocates its time and attention (Dutton & Ashford, 
1993). Whereas formal authority indeed needs to be used to accomplish major, explora-
tory undertakings, political behaviour becomes more important to the process as the ini-
tiatives become more exploratory, thereby underlining the need for strategic issue sell-
ing to achieve results (Lechner & Floyd, 2005). Dutton and Ashford (1993) underline 
the role of middle managers in strategic issue selling, and, consequently, as change 
agents within the organisation. Importantly, middle management can take a variety of 
different roles in strategy formulation. They can champion strategic options, synthesise 
information to top management, facilitate adaptability by acting as “buffers” between 
employees and top management, and most commonly, implement the deliberate strategy 
(Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). This view of importance of middle management is also 
consistent with earlier research (e.g., Bower, 1970; Burgelman, 1983) underlining the 
role of middle management in strategy making (Kanter, 1982). 
Individuals decide whether or not to initiate strategic issue selling efforts based on the 
value that the individual attaches to a strategic issue, as well as the individual’s beliefs 
in the eventual success of the effort (Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Strategic issue selling 
will be more likely when individuals believe that selling attempts will be successful, or 
when the issue is so important personally that the value of securing attention for the is-
sue is worth the extra effort of selling it. Initiation of strategic issue selling is more 
likely when sellers are general managers (who are usually centrally-located; cf. Dutton, 
1986b), or when the issues match their functional orientation in the organisation. The 
influence of a strategic issue selling effort is not limited only to the particular strategic 
issue at hand. Instead, because building the organisational strategic agenda is contingent 
on the existing agenda structure (size and composition), any new strategic issue will be 
affected by the prevailing agenda structure. Consequently, the impact of a strategic issue 
selling episode can occur also far beyond the strategic issue that was originally pro-
moted (Dutton, 1986b). Due to this cumulative attribute of strategic issue selling, for 
individuals or coalitions in the organisation, attempts to manage the agenda building can 
be a potent way to exert influence on either promoting or preventing strategic change. 
In spite of all good efforts, however, planned organisational change initiatives some-
times do not gather enough momentum to become realised. Reger et al. (1994) suggest 
that change efforts presented as radical departures from the organisation’s past fail be-
cause the cognitive structures of members, whose cooperation is necessary for success-
ful implementation, constrain their understanding and support of new initiatives (cf. 
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Dutton & Dukerich, 1991). Thus, Reger et al. propose that change should proceed 
through mid-range modifications “that are large enough to overcome cognitive inertia 
and relieve organizational stress, but not so large that members believe the proposed 
change is unobtainable or undesirable” (1994: 565). 
2.4 Conclusions 
Summarising how the diverse theories on organisational information processing and 
sensemaking dynamics affect the strategic issue management activities in companies is 
indisputably challenging. Although the theories do build, at least in part, on each other, 
they still represent a collection of multiple and sometimes even conflicting concepts, 
guidelines and frameworks. Moreover, they are underpinned by contrasting ontological 
and epistemological assumptions. However, the three theoretical strands of the Carnegie 
school, the social-psychological view, and the attention-based view also develop and 
complement each other. Particularly, the attention-based view serves as a credible at-
tempt to draw the discussion more towards a coherent, unified framework. 
Information processing and decision making in economies and economic organisations 
has been considered to be perfectly rational until relatively late in the 20th century. This 
assumption has underpinned both classical, Marshallian economic theory (e.g., Jevons, 
1871/1970; Marshall, 1890/1961; Menger, 1871; Walras, 1874/1954) as well as a large 
share of strategy models (e.g., Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939; Porter, 1980; Wright, 1917). 
However, empirical observation has often failed to correspond with these theoretical 
models. Indeed, the assumption of perfect rationality has been gradually challenged by 
the behavioural theory (Cyert & March, 1963/1992), which posits that individuals and 
organisations are only ‘boundedly rational’ (March & Simon, 1958/1993; Simon, 
1947/1997). This has, in its part, paved the way for research on strategic issue manage-
ment. 
The Carnegie school view introduced the concept of bounded rationality in organisa-
tional information processing and decision making. Crystallised in the so-called behav-
ioural theory of the company (Cyert & March, 1963/1992), the Carnegie school rests on 
three key variables. It views organisational goals as constraints imposed on the organi-
sation formed by a loose coalition of organisational members. To evaluate options for 
decision making, individuals form expectations about likely outcomes. Organisational 
choice, then, takes place in response to a problem, uses standard operating rules, and 
involves identifying an acceptable option (as compared to the goals and aspirations). 
Moreover, the behavioural theory assumes that goals are only quasi-resolved in the 
company, and that organisations avoid uncertainty. Search behaviour is problemistic: it 
is triggered by a problem and directed towards finding a solution. Finally, over time, 
organisational behaviour changes based on, for example, experience. 
In contrast, the social-psychological perspective (e.g.., Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 
1969/1979, 1995) takes a markedly less structured view of organisational decision mak-
ing. Organising is accomplished by processes containing individual behaviours that are 
interlocked among two or more people. These individual behaviours are contingent on 
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those of others. People and organisations create the (decision) environments that subse-
quently impose on them, and choice involves the imposition of various structures on 
enacted equivocal displays in order to reduce their equivocality and thereby selecting 
schemes of interpretation and specific interpretations. The selected interpretation is sub-
sequently stored in organisational memory. What makes this sensemaking viewpoint 
distinctive is both its grounding in the identity construction of the individual as well as 
its social nature of constructing intersubjectively shared meanings in the organisation. 
These two obviously are inherently intertwined. All this is done in language, from lan-
guage and by using language.  
The attention-based view (Ocasio, 1997) regards organisations as systems of structur-
ally distributed attention, in which the cognition and action of individuals are derived 
from the specific organisational context and situations that individual decision makers 
find themselves in. The key characteristic of this systems view of organisations is the 
relationship between individual and organisational information processing. The atten-
tion-based view underscores the selectivity of organisational information processing 
both on the individual and organisational level, and that the focus and actions of the de-
cision makers depend on the characteristics of the situation they confront. Finally, the 
particular context which the decision makers are in, and how they attend to it depends 
on how the organisation allocates its attention. 
For strategic issue management, the attention-based view provides the organisational 
backdrop where management of strategic issues takes place. In other words, organisa-
tional attention allocation processes have a substantial impact on how strategic issues 
are managed. In conclusion, a number of key implications can be drawn from the atten-
tion-based view that in part tries to integrate components from both research streams 
that have preceded it.  
First, small contingencies in the company can affect the situated attention and thereby 
may significantly change organisational adaptation and behaviour. For the company to 
adapt successfully to changes in its environment, the organisation needs to focus its at-
tention on an appropriate set of strategic issues and answers. Second, inertia, inappro-
priate change, or successful adaptation may result from situated attentional processes, 
all depending on how well the company can direct its attention to pertinent strategic is-
sues and answers. Third, both structural regularities and cognitive repertoires of strate-
gic issues and answers underlie attentional processes in organisations. Consequently 
both the procedures – whether implicit or explicit – applied to process strategic issues as 
well as the cognitive spaces of top managers influence the outcomes. Fourth, selective 
focus of attention facilitates the company’s strategic actions, yet it requires that atten-
tion and effort be focussed in a controlled manner, lest the processing of a strategic is-
sue may become saturated.  
On the level of strategic issue management, the process can be portrayed as a sequence 
consisting of three main process stages: (i) Scanning, undirected research and problem 
recognition; (ii) Directed research and gaining understanding; and (iii) Planning for ac-
tion. These are further followed by the subsequent implementation of the given resolu-
tion. 
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Within the scanning, undirected research and problem recognition phase, both external 
and internal environment of the company are observed for strategic issues (e.g., Aguilar, 
1967; Ansoff, 1980; Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). This phase takes place under the limited 
cognitive capacity of the individuals involved, as individuals impose various cognitive 
maps on the information at their disposal (Jackson & Dutton, 1988). Furthermore, a 
similar cognitive process takes place on the organisational level. Scanning mode is typi-
cally selected based on contextual factors (e.g., Aguilar, 1967; Daft & Weick, 1984), 
and can be defined as retrospective or prospective (Fahey & Narayanan, 1986). The 
scanning process is further influenced by strategic issue –specific, political, and struc-
tural factors (e.g., Aguilar, 1967; Daft et al., 1988; Daft & Weick, 1984; Elenkov, 1997; 
Garg et al., 2003; May et al., 2000).  
In the directed research and gaining understanding phase, the potential strategic issues 
are recognised and isolated for further consideration (Mintzberg et al., 1976), whereby 
their legitimacy, both on the individual and organisational level, is established. Making 
sense of the strategic issues takes place under limited cognitive capabilities both on in-
dividual and organisational levels, as the process rests on matching existing cognitive 
maps both on individual and collective levels with the received information (e.g., Dut-
ton et al., 1983; Dutton & Jackson, 1987). This simplification may be regarded alterna-
tively as heuristics or biases, since whereas on the one hand they provide the means to 
make decisions under incomplete information, on the other hand they may lead to im-
precise strategic issue diagnosis and subsequently inappropriate organisational moves 
(e.g., Das & Bing-Sheng, 1999). 
Much of the process is dependent on strategic issue categorisation (e.g., Dutton & Jack-
son, 1987). Strategic issue diagnosis has been found to be influenced by, for example, 
the framing of the issue, the amount of information used in diagnosis, and the controlla-
bility and feasibility of the issue (e.g., Kuvaas, 2002). Cultural variations exist in the 
way strategic issues are diagnosed in organisations (e.g., Barr & Glynn, 2004; Sallivan 
& Nonaka, 1988; Schneider & de Meyer, 1991). Due to the inherently cognitive nature 
of the diagnosis process, strategic issues can be processed in both an active and an auto-
matic fashion (Dutton, 1993). 
Strategic issues typically result in decisions that lead to a commitment to action 
(Mintzberg et al., 1976). Meanings that strategic issues create can facilitate the creation 
of momentum for change in the organisation (Dutton & Duncan, 1987a). In addition, the 
momentum can be increased by actively selling the strategic issue in the organisation 
(e.g., Dutton & Ashford, 1993). Middle management is likely to play an important role 
in achieving change (e.g., Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992). However, strategic issues with 
clear decisions may not always lead to strategic change, despite good intentions (e.g., 
Reger et al., 1994). 
In summary, whereas extant research has established the attention-based view of the 
company as the synthesis of the various cognitive and social-psychological models of 
organisations, as well as provided insights into how individual strategic issues are ad-
dressed, some areas in strategic issue management have only been lightly researched. 
First, although the existence of cognitive spaces and their impact on strategic issue man-
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agement have been amply postulated (e.g., Ocasio, 1997), research into the congregate 
cognitive spaces (cf. Bougon, 1992) and their specific link to strategic issue manage-
ment has been limited (cf. Gilbert, 2006; Kaplan, 2004, 2008; Kaplan et al., 2003). Fur-
thermore, strategic issue categorising has been discussed only in respect to the threat–
opportunity dichotomy (Dutton & Jackson, 1987), and the wider contents of the cogni-
tive space have been rather overlooked. Second, whilst it has been acknowledged that 
organisational attention allocation is likely to influence strategic issue processing (cf. 
Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005), the explicit, dynamic link of the attentional ca-
pacity to decision making performance has not been studied. Third, most of the strategic 
issue management research has focussed on individual strategic issue decisions, and has 
thereby overlooked the longitudinal element in strategy making, thus foregoing the op-
portunity to analyse how strategic issues develop as they are processed in the cognitive 
space of the company.  
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3 Research Methodology 
This chapter presents the research methodology applied in this study. Research method-
ology can be addressed from multiple related yet overlapping angles, including those of 
research methods, research strategy (e.g., Yin, 2003), research approach (e.g., Aram & 
Salipante, 2003) and research design (e.g., Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). The following 
discussion approaches the notion of research methodology on three levels: (i) the under-
lying scientific paradigm, (ii) the applied research approach that guides the research de-
sign, and (iii) the actual research design.  
3.1 Scientific Paradigm 
According to Kuhn (1970: 10), scientific paradigms include “law, theory, application, 
and instrumentation together --- [and] provide models from which spring particular 
coherent traditions of scientific research”. The scientific paradigm thereby determines 
the key concepts and methods, research designs, and significant problems to be studied. 
Similarly, Guba and Lincoln (1994) define scientific paradigm as the basic belief sys-
tem that guides the researcher in terms of ontology, epistemology and methodology.  
3.1.1 Ontological and Epistemological Underpinnings 
The traditional and dominant approach in scientific research (and especially in natural 
sciences) is the paradigm of scientific realism, which is sometimes also referred to as 
the positivist paradigm.22 Implicit in the notion of scientific realism is also the assump-
tion of a single, objective truth, and that objective observations are key in furthering 
knowledge, including any effects of researcher bias and interpretation in the process of 
building knowledge (Boyd, 1983; Moldoveanu & Baum, 2002). Methodologically these 
studies are often experimental or manipulative (Guba & Lincoln, 1994). 
Another prominent school of thought in social sciences is that of constructivism, which 
epistemologically assumes that no objective truth exists. Rather, knowledge is seen as 
being “created” by individual minds instead of being logically built up from theory and 
the observation of an independent reality (Moldoveanu & Baum, 2002). The principal 
support for constructivism in social sciences is that objective knowledge may not exist, 
because scientific knowledge is often produced in cooperation with informants. Con-
structivist studies often employ hermeneutic or dialectical methodologies. 
                                                 
22  Moldoveanu and Baum (2002) strongly oppose the use of the term positivist in a general context, for 
example, in economics research, in the sense suggested by Friedman (1953). Moldoveanu and Baum 
argue that Friedman’s interpretation of positivism as a form of instrumentalism is “peculiar”, and 
that “economics (---) is definitely not a positivist science” (2002: 736). Instead, they characterise this 
strand of organisation research belonging to the paradigm of scientific realism. 
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It is worth acknowledging that the present research is struggling at the crossroads of not 
only a plethora of complementary theoretical domains, but also a number of philosophi-
cal underpinnings. In the domain of organisational information processing, the early 
work by March and associates (Cyert & March, 1963/1992; March & Simon, 
1958/1993; Simon, 1947/1997) is clearly based on the notion of scientific realism, by at 
least attempting to present a normative model of organisational behaviour. The contri-
butions of Weick, in contrast, take a decidedly constructivist stance, even to the extent 
that his distinguishing essayistic literary style becomes an essential part of the theory 
(Van Maanen, 1995). Ocasio (1997), while introducing an attention-based view of the 
company, builds heavily on the realist research tradition of March and associates, but 
also in part on the constructivist work of Weick. Ocasio’s theory is, nonetheless, un-
questionably realist in nature. By building on the notion of the attention-based view of 
the company, this dissertation follows Ocasio’s realist paradigm. 
3.1.2 Meaning and Theory of Process 
Meaning of Process 
As defined in Section 1.5.3, this study understands a process as “a sequence of events 
or activities that describes how things change over time, or that represents an underly-
ing pattern of cognitive transitions by an entity in dealing with a [strategic] issue” (Van 
de Ven, 1992: 170). This implies that a historical developmental perspective is taken, 
with a focus on the sequences of incidents, activities and stages that unfold over the du-
ration of the period under study. In contrast to other process models, no variables are 
reflected. Rather, the developmental process model examines the progressions of activi-
ties or events that an organisational entity undergoes as it changes over time. These pro-
gressions are typically depicted as occurring in a linear and sequential manner, yet this 
is likely to be “inadequate to deal with the complexities of many strategy ventures” 
(Van de Ven, 1992: 172). Instead of the linear-sequential forms of progression, devel-
opmental progressions can be described as including multiple, cumulative, conjunctive 
and iterative progressions of convergent, parallel and divergent streams of activities un-
folding over time (van den Daele, 1969, 1974; Flavell, 1972). All this is precisely what 
Chakravarthy and Doz call for: In particular, “to address the central evolutionary proc-
esses and transformational processes” (1992: 9) to uncover the richness of organisa-
tional strategic decision making. 
Theory of Process 
Four abstract ideal types of theories of change process can be identified (Van de Ven, 
1992; Van de Ven & Poole, 1991), namely the life cycle, teleology, dialectic, and evolu-
tion process theories. In the life cycle theory, the typical progression of events is a uni-
tary sequence, which is cumulative and conjunctive. The progression to an end state 
takes place via a prefigured trajectory, whereby each piece contributes to the next. Life 
cycle theories often explain development in terms of institutional rules or programmes 
that require activities to progress in a prescribed sequence (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). 
The life cycle theory is predictive in nature (Van de Ven, 1992).  
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According to Van de Ven (1992), another usual type is teleology process theory, which 
underlies many theories of administrative behaviour.23 The teleological theory is based 
on the philosophical doctrine that the developing entity is purposeful and adaptive, ei-
ther by itself or in interaction with others. Unlike the life cycle theory, teleology theory 
does not presume a prescribed sequence of events, although it does imply standards by 
which change can be judged. Teleological models explain the progression toward an 
end state that may very well be a temporary one, rather than a long lasting point of equi-
librium. The end state can be achieved via multiple paths, implying an assumption of 
equifinality of the process. The progress, however, is constrained by environmental and 
resource factors. Theories relying on a teleological process theory cannot specify what 
specific trajectory developments follow, but can at best suggest a set of possible paths. 
Teleological theories are, nonetheless, predictive in nature. 
The third school, dialectical theory, makes the Hegelian assumption (Hegel, 1812/1975) 
that the organisational entity exists in a pluralistic world of colliding events, forces or 
values, either internal or external to the organisation, that compete with each other for 
domination and control (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995). Stability and change with a dialec-
tical process theory are explained by the relative balance of power between the oppos-
ing forces. If the momentum of the antithesis is sufficient to challenge the status quo, a 
novel construction departing from both the thesis and antithesis can be developed as 
synthesis (Van de Ven, 1992). 
In the evolution process theory, change occurs as a recurrent, cumulative and probabilis-
tic progression of variation, selection and retention. In organisation and management 
applications, evolutionary theory often depicts global changes in organisational popula-
tions (Van de Ven, 1992). Although one cannot predict which entity will survive or fail, 
the overall population persists and evolves through time, according to the specified 
population dynamics (Van de Ven & Poole, 1995).24 Evolutionary theories, similarly to 
dialectical theories, explain only how change and development occur, yet they have no 
predictive capability. 
Implications for Process Research 
Pettigrew (1992a) further develops Van de Ven’s thinking on the developmental process 
theory, and draws a variety of influences from the research in social sciences in offering 
five guiding assumptions for strategy process research. First, processes do not exist in 
isolation. They are embedded in contexts that need to be considered while studying the 
process in itself, because contexts both internal and external to the organisation shape 
features of the content and process of strategic development on multiple levels of analy-
                                                 
23  For example, the Carnegie school of information processing and decision making (Cyert & March, 
1963/1992; March & Simon, 1958/1993; Simon, 1947/1997) is underpinned by a teleological process 
theory, as is also the social-psychological sensemaking perspective (Weick, 1969/1979, 1995). 
24  In addition to organisational population theories, the evolution process theory has been applied to the 
micro level to explain social-psychological processes of organising (Weick, 1969/1979, 1995) as well 
as to organisational interpretation (Daft & Weick, 1984). 
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sis (cf. Ocasio, 1997). Second, process research must not be only about understanding 
the sequence and flow of events over time, but it must also be about surfacing the recur-
rent patterns in as well as structures and underlying logics of the process. Third, strategy 
process research needs to take into account that the processes are both constrained by 
features of the context as well as also shape the contexts where the organisations and 
decision makers are embedded in (cf. Ocasio, 1997; Weick, 1969/1979, 1995). Fourth, 
as a concomitant of the first three guiding assumptions, an investigation over a pro-
longed period is needed to find a holistic (rather than linear) explanation of process. 
Fifth, Pettigrew suggests that the process and its outcomes should be linked to exploring 
how and why variations in context and process shape variability in the observed out-
comes. 
3.1.3 Concluding Remarks on Scientific Paradigm of Present Study 
The scientific paradigm of the present study can be described along the lines proposed 
by Guba and Lincoln (1994). First, in terms of ontology, the present study assumes that 
the constructs and the paradigms used by the planners in the domain of business plan-
ning are “real”. Further, it is assumed that the strategic issues and processes studied are 
real, and that they can be described in real terms. Hence the research assumes a realist 
posture. Second, the research assumes no interaction and bias between the investigator 
and the investigated, supporting the ideal of objectivity, and, consequently, a realist 
epistemology. Third, the research aims to use an engaged scholarship approach, again 
suggesting a realist paradigm. In sum, these views reflect a realist positioning.  
3.2 Research Approach 
The selected scientific paradigm has implications for the research approach, even 
though it is not a predetermining factor. The debate on the research approach culminates 
in the relationship between data and theory (Easterby-Smith et al., 1991). The conven-
tional distinction is made between inductive and deductive strategies: The former starts 
from specific empirical findings that are generalised to induce new theory. In contrast, 
the latter starts from a theory that is considered to represent the truth and deduces theo-
ries and applications to a more specific problem of field of application (Creswell, 2003). 
This study follows the logic of inductive theory building.  
Van de Ven defines engaged scholarship as “a participative form of research for ob-
taining the advice and perspective of key stakeholders (---) to understand a complex so-
cial problem” (2007: ix). The primary aim of an engaged scholarship approach is to re-
solve the dichotomy of theory and practice (Pettigrew, 2001), and thereby produce 
knowledge both relevant and rigorous by engaging both practitioners and academics 
(Hodgkinson et al., 2001; Tushman & O'Reilly, 2007; Van de Ven, 2007). At the heart 
of the argument for the engaged scholarship approach is that the gap between rigor and 
relevance (Tushman & O'Reilly, 2007) is a problem of knowledge production and not 
one of knowledge transfer. The engaged scholarship approach stands in a position to 
address the “knowledge production problem” by focussing on a research problem that is 
grounded in reality, conducting the research as a collaborative effort of researchers and 
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practitioners, allowing for an extended research period, and using multiple models and 
methods (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006).  
3.2.1 Real-Life Research Problem 
A research approach building on the notion of engaged scholarship is particularly suited 
to increasing the understanding of how strategic issue management operates in a real-
life corporate setting. Not only is strategic issue management certainly a complex, social 
phenomenon as defined by Van de Ven (2007), it remains an under-researched area, at 
least from a practitioners’ standpoint (Kajanto et al., 2004). Moreover, from the aca-
demic standpoint, the focus in strategic issue management research has been on individ-
ual strategic issues rather than on the entire strategic issue management system of the 
corporation.  
The research problem of this dissertation then acts as a suitable starting point for an en-
gaged scholarship approach. The research problem is grounded in a fundamental chal-
lenge that corporations face, as senior executives frequently express their frustration for 
calendar-driven planning cycles (e.g., Beinhocker & Kaplan, 2002).  
As for the criticism that practitioner involvement in formulating the research problem 
may steer into narrow, short-term or particularistic directions (Brief & Dukerich, 1991; 
Grey, 2001; Kilduff & Kelemen, 2001), the author shares the view that heedful accom-
modation and integration of diverse viewpoints yields a richer understanding of the 
question being investigated than the sensemaking of a single stakeholder (Morgan, 
1983; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006; Weick, 1995). In essence, by moving back and 
forth between the observation of natural phenomena, the construction of abstract mod-
els, and subsequent testing and refinement of theory, theory of higher quality can be de-
veloped (Chatman & Flynn, 2005; Tushman & O'Reilly, 2007).  
3.2.2 Joint Academic and Practitioner Research Team 
Consistent with the engaged scholarship approach, the “knowledge production problem” 
(Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006) can be mitigated by improving the exchange of knowl-
edge between researchers and practitioners. For this to happen, research needs to take 
place in collaboration with practitioners while designing, conducting and implementing 
research in real-life settings (Anderson et al., 2001; Lawler et al., 1985; Miller et al., 
1997; Rynes et al., 1999). In particular, research teams where some researchers in a set-
ting are relative insiders, whereas some are relative outsiders have been argued to offer 
distinct advantages for integrating diverse perspectives on the problem under study 
(Evered & Louis, 1981; Louis & Bartunek, 1992; Van de Ven & Ferry, 1980). 
While conducting research in a joint academic and practitioner research team can help 
in creating theory which is both rigorous and relevant, some important concerns have 
been expressed: the scientific requirements of internal and external validity may be dif-
ficult to meet (Cook & Campbell, 1979; Sackett & Mullen, 1993), practitioner involve-
ment may compromise the independence and objectivity of the research (Beyer & Trice, 
1982; Grey, 2001; Hackman, 1985), practitioners may be unwilling to release results of 
research for publication (Lawler et al., 1985), and organisational pressures and events 
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may compromise or sacrifice the research methods and goals (Rynes et al., 1999). How-
ever, these risks are not particular to the engaged scholarship approach but, to all col-
laborative research in general (Van de Ven & Poole, 2002), and can be mitigated 
through the careful design of the working group (Amabile et al., 2001). 
3.2.3 Longitudinal Research 
Pettigrew (1992a) proposes that longitudinal studies are needed to get to holistic expla-
nations about strategy process. Indeed, a longitudinal approach is likely to be indispen-
sable in any research dealing with organisational change (Huber & Van De Ven, 1995).  
In essence, a longitudinal approach allows for the examination of the direction of cau-
sality as well as the association between organisational attention, organisational moves 
and cognitive change over time. Moreover, longitudinal research promotes deeper learn-
ing because it provides repeated trials for approximating and understanding the research 
question (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). For an engaged scholarship approach, an ex-
tended duration of the research allows for building meaningful relationships between 
the researchers and practitioners (Mintzberg, 1979; Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006).  
However, longitudinal research faces the strategic issue of recall bias if the data collec-
tion takes place ex post. To mitigate this risk, research can accommodate a rich variety 
of data sources, including interviews, archival data, survey data, ethnographies, and ob-
servations (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Jick suggests that “organizational research-
ers can improve the accuracy of their judgments by collecting different kinds of data 
bearing on the same phenomenon” (1979: 602). In fact, Fiol (1995) has found that pri-
vate and public communications can differ materially from each other. Furthermore, 
retrospective bias can be reduced through triangulating, using multiple informants and 
cross-checking against archival and public documents (Yin, 2003). 
3.2.4 Multi-Method and Multi-Level 
This dissertation employs multiple research methods that are needed to understand a 
complex reality (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). The use of multiple methods concur-
rently allows us to distinguish between features of reality and features that are merely a 
function of the theoretical framework applied (Azevedo, 1997). Comparing and con-
trasting multiple models reflecting different perspectives is essential for discriminating 
amongst error, noise, and robust information about a complex problem being investi-
gated (Van de Ven & Johnson, 2006). The combination of inductive and deductive ap-
proaches allows, on the one hand, the deepening of understanding of the complex proc-
esses at work in strategic issue management in the inductive logic, whereas on the other 
hand allows testing of the relative importance of some those processes on strategic issue 
management outcomes (Dougherty, 2002). In the terminology used by Van de Ven and 
Poole (2005), this represents a combination of the variance and process approaches of 
research. 
The empirical part of this dissertation begins with an inductive research approach that 
aims to increase understanding of how strategic issues are processed in a real-life or-
ganisation. This approach is applicable to the analyses in Chapters 4 and 5, where the 
evolution of a single strategic issue, and the cognitive space of the issue processing are 
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discussed, respectively. In its inductive logic, this research draws on ideas from the 
grounded theory building approach (Glaser & Strauss, 1967), which assumes that social 
life is inherently complex, and that outcomes are produced by ongoing interactions 
amongst people within a particular context (Strauss, 1987). This line of research aims at 
understanding why and how structures, conditions or actions may arise (Dougherty, 
2002), and focuses on understanding the complex interrelationships of a phenomenon 
(Stake, 1995). 
The inductive logic of research in a qualitative study is fundamentally about building 
from the data to broad themes to a generalised model or theory. The process typically 
begins by collecting information from the participants, after which the data is analysed 
to form themes or categories. These themes and categories are the basis for broad pat-
terns, generalisations or theories that can be later drawn from them. Finally, the gener-
alisations or theories are compared with past experiences or extant literature (Creswell, 
2003). The fundamental objective is to build, rather than to test or verify theory.  
The final empirical part of this dissertation in Chapter 6 integrates extant literature from 
Chapter 2 and emerging findings from Chapters 4 and 5, and applies a deductive logic 
to test and verify the theory. In general this type of process entails the development of 
hypotheses based on theory, collects data to test them, and reflects on the confirmation 
or disconfirmation of the theory by the results (Creswell, 2003). In contrast to the induc-
tive approach, the fundamental objective is to test or to verify, rather than to build the-
ory.  
This dissertation can also be viewed as incorporating many aspects of the case study 
approach. Yin (1981: 59) defines a case study as an “empirical inquiry that examines a 
contemporary phenomenon in its real-life context (---) when the boundaries between 
phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”. Similarly, Eisenhardt (1989b: 534) 
describes the case study as a research approach that “focuses on understanding the dy-
namics present within single settings”. Case studies are a suitable method of theory 
building when little is known about the phenomenon, or current perspectives seem in-
adequate or conflicting (Eisenhardt, 1989b). Yin (2003) asserts that the applicability of 
the case study approach depends on the type of research question, the extent of control 
over behavioural events, and the degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to histori-
cal events. The case study approach is used to generalise the case results into a theoreti-
cal framework, focussing on finding cases that predict similar results, or produce con-
trary results with predictable reasons. Then, analytical generalisation is used for build-
ing the theory from study.  
In terms of the case methodology, this dissertation leverages a single, nested case design 
(Eisenhardt, 1989b; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). Using a single case design makes 
sense for the purposes of uncovering the micro-mechanisms associated with strategy 
making processes (Pettigrew, 1987), and can richly describe the existence of a phe-
nomenon (Siggelkow, 2007). Restricting the research to a single case also helps to 
eliminate the potentially distracting influence of differing structures and strategic issue 
processing practices of different firms (Thomas & McDaniel, 1990). Furthermore, the 
use of single-case studies is justified when they are unusually revelatory, or opportuni-
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ties for unusual research access exist (Yin, 2003), both of which apply in the present 
context.  
In addition to a research approach embracing multiple methods, this dissertation ad-
dresses the research problem also on multiple levels of analysis (Babbie, 1998; Dan-
sereau et al., 1999; Garud & Kumaraswamy, 2005). On the one hand, the focus is on the 
macro-level operations of the strategic issue management system of the company (e.g., 
Ansoff, 1980), and its strategy formulation at large (Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst, 
2006). These include the analysis of longitudinal issue evolution in Chapter 4, and the 
analysis of cognitive space of issue processing in Chapter 5. On the other hand, the fo-
cus is on the micro-level mechanisms of strategy making (Johnson et al., 2003). These 
include many of the features analysed in Chapter 6 that pertain to, for example, meet-
ing-level practices of strategic issue processing. 
3.3 Research Design 
3.3.1 Research Setting 
Industry and Case Company Context  
The industry context for the research setting was selected from the high-tech industry, 
and, in particular, the information and communications technology sectors. During the 
timeframe under study from the latter half of the 1990s towards the early years of the 
2000s, the industry was experiencing rapid growth in terms of diffusion of information 
and communications technologies. While the roots of this evolution were in the 1970s 
with the introduction of modern microelectronics (e.g., Koski et al., 2001), it was during 
the 1990s when the industry experienced a true sea change. Not only did the technologi-
cal diffusion in the industry reach new heights as the internet became a true mass mar-
ket technology, but also the commercial potential of information and communication 
technologies was realised. At the same time in the 1990s many national markets were 
opened up to international competition. Internationalisation progressed rapidly also in 
the financial sector that was further fuelled by overall positive economic environment. 
All this led to a widely held belief that traditional economic logic and laws were out-
dated in an environment driven by these new information and communications tech-
nologies (Koski et al., 2002).  
The American press heralded this as the “New Economy” (Mandel, 1996), and publish-
ers came out with strategy guidebooks for the new era (e.g., Cronin, 1996). The party, 
however, came to an abrupt end in the early 2000s, as the “irrational exuberance” 
(Greenspan, 1996) of the “new economy” ended with the burst of the internet bubble 
(Goldfarb et al., 2006; Ofek & Richardson, 2003), decimating the market capitalisations 
of many internet companies and driving the global economy into a downturn. Overall 
the boom-and-bust cycle is not unlike the developments that transpired in the adoption 
of other significant technological advances, namely the inventions of steam, railroads 
and electricity that fuelled the first and second industrial revolutions (IMF, 2001). 
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Few, if any, companies were immune to the effects emanating from these kinds of 
changes in their broader environment. First, as the economy headed into a downturn, 
many companies were affected as their target markets experienced plateaus or even con-
tracted. This effect was particularly pronounced in the information and communications 
industry, where the hangover from the “new economy” effectively not only halted cor-
porate investments but also curtailed consumer spending. Second, investors overwhelm-
ingly gave up their focus on “internet companies” with a great technological idea but no 
business to speak of, thus putting more pressure on the more solid companies in the 
market to deliver results. Overall a great deal of uncertainty prevailed in the industry 
from the crash up until 2003, when markets began to pick up again.  
After the bubble had burst and the economy started improving again, the information 
and communications technology industry continued on its growth track, yet in more 
modest terms. At the same time, the industry underwent substantial technological 
changes, and there were significant business logic changes, and the entrance of new 
competitors took place. 
The high-tech industry is ideally suited to studying strategic issue management prac-
tices, as it is characteristically a high-velocity environment (Eisenhardt, 1989c). In such 
environments, the ability of the company to react to and even anticipate changes can set 
it apart from its competitors, underscoring the role of responding to emerging strategic 
issues. Competitive positions are continuously threatened and advances in technology 
open up new fields of competition. The industry faces a fast pace of innovation in all 
aspects, including technology, suppliers, competitors, and customers. Such an industry 
therefore ensures a sufficiently large number of strategic issues to focus on. 
Case Company and its Strategic Issue Management Practices 
The research was carried out in a large, global high-technology company headquartered 
in Europe, with branch offices in the United States and abroad. All in all, the company 
has an extensive global presence in more than 100 countries. The company employed 
between 30,000 and 60,000 workers and generated between USD 25 and 50 billion in 
turnover in 2004. During the research period, the company has been one of the leading 
companies in its markets, being either the first or second player in terms of market 
share. 
Strategy work is carried out throughout the organisation. A dedicated strategy unit is 
responsible for facilitating corporate-level strategy process and supporting business 
strategy development. Strategy work is also carried out in business groups, which all 
have their own strategy functions. In this respect the planning mode is fractal-like: in 
addition to the corporate strategy unit, each business group has its own planning staff 
and so on down to lower levels of the organisation. 
The company employs an annual planning cycle to determine the overall focus of the 
corporation and its businesses as well as to assure coherence and cooperation between 
the entities. The annual process focuses on evolutionary rather than revolutionary 
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changes. Strategic plans are rolled down into more specific operational plans for all 
units as well into employee-level target-setting. 
The annual planning work is complemented by ongoing strategy work, which is driven 
by strategic issues that the company faces. It deals with developments that can have an 
important impact on the corporation, and it is thus likely to address more fundamental 
strategic concerns. To qualify as a strategic issue, the issues have to have corporate-
wide importance and hence they are typically cross business group issues; issues which 
do not fall directly into any business group; or issues which merit corporate-level atten-
tion due to their importance, even though they fall into a specific business group.  
Over the course of the three-year study period for the entire strategic issue portfolio, the 
corporation addressed in total 16 strategic issues through its strategic issue management 
process. For reasons of confidentiality, these strategic issues are labelled as I01…I16 in 
the subsequent discussion. The substance of the strategic issues is not a particular con-
cern in this study, since the purpose at hand is to describe the implementation of the 
strategic issue management process rather than the particular substance discussed. The 
author has had, nonetheless, access to the specific strategic issue substance to broaden 
the thinking in the present discourse. 
The progress of strategic issue processing in the corporation can be divided into a num-
ber of topics. Topics represent active work that typically took place in a taskforce mode, 
following which a decision was taken. Each of the 16 strategic issues can therefore be 
broken down into specific topics as presented in Figure 3.1. Each topic is associated 
with a specific decision episode taking place in a meeting of the strategic issue man-
agement board of the corporation. 
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Figure 3.1 Breakdown of 16 strategic issues into 92 topics over time 
Depending on the analyses in this dissertation, either the level of the 16 strategic issues 
or their 92 constituent topics is used (Babbie, 1998). First, Chapter 4 – analysing how a 
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single strategic issue is processed within the strategic issue management system of the 
corporation – uses the level of the 16 strategic issues as the unit of analysis. Second, 
Chapter 5 – in linking the cognitive space of the corporation to the categorisation and 
processing of strategic issues – analyses the level of strategic issues utilising the topic-
level as unit of observation. Third, in Chapter 6 – linking organisational attention allo-
cation with the performance of the strategic issue management system – the unit of 
analysis is the decision making situation regarding an individual topic. 
3.3.2 Data Collection 
The research makes use of multiple sources of data of both qualitative and quantitative 
in nature (Yin, 2003). By using a variety of different means to gather the data for the 
research, triangulation and validation of the data can be achieved. Data collection was 
concluded when a level of saturation was reached (Glaser & Strauss, 1967).  
The analyses started in 2003 and the research team consisting of five people spent hun-
dreds of hours during 2003 and 2007 in different tasks tracking and analysing the strate-
gic issues and in searching for ways to quantify their different characteristics. Two 
members of the research team (one being the author of this dissertation) have worked in 
the case company’s corporate planning unit, providing unrestricted access to all the in-
ternal materials and discussions concerning all the strategic issues that had been proc-
essed during the time period of the analysis. However, since these people had also been 
important actors in the strategic issue management process, a number of precautions had 
to be taken to ensure that the data was non-biased.  
One of the ways to eliminate subjectivity was that the two internal people involved in 
the analysis process cross-checked each other’s judgments. A good degree of conver-
gence was found in the ratings. The second stage of verification took place when the 
strategic issues were discussed together with the internal and external members, and 
where the judgments were discussed and compared to the descriptions of the strategic 
issue histories. In addition to these subjectivity checks, several alternative measures for 
the different strategic issue characteristics were developed, and measures that could also 
be quantified ex post were emphasised. For example, to ensure external validity of the 
perceptual measures, a text analysis of the original meeting notes was carried out, con-
cluding that the total investment made into a strategic issue correlated strongly with the 
number of words used in strategic issue reporting. 
Interview Data 
Key managers of the company under study were formally interviewed, some of them 
repeatedly, during 2004-2006. The list of interviewees comprises managers from differ-
ent levels, different functional groups, and different organisational entities who had 
been involved in or affected by the investigations, discussions or decisions of the case.  
Table 3.1 lists the interviewees and their positions while involved with the case. For rea-
sons of confidentiality, the interviewees are presented under pseudonyms. 
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Table 3.1 Interviewees and their positions 
Pseudonym Position while involved with the case 
Brian Smith President 
Paul Thompson Senior Vice President, CxO 
George Brown Vice President, Sales 
David Harris Vice President, Business Development 
Daniel Moore Director, Strategy Development 
Richard White Manager, Strategy Development 
Charles Jackson Manager, Business Intelligence 
 
The interviews were semi-structured and thematic (Denzin, 1989; Kvale, 1996; Wen-
graf, 2001), and were from one to three hours in length. In general, structure is needed 
to explain behaviour within pre-established categories, but the unstructured approach 
allows us to understand the complex behaviour of members of a society without impos-
ing any a priori categorisation that may limit the field of inquiry (Fontana & Frey, 
1994). Detailed interview notes were made from all of the interviews, with some of the 
interviews and discussions also recorded and transcribed ad verbatim. All the interviews 
were conducted on site. The interviewer typically invited the interviewee to recount the 
key events of his involvement in the development of the strategic issue, after which the 
discussion was directed to more particular questions. As the understanding of the evolu-
tion of the strategic issue became more exhaustive, the interviews became more struc-
tured. In addition to the interviews, informal discussions helped to clarify details and 
corroborate the interview findings.  
Archival Data 
The research also utilised an extensive amount of archival data. These included com-
pany annual and quarterly reports, press releases, trade journals, general business press, 
and market and financial analyst reports. Furthermore, the researcher was granted ac-
cess to management meeting presentations and minutes as well as various working 
documents that pertained to the evolution of strategic issues. This archival data was con-
trasted with the data obtained through interviews to validate the interview data further 
(Golden, 1992). The archival data also allowed a construction of a chronology of key 
events of the case that could be used in the interviews.  
Archival data also provided a basis for a quantitative examination of the case. This part 
of data collection covers a period of three years, which is less than the whole duration of 
the strategic issue analysed as a case study. This particular reference period was used 
because commensurate data was obtainable, both for the particular case as well as the 
overall portfolio of strategic issues. Nonetheless, this duration can be effectively used to 
illustrate the dynamics of the case per se as well as in relation to the overall portfolio of 
strategic issues, since the bulk of the activities related to the case took place under the 
reference period. 
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In addition to assigning the timing and giving the episode an abstract, the episodes were 
categorised by type, organisational bodies involved, and nature of work. The main con-
tributors were identified and the share of the attention estimated. Decision episodes, 
specifically, were assessed on a plethora of additional dimensions (see Table 3.2). For 
dimensions that were not numerical by nature (e.g., perceived uncertainty associated 
with the topic), indicative values were assigned for purposes of statistical analyses.  
The decision episodes were categorised by two strategy managers according to a prede-
termined classification scheme. The strategy managers, who worked in the corporate 
headquarters, were fully conversant with the strategic issues. However, it should be 
noted that any effort to classify strategic issues through a classification scheme is poten-
tially subject to inaccuracy and distortion, not least because the strategic issues by their 
very nature are multifaceted and complex. 
Table 3.2 Classification scheme for topics  
Dimension Classification Assigned 
values 
Source of topic  Top management 
 Escalated from business 
 Planning process 
n/a 
Value at stake  Low – Value impact less than 0.5% of market 
capitalisation 
 Medium – Value impact between 0.5% and 5% 
of market capitalisation 
 High – Value impact more than 5% of market 
capitalisation 
 0,25 
 
 2,5 
 
 7,5 
Uncertainty  Procedural 
 Structural 
 Fundamental 
 1 
 2 
 3 
Implementation 
challenge 
 Procedural 
 Structural 
 Fundamental 
 1 
 2 
 3 
Nature of work 
(in preceding 
task episode) 
 Scanning and undirected research (i.e., almost a 
“pre-issue” stage) 
 Directed research and gaining understanding 
(i.e., “it is a strategic issue, but we're not quite 
sure what to do with it yet”) 
 Planning for action (getting ready to implement) 
n/a 
Resourcing  Low  – “One man show” 
 Medium – 1…10 people (actively) involved 
 High – More than 10 people (actively) involved 
 1 
 5 
 15 
Amount of dis-
cussion notes  
Number of words in meeting minutes for topic n/a 
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Number of 
members in-
volved 
Number of members of the issue management board 
involved in preparing the topic for decision making 
n/a 
Number of visi-
tors involved 
Number of visitors (i.e., non-members of the issue 
management board) involved in preparing the topic 
for decision making 
n/a 
Rightness of de-
cision 
 Right 
 Somewhat right 
 Neutral 
 Somewhat wrong 
 Wrong 
 +2 
 +1 
 0 
 -1 
 -2 
Impact of deci-
sion 
 No concrete impact 
 Focussed impact on limited scale 
 Wide impact and implications for subsequent 
work 
 0 
 1 
 2 
 
The following discusses in detail each of the dimensions used to classify the issue topics 
for the analyses. 
Source of topic. Strategic issues may emerge from multiple sources into the organisa-
tion’s agenda. First, they can be noticed and put forward by top management, given that 
strategy is the domain of senior management in particular (Mintzberg, 1973). Second, 
strategic issues can be escalated from the various business units of the corporation, be-
cause business-specific issue may require input from the corporate level (Jackson, 
1992). Third, since strategic issue management represents a complement to the calen-
dar-driven planning process, open issues may be fed from the planning process into the 
issue management process (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton & Duncan, 1987b).  
Value at stake. The purpose of any business enterprise is to increase its shareholder 
value (Lazonick & O'Sullivan, 2000; Prahalad, 1994; Rappaport, 1986). Strategy is one 
important constituent element to that end, and its formulation should be focussed on the 
most significant decisions of the company (Porter, 1980). Therefore the most significant 
strategic issues that a company faces should also be the ones with the highest value at 
stake. Since defining exact values at stake can be difficult particularly in the absence of 
detailed financial models for each and every decision, the classification is operational-
ised by assessing the likely range of value at stake. The market capitalisation of the 
studied company during the time period of study ranged between USD 50 and 200 bil-
lion. Relative instead of absolute value at stake was used, since it better reflects the rela-
tive importance of a given decision vis-à-vis others and need not be recalibrated over 
time. Put differently, relative classification considers the decision within the decision 
making context of the management in the particular company. 
Uncertainty. Strategic issues are typically associated with high levels of uncertainty, 
which can influence both the interest the issues raise (Dutton & Webster, 1988) as well 
as their processing (Dutton & Duncan, 1987a). Reduction of uncertainty associated with 
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a strategic issue is a key task for the issue management process, where sense is made of 
otherwise ambiguous and equivocal strategic issues (Weick, 1995). For the purposes of 
this dissertation, uncertainty is defined as follows: Procedural uncertainty refers to a 
situation where the uncertainty can be recognised procedurally, and where the uncer-
tainty can be resolved analytically. In structural uncertainty, existing structures prevent 
the recognition of the issue as well as prevent resolving the uncertainty. Fundamental 
uncertainty refers to a situation where a fundamental inability to know regardless of 
analysis exists. However, fundamental uncertainty can be resolved over time (Kajanto et 
al., 2004). 
Implementation challenge. Similarly to the inherent uncertainty regarding the strategic 
issue, the perceived implementation challenge is likely to influence its processing 
(Dutton & Duncan, 1987a; Kuvaas, 2002). For the purposes of this dissertation, imple-
mentation challenge is defined as follows: in a procedural implementation challenge, 
existing structures do not restrain implementation, yet successful implementation is still 
dependent on the ability to plan and commit people appropriately. A structural imple-
mentation challenge refers to a situation where the prevailing structures and assets do 
not provide support for implementation. Rather, they would pose a barrier to implemen-
tation by either contradiction or cannibalisation. In fundamental implementation chal-
lenge, implementing the change is almost impossible (e.g., breaks the laws of nature, 
technology may be impossible to develop). However, as with the similar type of uncer-
tainty, fundamental implementation challenges may be mitigated through time (Kajanto 
et al., 2004). 
Nature of work. The processing of strategic issues can be defined as comprising three 
different stages, namely (i) Scanning, undirected research and problem recognition, (ii) 
Directed research and gaining understanding, and (iii) Planning for action (Kajanto et 
al., 2005). Each of the stages of the strategic issue management process entails different 
types of activities being performed by the organisation. First, in scanning stage, infor-
mation is being acquired about potential strategic issues (Aguilar, 1967). Second, in di-
rected research stage, strategic issues are recognised, isolated for further consideration, 
and interpreted (Dutton et al., 1983; Mintzberg et al., 1976). Third, in planning for ac-
tion stage, more detailed plans to implement the issue are made, buy-in is solicited from 
various organisational members, and momentum for change is created in the organisa-
tion (Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton & Duncan, 1987a, b).  
Resourcing. Strategic issues are often processed in taskforces that can have anything 
from a focussed to very extensive participation (Ansoff, 1980; Jackson, 1992). Task 
force size in itself has been found to be dependent on inherent characteristics and per-
ceptions of strategic issues (Dutton, 1986a). Resourcing is therefore likely to illustrate 
both how important the strategic issue is perceived as being as well as the difficulty of 
resolving it. 
Amount of discussion notes. Discussions in the strategy board meetings are captured in 
meeting minutes. Longer discussions – typically on more ambiguous and equivocal is-
sues – are likely to result in longer notes, thus acting as a proxy for allocation of meet-
ing time within the meeting (cf. Yu et al., 2005). Moreover, since making sense of stra-
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tegic issues takes place through the use of language (Weick, 1995), the length of meet-
ing notes indicates the extent of sensemaking carried out for the strategic issue. 
Number of members and visitors involved. Strategic issue processing in a corporation 
can rely extensively on the wide-ranging participation of the organisation, with much 
activity centred around a few key individuals but complemented by a large number of 
additional strategic issue management board members and visitors (i.e., non-members) 
(Jackson, 1992; Kunnas et al., 2006). The composition of the participants is also likely 
to influence the processing of strategic issues (Dutton & Duncan, 1987b). Therefore the 
number of members and visitors to the strategic issue management meetings are likely 
to reflect the different knowledge and competencies required to process strategic issues, 
depending both on their characteristics as well as the stage of the process. 
Rightness of decision. Strategy formulation should result in making decisions that re-
solve the given strategic problem on a rational basis (Allison, 1971). This implies that 
the rightness of the decision – assuming an optimal solution (cf. Taylor, 1911) – be-
comes an important measure of success of a strategic issue management system. The 
rightness of the decision describes the ability to of the strategic issue management sys-
tem to produce the correct outcomes. 
Impact of decision. The strategic issue management system needs not only to generate 
the right decision, but it also needs to generate momentum for change (Dutton & Dun-
can, 1987a). However, not all decisions – even if they were the correct ones – are im-
plemented and lead to strategic change (Ocasio, 1997). Therefore the impact of the de-
cision made is the other main success measure of a strategic issue management system 
(Schendel, 1992).  
3.3.3 Data Analysis 
The analysis proceeded in stages. First, the analysis focussed on making sense of the 
strategic issue management system of the case company in general by using a combina-
tion of grounded theory strategy and quantification strategy (Langley, 1999). The for-
mer was used to make sense of the organisation and its industry context, including the 
way the case company formulated its strategy both in its annual planning cycle, as well 
as in its ongoing strategic issue management process. Not only did this approach pro-
vide a thorough foundation for the rest of the research, it provided important clues into 
what the dimensions to be used when applying the quantification strategy should be. In 
other words, the significance of this work was to make sense of how the strategic issues 
themselves were processed in the strategic issue management system of the company, 
but also how that system is both explicitly and implicitly linked to the other processes 
and functions of the company.  
This stage of the analysis heavily leveraged the research team’s ability to rely on two 
members that were part of the case company, thus providing an in-depth understanding 
of the organisational phenomena in strategic issue management (cf. notion of clinical 
research; Normann, 1975). By combining the viewpoints of researchers and practitio-
ners, the research team was able to generate a rich description of how strategic issue 
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management operates in the case company, and how it is linked to the overall mecha-
nisms for attention allocation in the organisation. This comparative approach helped to 
gain further perspective on the data available (cf. Pettigrew, 1990). The resulting de-
scriptions also allowed for comparing the case company’s strategic issue management 
practices with other leading companies: The research team interviewed representatives 
of other companies as benchmarks, and studied the secondary material that is publicly 
available on the strategic planning practices of corporations such as Hewlett-Packard 
and IBM (Kajanto et al., 2004). This helped to further validate the research concepts to 
be applied in the study going forward. 
This sensemaking process provided the foundation for the quantification strategy. Based 
on the understanding of the strategic issue management system, a rich set of unique data 
was collected for a plethora of dimensions for all of the 92 topics that constituted the 16 
strategic issues the case company faced over the study period. The 92 topics were then 
coded based on a predetermined classification scheme (see Table 3.2 for details) to form 
a strong dataset that could be used for statistical testing (cf. Van de Ven & Poole, 1990).  
Second, a narrative strategy was applied (Langley, 1999). The first stage of research 
suggested that performing a “deep-dive” into one of the most central strategic issues 
could provide further illustration of how attentional processes on the organisational 
level affect the processing of a strategic issue over time. Drawing both on the qualitative 
and quantitative dataset compiled in the first stage, key organisational participants in-
volved in the strategic issue throughout its lifespan were identified and interviewed. The 
interviewees varied in terms of their positions during the lifespan of the strategic issue 
from middle up to senior management. Individual interview meetings were set up and 
conducted by one of the company insiders part of the research team. In addition to pro-
viding their views and recollections of the events, the interviewees provided additional 
documentary material from their own archives, including presentations at various stages 
to top management. This approached enabled the development of a “thick” description 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985) that helped to uncover the causal links that show how strategic 
issues are processed in organisations. Specifically, an explanation-building approach is 
used as analytic tool (Yin, 2003).  
Once the initial interviews were conducted and compared to the picture derived from 
the archival data to assess validity, a chronology of key events was constructed (cf. Bur-
gelman, 1996). The list of key events was then further analysed to achieve understand-
ing of organisational phenomena in strategic issue management by providing a “vicari-
ous experience” of a real setting in all its richness and complexity (Lincoln & Guba, 
1985: 359). What emerged from the analysis of the chronology of key events was a pat-
tern of cyclicality not unlike that observed earlier by Mintzberg et al. (1976). Within 
this cyclicality, the attention allocation processes of the organisation could then be ana-
lysed in more detail as they pertain to the different phases of strategic issue manage-
ment, including scanning, directed research and planning for action. Further analysis – 
as presented in Chapter 4 – through the lens of strategic issue management provided fur-
ther insights into the social, distributed nature of the strategic issue management process 
across the organisation, highlighting the role of social and organisational cognition 
(Ocasio, 1997) in the process. 
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Third, an innovative way to map the cognitive space of the strategic issue sensemaking 
process was developed utilising text analysis. Use of cognitive spaces to depict and ex-
plore the cognitive structures of members of organisations facing complex strategic is-
sues has become well-established in recent years (Eden, 2004). The benefit of graphical 
representations of cognitive spaces lies in their ability to simplify the complexity of or-
ganisational cognition (Eden et al., 1992). Graphically presented cognitive spaces make 
it “relatively easy to see how each of the concepts (---) relate to each other, and to see 
how the overall structure of the whole set of portrayed assertions” (Axelrod, 1976: 5). 
In other words, cognitive spaces can be seen as a visual aid in comprehending the un-
derstanding of particular elements of thoughts of an organisation (Eden, 1992a), and 
what the relationships between cognitive elements are (Huff & Fletcher, 1990). 
This research builds on Bougon’s (1992) notion that a congregate cognitive space is in-
herently linked to the strategy of the organisation, rather then an aggregation of individ-
ual cognitive spaces of top management team members. Thus the congregate cognitive 
space provides a holistic picture of the organisation’s overall perspective (Jenkins & 
Johnson, 1997), and allows reflecting managerial perceptions of strategic issues they 
face (Clarke & Mackaness, 2001; Eden, 2004).   
Yet because there are few well-developed, standard methods of constructing depictions 
of cognitive spaces, the analysis needs to be within the context of a clear theoretical 
framework and analytical purpose (Eden et al., 1992). Similarly the terminology to de-
scribe cognitive maps is to date scarce (Walsh & Fahey, 1986). Eden (1992a) argues 
that the ability of the map to model the cognitive space depends particularly on the 
method of elicitation of cognition, to which there are but a few well-developed methods 
(Eden et al., 1992). The concern lies primarily in the way that most representations of 
cognitive spaces are built based on interviewing: According to Weick (1995) articula-
tion and thinking interact, thus making the elicitation of cognition “out-of-step” with 
cognition before, during and after the elicitation process.  
To build a congregate cognitive space to illustrate the processing of strategic issues in 
the case company, this research leverages the discussion notes from the strategy board 
meetings in the case company. Covering all 92 topics constituting the entire strategic 
issue portfolio of the case company over three years, the discussion notes provide a 
unique view into the cognition of the management of the case company. Although re-
corded by a single individual (the same person throughout the study period) and thus 
prone to biases, the discussion notes have been circulated as standard practice shortly 
after the respective meeting amongst the participants to scrutinise the notes and provide 
feedback. Therefore the discussion notes can be seen to reflect the congregate view of 
the senior management rather than just the view of a single individual.  
A text analysis was performed on the discussion notes to identify the most common 
words in the set of discussion notes over a three year period. First, the 20 most common 
words (excluding articles and prepositions) used to document the strategy board’s dis-
cussion on strategic topics were identified. Second, each of the 92 topics constituting 
the strategic issues was then coded into 20 item vector corresponding to the occurrence 
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of these 20 words, which turned out to be a sufficiently fine-grained classification to 
generate insights into how management made sense of different types of topics.  
Third, social network mapping software UCINET (Borgatti et al., 2005) was then used 
to analyse the co-occurrence of the same words across topics. The so-called ‘spring em-
bedding’ algorithm was applied to perform a clustering of the topics in the network dia-
gram according to the geodesic distances between each pair of words, as determined on 
the basis of their co-occurrence in the notes of different strategic topics. The spring em-
bedding algorithm was superior to other network theoretical visualisations of the con-
cept relationships. For example, the principal component analysis tended to focus on the 
most commonly occurring worlds such as ‘business’, ‘market’, or ‘strategy’ and lump 
all the other less commonly occurring words together into the same cluster. The spring 
embedding algorithm enabled better visualisation of the largely implicit dimensions 
used by management when trying to make sense of the emerging strategic issues. In  
doing so, the complexity of cognitive spaces can be simplified through clusters, as the 
cognitive space breaks down into a system of interrelated themes (Eden, 2004) that can 
be analysed further, both in regard to the properties of the clusters themselves as well as 
the relationships between clusters.  
The results of the text analysis were used predominantly in the analyses that illustrate 
the effect of cognitive space on the processing of the strategic issues on the system 
level, as described in Chapter 5. In addition, the strategic issue categories constructed 
were utilised to augment the dataset from the first stage of the research to be used in the 
statistical analyses (Chapter 6). 
The statistical analyses were carried out using ordered logit regression. All the regres-
sions were performed using White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors. 
The data was also tested for multicollinearity problems inherent in the research setting. 
Throughout the research process, the emerging insights were continuously checked for 
validity in discussions with the project team, case company managers, and other experts 
(e.g., industry peers, other researchers). These discussions resulted in numerous revi-
sions and redefinitions of the constructs applied (cf. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997), and 
helped to develop and refine the insights emerging from the analysis. 
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4 Evolution of a Strategic Issue 
This chapter presents the evolution of a single strategic issue over time. Throughout the 
discourse, the point of view is distinctly on the strategic issue management procedure 
and its phases, from scanning through directed research and into planning for action. 
However, the chapter serves also to demonstrate how attention allocation and sensemak-
ing processes influence the evolution of the strategic issue. Using an inductive logic, 
this chapter aims at highlighting key aspects of strategic issue evolution that will be ex-
plored in more detail in the subsequent chapters of this dissertation. 
The discussion in structured as follows: first, a brief theoretical background is presented 
to set the context for the subsequent discussion. Second, an analysis of the case devel-
opment (largely in chronological order) is presented. Third, the key findings of the 
analysis are presented, including (i) Cyclicality of strategic issue processing, (ii) Strate-
gic issue urgency and timing, (iii) Multiplicity of strategic issue categorisation, (iv) The 
social, distributed nature of the process, and (v) Shifting taskforce composition. 
4.1 Theoretical Background 
The development of strategic issues is inherently a cyclical process, as strategic issues 
can only rarely be resolved in a single instance but typically require multiple, subse-
quent elaborations and decisions. Strategic decision processes usually begin with little 
understanding of the decision situation or the route to its solution, and only a vague idea 
about the solution and its eventual evaluation (Mintzberg et al., 1976). During the vari-
ous stages of the sensemaking process (Weick, 1995), the strategic issue is categorised 
(Dutton & Jackson, 1987), diagnosed (Dutton & Duncan, 1987a; Dutton et al., 1983) 
and interpreted (Dutton, 1993). The definition of the strategic issue is likely to change, 
as understanding increases: They may emerge with a narrow focus at the time of initia-
tion, but expand over time (Dutton, 1983), or may begin as a broad problem formulation 
and become focussed on more particular concerns during its duration (cf. Chapter 4 of 
this study). The cycles of sensemaking do not need to be strictly sequential, though, as 
gaps in strategic issue processing may occur (Dutton, 1983).  
In particular for strategic issue categorisation, framing has been established to have an 
important bearing on the response the strategic issue elicits in the organisation 
(Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). Particularly the framing of the strategic issue to represent 
either a threat or an opportunity has been a significant area of research (e.g., Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988). The argument for the influence of framing on 
organisational action is essentially two-pronged: First, threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et al., 
1981) posits that there are general tendencies for individuals, groups and organisations 
to behave rigidly in threatening situations. Second, prospect theory (Kahneman & Tver-
sky, 1979) states that presence of risk in decision situations influences the decision 
made. These suggest that categorisation appears to influence the direction of organisa-
tional actions, particularly when the events are categorised as threats. The results show 
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that control-reducing threats lead to more conservative internally directed actions, and 
that likely losses lead to riskier externally directed actions (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). 
Furthermore, in relation to the cyclicality of strategic issue processing in organisations, 
framing needs to be understood longitudinally (rather than in single-period models; cf. 
Gilbert, 2006). Each of the main phases or periods of the issue’s duration may exhibit 
distinct framings. Put differently, once the strategic issue definition changes, previous 
framings may or may not apply in the changed context. (The same obviously applies 
also to key assumptions as well as cognitive maps made of the strategic issue.)  
The involvement of the organisation and its actors can vary widely in different modes of 
strategic issue management. Group composition is likely to play a significant role both 
in the way strategic issues are processed and how good the decisions reached are 
(Jackson, 1992). For example, the diversity of participants is likely to lead to a greater 
number of strategic issues with broader scope identified (Dutton & Duncan, 1987b). Di-
versity can be the result of the involvement of, for example, both staff and line manag-
ers (Dutton & Duncan, 1987b), multiple organisational layers including middle man-
agement (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990), or visiting 
substance matter experts (Kajanto et al., 2005). However, deep and diverse participation 
may consume excessive managerial resources, increase the time needed to reach the de-
cision, and reduce the number of strategic issues that can be handled concurrently 
(Kajanto et al., 2004). Nonetheless, for example Kajanto et al. (2005) have found evi-
dence that the size and composition of the strategic issue management taskforces im-
pacts decision quality and impact, implying that it is worthwhile to consider the optimal 
organisation and staffing of the taskforces working on the strategic issues. 
4.2 Analysis 
The following lays out four distinct periods of the duration of the strategic issue as pre-
sented in Figure 4.1. For each period, key developments of the strategic issue are high-
lighted. 
Early 
investigations
First attempts 
to address the 
market
A new 
approach
Towards 
formation of an 
independent 
business
Months 1…25 Months 25…35 Months 35…51 Months 51…60
 
Figure 4.1 Four separate periods comprising the evolution of the strategic issue used as the 
case 
These periods will describe how the strategic issue has developed over time by explain-
ing how changes in the company’s environment, developments in its business, and 
changes in attentional processes have influenced the issue. In the interests of thorough-
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ness, a full list of events throughout the strategic issue lifecycle is presented for refer-
ence in the appendices. 
4.2.1 Period 1: “Early Investigations” (Months 1…25) 
The original stimulus for the whole chain of events came from outside the company. In 
the preceding couple of years, technological development within the industry and in ad-
jacent industries had been both rapid as well as widespread. These changes, widely dis-
cussed in the business press yet still inchoate in their factual development, caught the 
attention of one of the members of the top management, who assigned a number of task 
forces to assess the implications of the new technologies for the current business. One 
of the task forces was assigned to look into the impact in a specific, emerging segment 
of the market, out of which a significant new business opportunity for the company 
could develop. 
Top management felt that this market could be a vital avenue to manage the long-term 
development of the industry, while at least in part mitigating some potential threats in 
the environment. In essence, top management felt that the industry was approaching a 
new phase in its development and that this change could bring about potentially signifi-
cant changes to the industry structure, player roles, and, eventually, distribution of 
value. Given its advantageous position in the market, top management obviously felt 
that the company’s position should be protected. Whereas the likely outcome of this 
transition was impossible to sketch out conclusively, or even to some degree of reliabil-
ity in advance, top management could lay out some of the potential risks involved. The 
early task force work was perceived as providing at least some tentative ideas to manage 
any unpropitious industry transformation. 
As the first practical move, roughly half a year after initial deliberations, a dedicated 
sales unit was established within one of the regional entities. The choice for the specific 
regional set-up may have been influenced more by regional proximity and understand-
ing of the market overall rather than any particular features of the target market seg-
ment. In fact, the chosen region represented the home market for the company. This al-
lowed the company to begin exploring the new market in a familiar business environ-
ment while being supported by established reputation, contacts and market position. 
The unit was given the mandate to develop a new channel to address the novel market 
segment, and to work directly with customers while doing so. The direct sales approach 
was markedly different from the typical approach used by the company, yet it allowed 
the company to gain preliminary, first-hand experience of the market. 
However, after a year worth of experimenting with the new sales unit, top management 
felt that the currently rather limited channel strategy addressing the new market segment 
should perhaps be expanded into something more substantial. In particular, although top 
management may not have fully understood the market or its significance at this point 
yet, they saw the opportunity of developing the company’s position further. This may 
have been induced at least partly by exogenous factors: While the company had experi-
enced strong top-line and bottom-line growth for a number of years already, the stake-
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holder expectations for growth going forward remained substantial. This is likely to 
have induced an interest in top management to readdress the strategic issue. Put differ-
ently, the need or indeed pressure to deliver on the growth expectations may have con-
tributed to the increased interest in the thus far limited-scale exercise. 
4.2.2 Period 2: “First Attempt to Address Market” (Months 25…35) 
Based on the decision to expand the approach, a first proper strategic plan was devel-
oped in multiple stages and discussed amongst the top management. In the first stage, 
after a few months of task force work, a current state analysis of the extant approach 
was presented to top management. The key conclusion of this analysis and subsequent 
discussion was that a company-wide approach needs to be developed, thereby signifi-
cantly widening the scope of the work. Spending another month on developing a pre-
liminary approach, top management understood that establishing an advantageous posi-
tion in an adjacent, but somewhat related market would require a broad scope both in 
terms of activities and product and services offered. Prompted by this conclusion, top 
management decided that the initially proposed corporate-wide approach was insuffi-
cient per se, and would need to be complemented with the provision of additional prod-
ucts and services.    
However, some uncertainty and ambiguity existed regarding, for example, key differen-
tiating factors, as well as the significance of the business overall. On the one hand, per-
sistent uncertainty and equivocality about the key dimensions of the market led to a 
need for more investigation. A feasibility study commissioned by top management pro-
vided an indication of potential differentiating factors for the company against competi-
tion. On the other hand, however, top management felt that there was too much ambigu-
ity about key dimensions of the market at this stage, including the significance of key 
success factors and the importance of the market segment overall for the company’s 
growth strategy. Furthermore, the prevailing uncertainty also prevented the company 
from formulating holistic strategies to address the market. Consequently, top manage-
ment decided that the directed research to increase understanding should continue. 
Due to the conclusion that a comprehensive approach would be needed to succeed in the 
novel market, top management began to rethink which organisational entities would 
need to be included in the effort to devise a strategy for the business. Top management 
specifically discussed what the role of one of the units that had not been involved thus 
far should be, and yet no decision was taken at this point. However, a month later top 
management decided to bring a previously passive unit into the effort, arguing that their 
products would be important in the business in aggregate. 
4.2.3 Period 3: “A New Approach” (Months 35…51) 
In conjunction with the introduction of an additional organisational unit into the effort, a 
new task force work was kicked off to formulate a holistic strategy for the new market. 
This effort was led by a newcomer to the company, who had joined the company liter-
ally days before. A virtual outsider to the company was chosen, not only because of 
suitable functional experience, but also to provide an unbiased view to the effort. Re-
calling the situation later, he noted about the situation: 
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“When I was assigned to take a shot at figuring out a solution to this strategic 
issue, I essentially got two types of comments from various members of the or-
ganisation. The first was of the type ‘We have tried to solve this already earlier, 
so good luck with it!’, whereas the second type was along the lines of ‘Take the 
old slides and build a new presentation based on them’.”25  
The quote highlights important findings about how the strategic issue was perceived at 
this particular time within the organisation. It appears that there was a perceptible disbe-
lief about the attractiveness of the potential market altogether, as indicated by the first 
type of comment the task force leader received. The second comment suggests that the 
organisation perceived that all that needed to be understood had already been effectively 
researched, and that few additional things could be done to increase organisational un-
derstanding of the strategic issue.  
The disbelief about market potential was fuelled as customer spending in the core mar-
kets of the company, as well as in adjacent markets, declined rapidly. The market de-
cline also continued strongly in the following year. This adverse development further 
raised incredulity within the organisation as to the feasibility of the proposed market 
segment. Indeed, notes one interviewee: 
“Scepticism about the rationality of even considering the new market segment 
was great.”26  
The new task force work resulted in a revised, expanded approach to address the mar-
ket, and brought more organisational entities into the discussion. Previous efforts had 
not been able to develop a comprehensive approach and offering, and had limited con-
tacts to, and understanding of, the true needs of the customers. The work was also in-
strumental in itemising a number of drivers that could make reconsidering the approach 
to the market well-motivated. First, the customers, through their unique needs and be-
haviour, could serve as instrumental beachheads in pushing for the adoption of new 
technologies to the market. Second, beyond promoting new technologies, the customers 
could potentially have wider, indirect influence on a larger group of customers. Third, 
the market would have a good strategic fit with the existing business. Fourth, by enter-
ing the market, the company could have a possibility to mitigate a potentially substantial 
competitive threat in the future. Finally, the business opportunity could be substantial, 
as put in quite uncertain terms in a presentation to top management: 
“Our business opportunity [can be] anywhere from ‘slightly positive’ to ‘sig-
nificant.’”27 
                                                 
25  Source: Interview with David Harris 
26  Source: Interview with David Harris 
27  Source: Presentation to management by David Harris 
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Although investigations suggested that the existing approach had some deficiencies, 
based on further investigations management concluded that the company could, in fact, 
have an advantage over its competitors. Due to the inherent complexity of the products 
and related systems, the market could be difficult to approach as a new entrant. How-
ever, management thought that the company could leverage its existing products to en-
ter the market. 
Despite the multiple studies into the market, top management did not feel confident in 
the strategy developed, and prompted a new iteration to reach a concerted strategy. Al-
though much progress had been achieved in detailing the particulars of the strategy, top 
management felt that the extant approach still needed some sharpening. Based on a 
broad task force work, top management received an update on a preliminary, holistic 
approach to tackle the market. Management again stressed the systems approach and co-
operation with other industry players. 
While the market was still inchoate and hampered by setbacks in adjacent markets, 
management was concerned by the relatively slow development of the business for the 
company. Management therefore also considered an alternative positioning of the com-
pany in the novel market, an approach that would have required a radically different 
business model than that the company had previously employed. No clear decision was 
taken, however. This was not least influenced by the fear of retaliation from other indus-
try stakeholders who might feel threatened. In the preceding years, the company had 
become a significant player in its industry. This had caused some discord within certain 
stakeholders in the industry, who were apprehensive of the growing influence of the 
company. At the same time, nevertheless, the company felt that the other stakeholders 
could threaten its leadership position, since they were essentially controlling much of 
the consumer relationships. This drove the company to seek strategic options that could 
be implemented without the support of the concerned stakeholders. 
As the detailing of the strategy continued, inherent uncertainty still inhibited manage-
ment to make a committing decision to the market at that point. In the short-run, man-
agement decided that more emphasis would need to be placed on establishing product 
requirements for the new market, yet the results of these efforts served to support later 
efforts, too. Subsequent task forces focussed their efforts on more specific question ar-
eas. Specifically, a task force worked on establishing more detailed product require-
ments for the new market, followed by a need to devise a specific product strategy.  
Whereas the various efforts increased the company’s understanding of the new market, 
they also made explicit a number of potential strategic issues that the company faced as 
it contemplated how to enter the market. Specifically, various units were active, with 
multiple initiatives underway, yet the coordination between them was very low or even 
non-existent. A good description of this was provided by one of the interviewees: 
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“The coordination was inadequate already from the very beginning. This was 
further aggravated by one of the units who were for some reason not too willing 
to share information and participate in cross-company coordination.”28 
While the work with the concerted strategy was ongoing, top management raised a 
question of the organisational set-up that would be needed to run the effort in an optimal 
fashion. One option discussed was the establishment of an independent unit, yet that 
decision was not reached due to, for example, political pressure. In essence, reallocating 
the responsibility would have also implied a redistribution of organisational clout. Find-
ing the right leader for the unit proved to be quite difficult, too. As one observer re-
called: 
“[A senior manager] considered to lead the proposed entity appeared somewhat 
perplexed by the fact that his name had been brought into the discussion.”29  
However, an upcoming reorganisation in one of the business units was thought to ad-
dress the organisational problems around the new business, especially as the latest strat-
egy emphasised the coordination responsibility across various units. The premise, on 
which the new strategy was formed, was that the organisational fragmentation may not 
be an issue after all. Rather, one of the units would be in charge of creating the products, 
and the rest of the organisation would take care that the products would reach the mar-
ket. As described by one of the interviewees: 
“It was believed that somebody will handle [the sales] once the products are 
there.”30 
The question of appropriate organising seemed to underpin many of the discussions of 
the case. Throughout the period, the deficiencies of the organisational set-up were 
raised. Even top management seemed to acknowledge that at least part of the problem, 
in fact, was that the current organisational structure could restrict implementing a com-
prehensive strategy in the given market segment. However, notes an interviewee: 
“One of the fundamental obstacles of resolving the strategic issue overall was a 
lack of will amongst top management to settle the organisational problem be-
tween the various entities.”31 
                                                 
28  Source: Interview with Daniel Moore 
29  Source: Interview with Daniel Moore 
30  Source: Interview with George Brown 
31  Source: Interview with David Harris 
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4.2.4 Period 4: “Towards Formation of Independent Business” (Months 
51…60) 
Similarly to what already had happened once earlier, discussions amongst top manage-
ment raised concerns about the success of the now current approach. Management con-
sequently undertook a review of progress thus far, and concluded that the systems ap-
proach initially called for had not been fully implemented. A small team was set up to 
come up with plans to improve the situation, yet top management agreed that fixing the 
situation was a matter for the unit’s management and not a corporate-level strategic is-
sue. As one interviewee put it: 
 “[Top management] gave [the unit’s management] a new try to make a success 
out of the business.”32 
A number of factors contributing to the lack of progress can be identified. First, the ef-
fort to address the new market segment was split over multiple organisational units. 
Second, it remained unclear which of the units was to lead and which were to follow. 
Third, even within one of the units, different opinions existed as to the appropriate stra-
tegic direction and the areas of focus. Fourth, a member of the senior management run-
ning of one of the units may have been unwilling to let his unit to be overtaken by oth-
ers. 
Rethinking the corporate-level approach to the new market segment was initiated again. 
The apparent lack of progress in executing the current strategy for the new segment fo-
cussed the minds of the top management in order to assess how the current approach 
could be fixed. To this end, a large-scale task force work was established. The mandate 
of the team was as follows:  
“From a customer perspective, analyse strategic options and develop a strategic 
intent and key directions in the new segment for the company.”33  
Whereas this mandate was not fundamentally different from previous efforts, both the 
shortcomings of, and the lessons from, the previous efforts heightened the need to make 
a difference this time. With senior management ownership and broad-based participa-
tion, the team started by assessing the overall attractiveness and relevance of the market, 
as well as formulating tentative strategic directions. 
Somewhat by chance, an impending organisational change on the corporate-level made 
resolving the organisational issues less complicated. Although the organisationally dis-
tributed approach was questioned already at an early stage of the process, reaching a 
decision on the matter was never achieved, at least partially due to political and also 
technical implications. However, a planned restructuring on the corporate-level would 
                                                 
32  Source: Interview with David Harris 
33  Source: Kick-off meeting presentation by Paul Thompson 
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have made it possible to reassess the organisational issue with respect to the specific 
market.  
The corporate-level restructuring was announced only slightly later, yet planning for it 
had been already begun somewhat earlier, albeit only with a small core group. Nonethe-
less, as the organisational option becoming viable again, the task force work refloated 
the question of forming an independent organisational unit to house the currently dis-
persed activities. The impetus to bring the organisational option back into the discussion 
was an extremely weak signal from top management. As the primary driver of the task 
force work explains it:  
“[Around the months 55..57], I sensed from one of my discussions with a mem-
ber of the top management that they could be willing to accept a more radical 
organisational change proposal, and that something to that end had already 
been discussed at least initially.”34 
Other interviewees also recounted episodes supporting the above perception. One per-
son explained having received vague indications of a potentially upcoming organisa-
tional change a few months later: 
“I had some idea of an upcoming organisational change – if nothing else than a 
qualified guess based on experience – sometime [around month 60].”35 
Another interviewee recalled a similar incident from already a few months earlier: 
“Based on the way [a member of the top management] addressed a question re-
garding the organisation, I assumed that something must be going on in the 
background.”36 
Indeed, the validity of the indications was confirmed by a member of the top manage-
ment of the company: 
“The planning for the reorganisation had been initiated amongst a very small 
group of senior executives already during [the months 55…57].”37 
                                                 
34  Source: Interview with Paul Thompson 
35  Source: Interview with George Brown 
36  Source: Interview with Charles Jackson 
37  Source: Interview with Brian Smith 
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Based on the guidance from top management to focus on formulating an implementa-
tion plan, the task force ended up proposing setting up an independent organisational 
unit. This was recalled by one member of the task force as follows: 
“With hindsight, the question of resolving the organisational issue seemed to 
underpin the whole effort.”38 
This suggests that the guidance of top management helped to again raise the issue of the 
organisational set-up as part of the discussion, even though in an implicit manner. Fi-
nally, top management decided on establishing a single, independent unit while retain-
ing much of the earlier strategic directions as being valid. The decision to house all the 
activities in an independent unit was communicated on its own within weeks of the final 
decision, whereas the announcement of the larger organisational change took place only 
a few months later. By establishing an independent business unit, the strategic issue be-
came essentially solved from the point-of-view of the corporate strategic issue man-
agement system.  
4.3 Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter presented a deep-dive into the development of a single strategic issue 
(within the strategic issue management system of the company). The preceding discus-
sion has been focussing on the evolution of the strategic issue from the strategic issue 
management process perspective. In this setting, attentional processes both on the indi-
vidual and organisational levels act as mediating factors (while remaining in the back-
ground) to the strategic issue management process. 
The discussion provides five main observations from the case. First, the case highlights 
the cyclical nature of strategic issue management in corporations. Over a time span of 
five years, the strategic issue went through four distinct periods with somewhat unique 
problem formulations, punctuated by periods of implementation. Second, the case raises 
the question about appropriate timing and urgency to address the strategic issue. Being a 
first-mover may be advantageous particularly in technology-driven industries, yet it 
may allow others to “free-ride” on earlier investments. Third, the case highlights that 
categorisation of strategic issues does not take place in a clear-cut, threat-opportunity 
dichotomy, but that strategic issues can be categorised both as an opportunity and as a 
threat at the same time. Fourth, the findings provide support for the view of strategic 
issue recognition as a social phenomenon, leveraging a wide network of participants 
both internal and external to the company. Fifth and finally, during the four different 
periods of strategic issue processing, multiple changes were made in the leadership, or-
ganisational involvement, and key contributors to reflect changes in strategic issue defi-
nition.  
                                                 
38  Source: Interview with Charles Jackson 
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4.3.1 Cyclicality of Strategic Issue Processing 
This case excellently demonstrates the cyclical nature of the strategic issue management 
process (Ansoff, 1980; Dutton, 1983; Hendry & Seidl, 2003; Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
The overall length from initiation to close of the strategic issue was roughly five years. 
During this time, the strategic issue went through four distinct periods with somewhat 
unique formulations of the problem (cf. Dutton, 1983). These periods went through dis-
tinctive (adapted) cycles of problem formulation, interpretation and planning for action 
in the strategic issue management system, punctuated by periods of implementation in 
the organisation (put differently: temporal gaps for implementation). 
Over the course of the strategic issue’s lifespan, its definition changed as the issue and 
its implementation unfolded, yet the underlying raison d’être for the strategic issue re-
mained virtually unchanged: “How to address the new market in order to find sustain-
able, profitable growth for the company?” As an analogy, while the primary “colour” of 
the strategic issue stayed the same, its “shade” changed over time. During the first pe-
riod the focus was on gaining first insights into the market through taskforce work and 
real market activities. In the second period, the focus shifted to formulating the first 
strategic plan as well as putting it into implementation. In the third period the focus 
shifted again, this time towards clarifying the approach and organisational concerns, 
which were subsequently at the heart of the fourth period. 
The long duration of the strategic issue raises concerns, however. On the one hand, one 
can quite easily claim that such a complex, ambiguous strategic issue would in any case 
require a lengthy period to resolve. On the other hand, the long duration can be seen as a 
waste of time and valuable top management attention. So would the outcome of the stra-
tegic issue have been different if the company had been able to compress the time 
needed for the strategic issue processing? As the most plausible explanation, it is 
unlikely that faster processing would have yielded better results at least per se, as the 
most significant hurdle for the development of the strategic issue was in fact exogenous 
to the company (that is, the underdeveloped market environment). 
The strategic issue was brought back from implementation from the relevant organisa-
tional entities to the strategic agenda a number of times. The primary trigger seemed to 
be performance-related (cf. Mintzberg et al., 1976): In all three instances, top manage-
ment was concerned by the slow development of the business, thus prompting manage-
ment to reconsider the strategy. Whereas part of the shortfall from expectations was 
clearly attributable to encountering challenges in implementation within the company, 
the reason was partly exogenous to the company. As the market seemed to form and de-
velop considerably slower than was assumed in the company’s business plans, the de-
velopment of business results was also slower than anticipated. 
However, even though lacklustre performance was a major factor, triggering may not 
have been as monochromatic an event as it seems. Rather, other factors are likely to 
have played a role, too. At least organisational concerns seem to have contributed to 
triggering, in particular in the beginning of the fourth and final period (cf. Dutton, 
1983). 
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The early periods, which may not have yielded substantial financial results, nonetheless 
allowed the company to increase its understanding of the new market as well as to gain 
first-hand yet tentative experiences. The numerous studies conducted helped the com-
pany to solve some of the subissues and explicated a number of concerns, but also 
strengthened the basis for formulating subsequent strategies. Moreover, they may have 
acted as valuable probes for the future in areas unrelated to the strategic issue per se (cf. 
Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; McGrath, 1999; McGrath et al., 2004). 
The periods also demonstrate how attention was allocated to solving more particular 
questions as to the overall understanding of the strategic issue increased. Whereas in the 
first and second period the focus was largely on making sense of the strategic issue 
overall, focus subsequently shifted into solving more detailed sub-issues concerning, for 
example, the product offering. Interestingly, this development appears to be in contrast 
to Dutton’s (1983) finding that strategic issues tended to have a narrow focus at time of 
initiation but expanded over time. 
The periods also demonstrate a variety of different approaches of tackling the strategic 
issue. As a new organisational entity was established very early in the lifetime of the 
strategic issue, it gave the company a good way to gain preliminary experience of the 
market. These experiences not only provided the company a vehicle to conduct experi-
ments, that is, to test new propositions in the market place and learn from them as feed-
back from customers was channelled back.  
Whereas establishing a new entity provided a concrete way to develop the strategic is-
sue, persistent ambiguity made the company somewhat unwilling to commit to any one 
approach, though. The company sought to conduct more investigations into the strategic 
issue, thus hoping to reduce the ambiguity and equivocality of the situation. In one way, 
the case company appears to have implicitly treated the strategic issue more with a real 
option reasoning rather than with the conventional discounted cash flow approach (e.g., 
Adner & Levinthal, 2004a, b; Barnett, 2008; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004; McGrath et al., 
2004; Trigeorgis, 1996; Zardkoohi, 2004) as the strategic issue unfolded.  
However, this is unlikely to have been an explicitly chosen approach for two main rea-
sons. First, based on the company’s archival material and interviews with managers, 
real options reasoning was not prominently exercised in the company. Second, given the 
significant investments that were made into the market, the logic of the case does not 
seem to follow entirely the notion of real options providing a relatively inexpensive “en-
try ticket” to potential future opportunities (put differently, curtailing investments while 
preserving the option value). 
Moreover, as the investments took place over a prolonged period of time, the case could 
be described as having exhibited an escalation of commitment (Adner & Levinthal, 
2004a, b; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004; McGrath et al., 2004; Staw, 1981; Whyte, 1986; 
Zardkoohi, 2004). Yet as the eventual outcome has been at least a moderate success, 
this conjecture would appear to be somewhat misplaced. 
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4.3.2 Strategic Issue Urgency and Timing 
Another question related to the long duration of processing relates to the appropriate 
timing to put the strategic issue resolution into implementation. After all, having been 
identified, the strategic issue may not be so urgent that it would warrant immediate reso-
lution but merely monitoring (Dutton & Duncan, 1987a; Miller, 1982). Establishing the 
right timing for strategy implementation is one of the key questions a strategy needs to 
address in various areas, including product launches (e.g., Bayus et al., 1997), geo-
graphical market entry (e.g., Gaba et al., 2002), or innovation in general (e.g., Reinga-
num, 1989).  
Advantageous timing becomes even more important in technology-driven industries, 
where technological discontinuities (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) trigger the process of 
the “creative destruction” of industries (Schumpeter, 1943/1976). Increasing returns 
(Arthur, 1994, 1996) are idiosyncratic to knowledge-based industries, and are brought 
about by up-front costs (Dosi, 1996), network externalities (Economides, 1996; Katz & 
Shapiro, 1985; Liebowitz & Margolis, 1994a, b, 1995a, b) and learning curve effects 
(Arthur, 1996; Lieberman, 1987; Spence, 1981). Markets that are characterised by in-
creasing return adoption often exhibit path dependence, where small, ostensibly unim-
portant events in the history may determine market development, further amplified by 
positive feedback. Due to increasing returns, a path-dependent process may become 
locked-in to a technological path that is not necessarily efficient (Arthur, 1989).  
Numerous studies suggest that first-moved advantages do exist (e.g., Lambkin, 1988; 
Miller et al., 1989; Suarez & Utterback, 1995; Urban et al., 1986). Advantages of early 
entry comprise technological leadership, the pre-emption of scarce assets, and buyer 
switching costs (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Conversely, late entry may lock the 
company out from reaching a leadership position, and force it to adopt an existing tech-
nology. Furthermore, timing is not entirely within the control of the company, espe-
cially in terms of technical development, coproduction, user education, and learning ef-
fects (Grindley, 1995). Nevertheless, first-mover advantages are neither indisputable nor 
certain to prevail. Late-movers may benefit from the ability to “free-ride” on the first-
mover investments in technological development, the resolution of technical and market 
uncertainties, shifts in technology or market needs, and incumbent inertia, which all un-
dermine potential first-mover advantages (Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988). Further-
more, it is argued that there is no single time of entry that would be universally benefi-
cial, but that relationship between order of entry and competitive performance does ex-
ist (Lambkin, 1988).  
In the context of this particular strategic issue, the case company was clearly at least an 
early-mover (if not entirely a first-mover) in its new business. In the technology-driven 
industry that the case corporation operates in, and particularly in the new business area 
that overlapped multiple technical domains, being an early-mover is likely to have been 
an appropriate strategic posture. The learning effects from early market contact and 
technology development are likely to add to the benefits. However, these benefits did 
not come without cost. Engaging in a multi-year market and business ecosystem devel-
opment project certainly cannot have been an inexpensive exercise. Therefore, for this 
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particular case and for strategic issue management in general, one of the critical deter-
minants for success is to assess the urgency for the processing of a given strategic issue 
(Dutton & Duncan, 1987a). As this case demonstrates, much of the ambiguity regarding 
the appropriate timing is caused by an inherent uncertainty about the issue: Uncertainty 
whether the issue should be processed or not, as well as uncertainty how the issue 
should be resolved and brought to implementation (cf. Kajanto et al., 2004). 
4.3.3 Multiplicity in Strategic Issue Categorisation 
At first, the strategic issue was framed largely as a potential opportunity for the com-
pany. However, in addition to the opportunity-framing, the strategic issue was concur-
rently perceived to also constitute a potential threat. The threat-framing may have been 
caused by a fear on the part of top management that the technological change could 
mark the onset of long-term structural changes in the industry (Anderson & Tushman, 
1990; cf. Schumpeter, 1943/1976; Tushman et al., 1996). This change could have 
changed the sources of competitive advantage in the industry, thus threatening the es-
tablished and advantaged position of the company in its markets. This possibility under-
lined the need to look for new ways to manage industry development. Consequently, 
perception of the motives and aims of other actors in the business system shaped the 
decision and action premises. This bipolar perception of the strategic issue is largely 
related to its ambiguity (cf. Dutton, 1983), which remained substantial for a consider-
able time.  
Longitudinally, the decision episodes of the strategic issue moved around in their cate-
gorisation. In the beginning, threat-framing was most prevalent. As the strategic issue 
progressed market and implementation emphases became more typical. This shift in 
strategic issue categorisation coincides with the changing perception of the issue, and 
also its maturity. As the strategic issue became clearer during the progress of its proc-
essing, threat-framing may have lessened as the uncertainty related to the strategic issue 
was reduced.   
The rise of market-emphasis is likely to have been caused by the reoccurring shortcom-
ings in the performance of the business vis-à-vis set targets. These shortcomings were 
driven to a large extent by slower than anticipated development of the target market, 
further strengthening the market-emphasis categorisation at that point of time. Finally, 
as the concerns about the correct organisational set-up became substantial, the cognitive 
focus shifted to implementation emphasis.  
The multiplicity in framing raises important questions regarding the interpretation of the 
strategic issue and its implementation. Under the threat-rigidity thesis (Staw et al., 
1981), a response induced by an external threat may lead to severe forms of ‘group-
think’ (Janis, 1972) where cognitive flexibility is compromised. At the same time, threat 
perception is likely to increase commitment of resources, yet it is likely to narrow down 
cognition in exploring organisational routines as to how to allocate those resources 
(Gilbert, 2005). However, to secure both high commitment (through threat-framing) as 
well as flexible plans (through opportunity-framing), both frames need to coexist tem-
porally (Gilbert, 2006). 
 
  90
In the context of the case strategic issue, perception of a threat was evident in particular 
as the strategic issue emerged and was interpreted. In essence, it is likely that threat-
framing has been instrumental in putting the strategic issue on the organisational agenda 
in the first place. Moreover, threat-framing helped to secure the organisational commit-
ment to resolving the strategic issue, and to allocate sufficient resources to do so. How-
ever, at the same time, threat-framing may have automatically limited organisational 
flexibility to explore all possible options to resolve the strategic issue. Nonetheless, a 
potential solution to the strategic issue was indeed found, and it was even perceived as 
an opportunity for the company. Consistent with the notion of opportunity-framing pro-
viding flexibility in execution, a variety of approaches were used over the multi-year 
resolution of the strategic issue. However, this may have led to a situation where mana-
gerial cognition did, in fact, clamp down on the potential solution so that the threat-
induced initial resource commitment was never strongly challenged. This can be seen to 
suggest that if the strategic issue is initially perceived as a threat, to which an opportu-
nity-framed solution is found, managerial cognition can be rigidified so that initial 
commitment cannot easily be questioned – a case where sequential threat-opportunity 
framing is not be enough to open up managerial cognition for the exploration of strate-
gic options (cf. Gilbert, 2006). 
4.3.4 Social, Distributed Process 
The original stimulus to initiate any activity regarding the strategic issue was exogenous 
to the company. In fact, it was largely technological developments that caught the atten-
tion of one member of the top management, coupled with an interest for any impending 
business opportunity. However, it was the growth strategy of the company that induced 
the interest to expand the approach to the new market segment. Overall, the case sup-
ports the notion of strategic issue emergence being a social process (cf. Eden, 1992b; 
Weick, 1995). While the origin of the strategic issue can be attributed to top manage-
ment, it is likely that the problem formulation has taken place in a wider setting. This is 
likely to have involved a large network of organisational members, but also potentially 
outsiders to the company (cf. Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). 
Only a minority of the topics handled in the strategic issue management processed per-
tained to the phase of scanning. This does not imply, however, that the process was not 
concerned with scanning for and identifying new strategic issues. Instead of a formal 
and explicit process for scanning, a social and distributed process seemed to have been 
responsible for feeding new strategic issues onto the strategic agenda of the corporation. 
Although only anecdotal evidence exists to support the proposition, the following ac-
count of the scanning process seems reasonable: first, on the individual level, various 
weak signals catch the individual’s attention and are fitted to the prevailing individual 
cognition, thus representing a cognitive formation process that is typically not expli-
cated or revealed to others.  
Second, these weak signals are then strengthened through discussions amongst key stra-
tegic decision makers and experts internally, but also to some extent externally (cf. Par-
outis & Pettigrew, 2007). From a cognitive perspective, social and structural cognition 
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play a substantial role at this point: discussions with other individuals help to clarify the 
relationships between complex strategic issues and established cognition.  
Third, the discussions not only provide cognitive assistance, but they can also provide 
social support and encouragement for proceeding with the initial strategic issue. With 
enough social and organisational backing, the potential strategic issue will be admitted 
as part of the strategic issue portfolio of the company. 
4.3.5 Shifting Taskforce Composition 
During the four different periods of the processing of the strategic issue, multiple 
changes were made to the formation of actors involved both in the processing of the 
strategic issue as well as the organisational structure assigned to implement the deci-
sions. This observation is well in line with Dutton’s (1983) finding that key sponsors 
and organisational arrangements are important determinants of changes in the definition 
of a strategic issue.  
Changes in organisational involvement in implementation were performed based on two 
different arguments. First, on quite practical grounds, expanding the approach in the 
progress of strategic issue processing to a more comprehensive one drove top manage-
ment to reconsider the involvement of organisational entities. Second, at some point the 
existing organisational set-up was viewed as potentially insufficient to fully drive the 
new market segment. Establishing an independent unit was therefore considered, yet 
rejected after deliberation. However, an impending organisational change on the corpo-
rate level made resolving the organisational issues less complicated, paving the way for 
the independent unit. 
Each of the periods involved changes to the key contributors to the task forces. Of con-
sequence are the changes in the owners of the particular task forces during the periods. 
To some extent this reflects the changing nature of sub-issues to be resolved: new task 
force owners were assigned to bring in particular knowledge or competencies into the 
processing of the strategic issue. More importantly, though, changes in task force lead-
ership were made as new approaches to resolving were needed: the new task force own-
ers were perhaps thought to bring in novel views to the problem. This seems to have 
been the case particularly when a recent recruit to the company was named as the task 
force leader. 
In addition to the explicit, formal coordination of the task force work and its partici-
pants, a key characteristic would seem to be the use of autonomous, self-configuring 
networks in the process. Despite the fact that employees tend to participate in multiple 
communities and social networks outside the organisation, the internal communications 
patterns of many firms tend to resemble the formal hierarchical structures of the com-
pany (Burt, 2004; Han, 1996). The self-configuring internal networks provide the means 
to pool resources to make sense of strategic issues and develop plans for an appropriate 
response at the same time as the organisation is otherwise proceeding according to its 
strategic objectives put forward in the company’s overall strategic plan. 
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This finding seems to be also in line with recent findings on communication and coordi-
nation in large organisations. Evidence in the study by Kleinbaum et al. (2008) suggests 
that whereas formal structures of the organisation are influential in guiding communica-
tion, they are substantially augmented by informal, boundary-spanning communication 
in personal networks (cf. Hoon, 2007; Ocasio & Joseph, 2006), as is also evident in this 
case. Coordination in self-configuring internal networks does not necessarily mean that 
senior management would have no control over the networks, however. Coordination 
can occur through the actions of a few key people, who manage either the strategic issue 
management process in general on the corporate level, or through people that are lo-
cated in a structurally central position in the organisational network (cf. Kunnas et al., 
2006).  
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5 Cognitive Space of Strategic Issue Processing  
This chapter presents how the cognitive space of the case company influences strategic 
issue processing, building upon the findings of the preceding chapter, and links them 
into the discussion of cognitive spaces of strategic issue processing. In so doing, the 
present discussion revisits the strategic issue that was described longitudinally in the 
previous chapter. The earlier discussion, portraying the origins of the strategic issue 
from the very beginning, gave a description of the social process through which strate-
gic issues emerge and become explicated in the system.  
The discussion highlights how cognitive spaces can describe the strategic discourse tak-
ing place as the strategic issues are processed, and how the cognitive spaces can be il-
lustrated through the language employed in those discourses. Through the analysis of 
the cognitive space, this chapter deals with (i) strategic issue categorisation and (ii) spa-
tial configuration and temporal evolution of strategic issues in the cognitive space. 
5.1 Theoretical Background 
Organisations typically share a common mental set of beliefs and views that are used as 
lenses through which strategic issues are processed (e.g., Kiesler & Sproull, 1982). 
These mental models or knowledge structures play a vital role in organisational infor-
mation processing (Barr et al., 1992). For the purposes of this research, “cognitive 
spaces” can be defined as the “images and patterns engaging the mind when consider-
ing markets, products, industries, boundaries, strategies and capabilities” (Leibold et 
al., 2004: 62).39 Cognitive spaces comprise the mindsets, beliefs and attitudes that the 
organisation holds as an idealised cognitive model, and not necessarily a faithful repre-
sentation of reality (Fauconnier, 1985). On the individual level, organisational partici-
pants construct meaning in their minds by putting together similar mental models 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983). 
Cognitive spaces provide organisations a medium in which cognitive activities can take 
place (Baars, 1997; Fauconnier, 1985). Within cognitive spaces individuals and organi-
sations process information for the purposes of understanding and action. A plethora of 
cognitive spaces can be interconnected, and they can be modified as thought and dis-
course unfold (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998). For example, Leibold et al. (2004) argue 
that whereas cognitive spaces typically constrain organisations in their thinking, manag-
ers can use appropriate levers to cultivate mindsets conducive to changing their busi-
ness. Although cognitive space is one part of human and organisational cognition, it 
does not define thought processes, methods for interaction with external stimuli, mem-
ory, or other cognitive processes, however (Newby, 2001).  
                                                 
39  “Cognitive spaces” are sometimes also called “mental spaces” (e.g., Fauconnier, 1985). For the pur-
poses of the present discussion, these terms can be regarded as interchangeable. 
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Cognitive space links integrally to the theories underpinning the present research. First, 
from the perspective of the attention-based view of the company (Ocasio, 1997), cogni-
tive space belongs to the domain of the principle of situated attention. As part of the 
situated attention in the organisation, the cognitive space shapes the organisation’s and 
individuals’ focusing of attention and action. Second, in a similar vein, the sensemaking 
perspective (Weick, 1995) stresses how the organisation and its members construct 
meanings out of ambiguous and equivocal situations, and thereby utilise and update 
their cognitive spaces.  
Cognitive spaces are inherently connected to linguistics through their application in 
cognitive semantics (e.g., Fauconnier, 1985, 1997; Fauconnier & Turner, 1998; John-
son-Laird, 1983; Schlesinger, 1995). In cognitive semantics, interpretations are relative 
to cognitive spaces rather than being context-independent (Fauconnier, 1997).40 Incor-
porating context into cognitive semantics is achieved by assuming that truth values are 
incomplete as in situation semantics (Barwise, 1989), or that categories (types) are in-
complete as in generative lexicon (Pustejovsky, 1995), and by assigning these based on 
context. 
Strategies are abstractions in the minds of the managers (Mintzberg, 1987), which 
emerge from the sets of ideas and constructs through which strategic issues are identi-
fied and interpreted (Hedberg & Jönsson, 1977). The relationship between cognitive 
spaces and strategies can be made on multiple levels, including individual members of 
senior management (e.g., Calori et al., 1994) as well as on top management (e.g., Bou-
gon, 1992) levels.  
The newly emerging field of strategy-as-practice (e.g., Jarzabkowski, 2004, 2005; John-
son et al., 2003; Kaplan, 2007; Whittington, 1996, 2007) has made frequent comments 
that touch the area of strategic issue management by focussing on the microlevel proc-
esses and practices constituting strategy and strategising. Strategic practices include 
administrative and episodic as well as discursive practices (Jarzabkowski, 2005). Organ-
isational discourse can be regarded as being significant for strategy processes, as lan-
guage can be seen not only as enabling information exchange but also as constructing 
social and organisational reality (Dandridge et al., 1980; Pondy & Mitroff, 1979), high-
lighting the intimate relationship between language and organisation (Daft & Wiginton, 
1979). In particular, strategy is often shaped through discussions around the organisa-
tion (Samra-Fredericks, 2003). 
The discursive perspective to strategy (e.g., Vaara et al., 2004) rests on the assumption 
that structural aspects such as language are not separate from participants’ actions in the 
organisation (Giddens, 1976/1993). In organisational discourse, both communicative 
actions on the surface level and discursive structures on the deeper level are recursively 
linked through the actors’ cognitive spaces (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001). Discursive 
structures are largely implicit, inter-textual, trans-temporal and trans-situational 
                                                 
40  Context-independent semantics often refers to the so-called Montague grammar, which is limited by 
the context-dependent variability in the word sense (e.g., Dowty et al., 1981).  
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(Heracleous & Hendry, 2000), and are manifested, instantiated or challenged in daily 
communicative actions (Heracleous, 2006). Action arises out of cognitive spaces, and 
new experiences further influence cognitive spaces, and thereby subsequent action 
(Gioia, 1986a, b).  
5.2 Analysis 
The results of the network analysis of the cognitive space are discussed subsequently in 
more detail. First, the clusters within the cognitive space are presented in order to dem-
onstrate how the case company categorises its strategic issues. These clusters will also 
provide a useful way to control the types of strategic issues in the analysis of strategic 
issue attention allocation in Chapter 6. Second, four different strategic issues out of the 
strategic issue portfolio of the case company are portrayed, so as to illustrate how dif-
ferent types of strategic issues evoke different sets of the cognitive space, and how the 
strategic issues evolve within the cognitive space as they are processed in the strategic 
issue management system of the company.  
5.2.1 Strategic Issue Categorisation 
Figure 5.1 presents the cognitive space of the case company based on the text analysis 
performed. The result of the network analysis is a graph mapping the co-occurrence of 
the most common 20 words in the meeting notes of the studied 92 topics. In the graph 
the small solid circles represent the 92 topics coded according to the coding scheme. 
The small solid squares represent words that were mentioned in the notes of those topics 
that are linked to them. The words that are located closer to each other in the graph had 
a higher co-occurrence than words that are located more distantly from each other.  
The mapping of the words revealed the key distinctions used by the management in the 
case company to make sense of strategic issues. Based on the network analysis, the dot-
ted circles and their associated labels have been added later to demonstrate the cluster-
ing of the most co-occurring words together in the cognitive space.  
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Sensemaking emphasis
Implementation emphasis
Threat framing
Opportunity framing
Resource emphasis
Market emphasis
 
Figure 5.1 Dichotomies for categorising strategic issues in cognitive space derived with text 
analysis 
In addition to extending the understanding of strategic issue categorisation beyond the 
threat-opportunity dichotomy, these results will be used in subsequent analyses in Chap-
ter 6 to link attention allocation and cognitive space to strategic issue management sys-
tem performance. 
Multiple Dichotomies for Strategic Issue Categorisation 
Consistent with previous research (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987), a distinction is appar-
ent between labelling a topic an ‘opportunity’ or a ‘threat’ (the case company tended to 
use the word ‘challenge’). Interestingly, however, this categorisation of topics into 
threats and opportunities does not seem to be as central for the case organisation as im-
plied by the prior strategic issue management research.  
As an even stronger dimension, the dichotomy between ‘understanding’ of what is hap-
pening in the business environment and ‘implementation’ becomes apparent. It is inter-
esting to note that in the case company the sensemaking related to ‘understanding’ is 
close to the word ‘technology’ instead of, for example, ‘implementation’. This is a re-
flection of the case company specific importance of making sense of how the case or-
ganisation should deal with rapid technological changes that are taking place – after all, 
the case company’s industry is a high-velocity, technology-driven environment (cf. Eis-
enhardt, 1989c). 
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Finally, as the third key dimension of the cognitive space, a dichotomy of ‘resources’ 
versus ‘market’ is found. In the resources area, the words ‘vision’, ‘resources’ and ‘fo-
cus’ tend to cluster together. Here management tends to deal more with business-
specific strategic issues in contrast to the market dimension that would seem to be asso-
ciated with the ‘corporate’ dimension. The resource dimension would seem to relate 
more to the opportunity and understanding aspects of strategic issues, whereas market-
related topics are related to challenge and implementation aspects of strategic issues. 
This collocation of the words market, implementation and challenge could very well 
imply that many of the market-related topics are concerned not merely about perform-
ance gaps against the market development, but about how market development coupled 
with concerns of implementation are likely to be perceived as threats to the company.  
Within the strategic issue portfolio of the case company, strategic issues were catego-
rised using all three dichotomies, so each strategic issue could have multiple labels. In 
fact, on average, each topic was associated with c. 1.3 categories at the same time. 
Characteristics of Strategic Issue Categories 
Table 5.1   presents summary statistics for topics belonging to each of the strategic issue 
categories as defined above.  
The opportunity–challenge dichotomy did not appear to be central in the strategic issue 
management system of the case company, as only a handful of strategic issues out of the 
entire portfolio were associated with the opportunity–challenge dichotomy (only 13% of 
topics were categorised as either an opportunity or a challenge). Overall these topics 
tended to focus on planning for action rather than directed research, with more than 
80% of topics involving planning for action. However, topics categorised as opportuni-
ties were on average more likely to have almost twice the value at stake (often more 
than 5% of market capitalisation) than topics regarded as challenges. Opportunity-
related topics had, in fact, the highest average value at stake by a significant margin out 
of all the topics analysed. In terms of resourcing, topics categorised as challenges had 
overall the highest average resourcing levels out of all topics, with typically either 
1…10 people or even more than 10 people actively involved. Also in relation to oppor-
tunities, challenge-topics had on average higher resourcing (cf. Dutton & Jackson, 
1987), although the effect is less pronounced than with other categories. What is sur-
prising, though, is that although opportunity-topics had higher values-at-stake, they had 
lower resourcing and resulted in lower decision quality on average than challenge-topics 
(with equal average impact).  
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Table 5.1 Summary statistics for strategic issue categories41 
 Dichotomy 1 Dichotomy 2 Dichotomy 3 
 Threat Oppor-
tunity 
Sense-
making 
Imple-
menta-
tion 
Market Resour-
ce 
Number of topics 6 6 40 22 43 26 
Top manage-
ment 
67% 50% 73% 68% 77% 65% 
Escalated 
from business 
33% 50% 28% 27% 23% 31% Source 
Planning 
process 
0% 0% 0% 5% 0% 4% 
Value at stake  3.4 6.7 3.8 4.2 3.8 3.3 
Uncertainty  1.7 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.8 1.9 
Implementation chal-
lenge  
1.8 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.6 1.7 
Scanning  0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
Directed re-
search  
17% 17% 38% 36% 40% 46% Nature 
of work Planning for 
action 
83% 83% 63% 64% 60% 54% 
Resourcing 10.0 8.3 7.4 7.3 7.7 6.5 
Amount of discussion 
notes 
81 101 129 135 120 144 
Members 0.8 0.8 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.5 Ivolve-
ment Visitors 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.3 1.4 1.7 
Rightness  1.3 0.7 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 Out-
come Impact  1.5 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.6 1.6 
 
The sensemaking–implementation dichotomy was almost equally prevalent in the case 
company as market-resource focus, with 67% of topics belonging to the former and 
75% to the latter. In the sensemaking–implementation dichotomy, the focus in the case 
company was on sensemaking almost with a ratio of 2:1. A great deal of topics proc-
essed were in fact related to understanding the strategic issues more thoroughly, again 
underlining the inherent uncertainty and ambiguity associated with strategic issues. 
However, sensemaking-focus does not seem to be related to the amount of discussion 
notes generated in the strategic issue management meetings, since both sensemaking- 
and implementation-related topics tended to generate on average notes of equal lengths. 
Both categories had only somewhat higher than average values-at-stake, were over-
whelmingly driven by top management, and focussed on planning for action over di-
rected research with a split of roughly 60% vs. 40%.  
                                                 
41  Values in the table are averages per topic unless otherwise indicated. 
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What makes sensemaking-related topics unique, though, is their reliance on outside ex-
pertise: out of all categories, sensemaking-focussed topics had more than four times the 
number of visiting experts to the standing members in the strategic issue management 
meetings. While sensemaking-related topics do not necessarily generate more discus-
sion notes, their resolution seems to require a wider network of organisational partici-
pants. The effect is even stronger for topics that require sensemaking of technology – 
these terms are closely related in the case company’s cognitive space. For technology-
related topics, the strategic issue management forum needed to seek experts beyond its 
own ranks by a factor of seven!  
The third dichotomy, market vs. resources, is the most common one within the strategic 
issue management system of the case company: 75% of all topics are categorised within 
this dichotomy. Resource-focus tends to be categorised by the highest amount of discus-
sion notes, perhaps suggesting that the discourse between top management and business 
unit management is extensive. Market-focussed topics are most often initiated by top 
management (in 77% of cases), which supports the finding that these topics tend to be 
related to opportunity and understanding aspects of strategic issues. As with the previ-
ous dichotomy, the breakdown of work seems to be roughly 60% vs. 40% between 
planning for action and directed research. Out of all topics, however, resource-focussed 
ones tend to have, on average, the lowest resourcing. As these topics are often related to 
individual business sectors that the corporation operates in, one could argue that these 
strategic issues leverage resources in the particular business units beyond the typical 
strategic issue management network. This finding would be supported by a visitor-to-
member ratio far higher than the average (and only surpassed by sensemaking-related 
strategic issues). 
5.2.2 Strategic Issues in the Cognitive Space of the Company 
This section portrays four strategic issues in the cognitive space of the case company. 
The purpose of the discussion is to highlight how different strategic issues evoke differ-
ent parts of the cognitive space due to their intrinsic characteristics. This phenomenon 
will be described both from a static perspective highlighting the overall area of focus in 
the cognitive space, as well as from an evolutionary perspective, by describing the paths 
of the strategic issues as they develop in the strategic issue management system of the 
company. The strategic issues have been selected out of the entire strategic issue portfo-
lio so as to illustrate these two viewpoints effectively. 
Table 5.2 presents summary statistics for the case issues. 
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Table 5.2 Summary statistics for case issues42 
 Issue 
 I02 I03 I06 I15 
Number of topics 15 9 5 8 
Top management 80% 56% 0% 0% 
Escalated from 
business 
7% 33% 100% 100% Source 
Planning process 13% 11% 0% 0% 
Value at stake  4.0 2.1 2.6 1.7 
Uncertainty  1.7 2.2 1.8 2.0 
Implementation challenge  1.5 1.8 1.4 1.8 
Scanning  13% 0% 0% 0% 
Directed research  33% 56% 100% 38% Nature 
of work Planning for ac-
tion 
53% 44% 0% 63% 
Resourcing 9.0 6.1 4.2 4.0 
Amount of discussion notes 89 144 106 55 
Members 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.1 Involve-
ment Visitors 1.7 2.3 0.8 1.5 
Rightness  1.6 0.3 1.8 0.9 Out-
come Impact  1.8 1.3 1.4 0.9 
Threat 1 0 0 0 
Opportunity 0 0 0 1 
Sensemaking 6 4 2 5 
Implementation 3 2 0 0 
Market 8 3 2 0 
Number 
of cate-
gorisa-
tions 
Resource 2 5 1 2 
 
Strategic Issue I02: Formulating Approach for a New Market Segment43 
The main problem in strategic issue I02 was how the case company could develop a 
suitable approach to address a new, growing segment of the market – underpinned by 
the notion that the company needs to seek new growth areas that would supplement the 
perhaps decreasing growth in its main market segments. However, inherent uncertainty 
about the market’s viability and the company’s competitive advantage in the market as 
well as challenges in implementation persisted through most of its lifetime. 
                                                 
42  Values in the table are averages per topic unless otherwise indicated. 
43  Strategic issue I02 was presented in depth in Chapter 4, which detailed how the strategic issue was 
processed from its emergence to (final) implementation in the organisation. The present discourse 
links the earlier discussion on longitudinal evolution of the strategic issue with the characteristics of 
and dynamics within the cognitive space of the corporation. 
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Figure 5.2 shows strategic issue I02 in the cognitive space of the case company. This 
strategic issue exhibits a heavy market-emphasis throughout. In the resources–market 
dimension – the dominant dichotomy for the strategic issue – only two topics are asso-
ciated with resources, while eight are associated with markets. Market emphasis is 
likely to reflect the nature of the strategic issue, that is, defining an appropriate way to 
address a new, emerging market segment for the company. As the strategic approach is 
developing and being implemented, however, some of the market-emphasis gives way 
to resource-emphasis. 
Sensemaking emphasis
Implementation emphasis
Threat framing
Opportunity framing
Resource emphasis
Market emphasis
 
Figure 5.2 Strategic issue I02 in cognitive space: Formulating approach for a new market 
segment 
In the sensemaking–implementation dimension, the sensemaking-emphasis also domi-
nates for the majority of the duration of the strategic issue. Given the ambiguity and un-
certainty about the potential target market segment, as well as the company’s competi-
tive advantages, sensemaking played a substantial role in strategic issue processing. 
What makes the sensemaking phenomenon particularly interesting is that it seems to 
take place rather intermittently: Three points of time (topics 106, 116 and 120; 204 and 
208; and 225) seem to be associated with sensemaking, while other topics are not. This 
implies that strategic issue processing would exhibit cyclicality, where periods of sen-
semaking are followed by more concrete execution – a hypothesis that receives further 
evidence in Chapter 4. 
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Whereas the threat–opportunity dimension is not central to this strategic issue (only one 
topic was categorised in this dichotomy), the topics tend to be framed more in terms of 
threat than opportunity. This seems to be driven largely by how the cognitive space of 
the company is set up, since market-related topics are closely associated with threats 
overall. Consequently the cognitive shift regarding strategic issue I02 more towards op-
portunity-framing would appear to be driven by changes in the two other dichotomies 
rather than by the threat–opportunity dichotomy per se. 
Strategic Issue I03: Dealing with Long-Term Profit Pool Options 
The main thrust of strategic issue I03 (depicted in Figure 5.3) concerned the problem of 
how the corporation should address the technological changes and possible shifts in 
profit pools in its industry. As technological development in the company’s business 
environment progressed rapidly, potential new business opportunities began to emerge 
for various new entrants previously not in the core of the industry where the case corpo-
ration was a leading player. Although this had not yet been fully materialised, the corpo-
ration saw that this development was more than likely to happen in the future, and there-
fore wanted to preserve its competitive position as well as its share of the industry profit 
pool going forward.  
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Figure 5.3 Strategic issue I03 in cognitive space: Dealing with long-term profit pool options 
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The formulation of the problem was quite straightforward for strategic issue I03, be-
cause such technology-driven migrations in profit pools have been well recognised as a 
phenomenon (e.g., Schumpeter, 1943/1976). Examples of such developments include 
what happened in the computer disk drive (Christensen, 1993), slide rule (Acee, 2001), 
personal computer (Casadesus-Masanell & Yoffie, 2007; Gawer & Cusumano, 2002; 
Steinbock, 2003) and digital photography (Zelten, 2000) industries. In a way, the defini-
tion for this strategic issue was developed based on an analogy from similar cases in 
history. The case company’s concern was that the same development of value migration 
would likely take place also in their particular part of the information technology and 
communications market. 
Strategic issue I03 was predominantly about capturing value beyond this migration. The 
problem to be solved was, in essence, whether there would be a relevant opportunity 
emerging for the company beyond its current position in the industry. At the same time, 
another strategic issue also looked into the same overall question of long-term industry 
evolution, namely strategic issue I01. The main difference between these two strategic 
issues was the part of the value network of the industry they pertained to, as well as the 
likely timeframe associated with the potential changes. Since strategic issue I03 had a 
considerably longer time-to-market and since its inherent uncertainty was far greater 
than I01 had, I03 related to a completely different part of the cognitive space of the 
company. Whereas I01 was about approaching the market in the right way and making 
sure that implementation was suitable and effective, I03 concerned both long-term re-
source allocation towards the potentially new market as well as making sense out of the 
ambiguous and equivocal strategic issue (as shown through resource- and sensemaking 
emphases). One section of the notes illustrates the situation: 
“We do not have an understanding of what our end target is [for this strategic 
issue]. (---) We have only elements of initial directions defined.” 
I03 could even leverage the development of I01, at least if things were to develop propi-
tiously to the company. However, value at stake was not perceived to be very great, 
perhaps due to somewhat lacklustre developments in the market at the time. However, 
given that I01 was assumed to materialise in a shorter timeframe than I03, its value 
should be, ceteris paribus, be higher. One should also note that dividing the exact val-
ues for strategic issues that are at least somewhat related (like I01 and I03) is quite chal-
lenging, because of the ability of a significant industry player to influence the locations 
of the profit pools within the value chain.  
In addition to being concerned about resource-allocation to build the new business area, 
senior management devoted considerable resources into making sense of the strategic 
issue, as is evidenced by very extensive notes from the strategic issue management 
meetings. Indeed, commensurate with its nature, most topics under this strategic issue 
were initiated by the top management, thereby suggesting that reasoning by analogy 
(e.g., Gavetti et al., 2005; Juthe, 2005) is a matter for senior leaders in the organisation.  
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Strategic Issue I06: Monitoring Industry Technology Adoption   
Strategic issue I06 was concerned with monitoring the adoption of a novel technology 
in the market. Technology adoption in information and communications technology in-
dustries often involves multiple, competing technologies, out of which a dominant de-
sign emerges (Henderson & Clark, 1990). Underpinning strategic issue I06 was both the 
question of whether the technology supported by the case company would emerge as the 
dominant design, and how fast the adoption would progress. 
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Figure 5.4 Strategic issue I06 in cognitive space: Monitoring industry technology adoption 
Figure 5.4 presents strategic issue I06 in the cognitive space of the case company. Pri-
marily categorised within the resources–markets dichotomy, the strategic issue begins 
with a clear market emphasis. This reflects the underlying reason as to why the strategic 
issue was raised on the corporate agenda in the first place, namely that there were con-
cerns about the pace of technology adoption in the market. Over the course of strategic 
issue processing, the categorisation moved to resource-emphasis as changes to current 
execution were made and resources allocated accordingly.  
The other interesting aspect of the evolution is the sensemaking emphasis in the middle 
of the strategic issue processing with topics 219 and 222. On the one hand, topic 219 
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explored how the case company should view the market development overall, as illus-
trated by a section of the meeting notes: 
“The key question to explore is whether this plays into our advantages overall. 
(---) Depending on the point-of-view from which business we look at this, the 
answer may be different.” 
On the other hand, topic 222 focussed on making sense of what would be the right ap-
proach to market the technology so as to accelerate adoption. Overall it would seem that 
market-emphasis supported highlighting the performance concern of the strategic issue 
(cf. scanning behaviour), whereas a sensemaking-focus was used to deepen the under-
standing of the strategic issue and thereby reduce equivocality (cf. directed research), 
after which focus shifted to resource allocation (cf. planning for action). 
The topics comprising strategic issue I06 were not at all associated with the threat–
opportunity dichotomy. This is somewhat surprising, given the reliance of the company 
on the advantageous adoption of the technology it supported. However, one could argue 
that both threat and opportunity aspects are included in the market- and resources-
emphases of the topics respectively, given their collocation in the cognitive space. 
Moreover, the threat–opportunity dichotomy was not central to strategic issue categori-
sation in the case company anyway.  
Strategic Issue I15: Reaching New Growth through Business Development 
Figure 5.5 displays strategic issue I15 in the cognitive space. Strategic issue I15 was 
primarily about how the core businesses of the company could be augmented with new, 
emerging business domains. Since part of the strategic issue management board’s man-
date was to investigate new business opportunities for the corporation, it is only ex-
pected that such strategic issues are likely to be on the strategic agenda also. As strate-
gic issue I15 however comprises a number of different new business opportunities, it 
may in itself be regarded only as a “container” of diverse strategic issues. However, 
since the corporation had been and intended to continue as a “growth company” (e.g., 
Fama & French, 1995; Lakonishok et al., 1994), new business development can cer-
tainly be described as a strategic issue in its own right. In total this business develop-
ment –related strategic issue comprised eight individual new business opportunities for 
the corporation, each valued perhaps up to a few percentages of the corporation’s mar-
ket capitalisation.  
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Figure 5.5 Strategic issue I15 in cognitive space: Reaching new growth through business de-
velopment 
Topics belonging to strategic issue I15 have commensurately been primarily sensemak-
ing-focussed and secondarily resource- and opportunity-related, in contrast to strategic 
issue I03, which was primarily resource- and secondarily sensemaking-focussed. This 
would be explained by the fact that new business opportunities are, by their very nature, 
uncertain and unpredictable (e.g., Gartner, 1985; Shane & Venkataraman, 2000), mak-
ing them a prime target for increasing organisational understanding through sensemak-
ing. Somewhat surprisingly the topics were attributed only secondarily as opportunities. 
However, since the topics had already been identified as being relevant opportunities for 
the company, the discussion has likely shifted towards other dimensions (such as sen-
semaking in particular).  
What makes this strategic issue particularly interesting is that there is no evolution of 
the topics in the cognitive space. Since the individual business opportunities that com-
prised strategic issue I15 were in the strategic issue management process only for a rela-
tively short period of time, no evolution could be traced for them.  
Overall the topics within strategic issue I15 have generated quite little discussion in the 
strategic issue management board meetings based on the amount of notes recorded. All 
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of them had been escalated from the different business units of the company (as op-
posed to being raised by top management). Similarly the processing of these topics has 
involved a surprisingly high number of participants beyond the strategic issue manage-
ment meeting, with visitors outranking members by a factor of 12. This obviously re-
flects the specialised nature of the business opportunities, requiring specific expertise to 
be brought into the discussion to facilitate the sensemaking process. 
Although all of these topics resulted in a fairly low impact as well as decision rightness, 
they may have had other benefits beyond their intrinsic value potential. Initiatives that 
have not yielded the highest rightness or impact may have provided the organisation 
valuable learning opportunities that can have substantial value in processing other stra-
tegic issues (cf. McGrath, 1999; McGrath et al., 2004; Tukiainen, 2004). 
5.3 Discussion and Conclusions 
While extant research has emphasised the categorisation of strategic issues into either 
opportunities or threats to the company (Dutton & Jackson, 1987), the categorisation of 
strategic issues in real-life business organisations appears to be a much more multifac-
eted phenomenon than had previously been thought. Even though the prototypical 
threat–opportunity dichotomy (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988) 
did appear in the cognitive space of the company, it did not play a pivotal role in the 
categorisation of strategic issues. Based on analysis of the cognitive space of the case 
company, the threat-opportunity dichotomy does in fact appear to be far less prevalent 
than earlier assumed.  
In addition to the threat–opportunity categorisation, the analysis suggested two addi-
tional dichotomies: sensemaking vs. implementation and resources vs. markets. In the 
sensemaking–implementation dichotomy, sensemaking-emphasis was prevalent in the 
case company. This suggests that one of the fundamental roles of the strategic issue 
management system is indeed to increase the understanding of the strategic issues in-
stead of direct decision making. The resources–market dichotomy was the most com-
monly used categorisation scheme in the case company. Interestingly, market-focussed 
topics tended to be overwhelmingly driven by top management, and related to opportu-
nity and understanding aspects of strategic issues, whereas resource-focussed strategic 
issues seemed to be linked into the individual business sectors the company operates in. 
The multiplicity of dichotomies for strategic issue categorisation implies that organisa-
tions and senior managers are likely to apply multiple categorisations concurrently to 
strategic issues (cf. Gilbert, 2006). Not only are strategic issue categories linked to each 
other in a networked manner, topics themselves were more often than not associated 
with multiple categories at the same time. The findings of this analysis would also lend 
support to Gilbert’s finding that the senior management team acts as the “frame integra-
tor” within the company, thus reducing cognitive dissonance in the organisation at large. 
However, at the same time, it is likely to add to the likelihood of attentional saturation 
in the strategic issue management system, as incremental attention is needed to manage 
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coexisting cognitive categorisations and translations between different organisational 
units. 
When compared to the longitudinal deep-dive into issue I02 in Chapter 4, which already 
demonstrated that the issue was perceived both as a threat and as an opportunity, the 
picture is somewhat different. Instead of a balanced threat-opportunity split, the deci-
sion episodes of the case seem to be more threat-related. On the other dimensions, the 
emphasis was on market (instead of resource) factors, which illustrates the externally 
oriented nature of the strategic issue. Indeed, much of the ambiguity and equivocality of 
the case was due to the inchoate nature of the market. And given the ambiguity and 
equivocality of the case, sensemaking emphasis would have been a likely hypothesis, 
yet most of the decision episodes were implementation-related. While this may seem 
somewhat paradoxical given the nature of the case, one of the main hurdles in the case 
was indeed implementation and the multiplicity of organisational units involved. Also 
the action-oriented character of the case company may have had an impact on the result. 
Nonetheless, although there are some discrepancies between the results from the case 
deep-dive and the cognitive space mapping, the results – taken together – lend further 
support to the findings that strategic issues are indeed categorised in multiple dimen-
sions instead of the classical threat-opportunity labelling. 
Furthermore, based on the analysis, strategic issue characteristics seem to bear signifi-
cant influence on which areas of the cognitive space of the company they evoke. This 
will subsequently also influence how strategic issues are processed within the company 
and its strategic issue management system. In the sensemaking–implementation dichot-
omy inherent uncertainty regarding the strategic issue would seem to be associated with 
a sensemaking-emphasis instead of implementation-focus. This would also be well in 
line with organisational sensemaking theories overall (cf. Weick, 1995), which would 
suggest that inherent uncertainty underlies sensemaking as an activity, and that the pur-
pose of sensemaking is to reduce the ambiguity and equivocality of strategic issues. 
Also in the most often applied categorisation dichotomy – markets vs. resources – stra-
tegic issue characteristics would appear to play a significant role. In the market vs. re-
sources dichotomy, framing would appear to be influenced less by the strategic issue 
characteristics per se, but more by whether the focus of the issue is external of internal, 
respectively, to the company. For example, business-specific strategic issues concerning 
resource allocation would tend to be resource-focussed overall, whereas strategic issues 
with concerns of market development or position in markets would be clearly market-
framed. 
Since the threat–opportunity dichotomy is not very prevalent in the cognitive space of 
the company, the strategic issues do not demonstrate any significant bias to either end of 
the spectrum based on their (antecedent) characters. Threat- or opportunity-framing 
would instead seem to be associated to strategic issues based on their relative position-
ing in the cognitive space, and through collocation with other framings. This would sug-
gest that the coexistence of multiple framings at the same time (Gilbert, 2006) are not 
only possible, but are also quite typical within the cognitive space of the company. 
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An additional and significant conclusion from the analysis seems to be the overall dy-
namic of movement over time from sensemaking towards implementation (although all 
strategic issues may not exhibit this behaviour, as demonstrated by strategic issue I15). 
This move is likely to correspond to decreasing levels of uncertainty and implementa-
tion challenge with the strategic issue following intense sensemaking: Only when un-
derstanding of the strategic issue deepens can reasoned decisions about its implementa-
tion be made. Progression from sensemaking- to implementation-emphasis may not be a 
unidirectional movement. In fact, strategic issues can shift back to sensemaking-
emphasis when their focus becomes redefined or environmental conditions change, sug-
gesting a cyclical pattern of sensemaking and implementation in the organisation (cf. 
Mintzberg et al., 1976). 
Similar cyclicality was demonstrated also by the longitudinal case presented in Chapter 
4. This case could clearly be divided into four distinct phases, each of which represented 
one cycle of strategic issue processing. The very same cyclical patter was also evident 
in the discussion in this chapter. Within the cognitive space this strategic issue can be 
clearly seen to have intermittent topics of sensemaking, while a great share of the other 
topics are associated with other areas of the cognitive space. This intermittent pattern of 
sensemaking ties back to the cyclicality of strategic issue processing, where each re-
definition of the problem necessitated a period of sensemaking to move the strategic 
issue ahead. 
The dynamics within the resources–markets dichotomy appear to be more varied: the 
cases demonstrate movement from resource- to market-focus and vice versa. On the one 
hand, move from market- towards resource-emphasis would seem to be associated with 
the strategic issue being raised because of concerns over market development or the 
company’s position in the market. As these were being resolved, the focus began shift-
ing towards resource-related questions. On the other hand, a converse situation took 
place as the problem was redefined during the processing of the strategic issue, which 
led to a more market-focussed framing for the issue. 
The findings on the evolutionary dynamics suggest that strategic issue categorisation at 
the senior management level is not only more multifaceted than mere threat vs. oppor-
tunity framing, but also that top management can change its categorisation dynamically 
as the strategic issues progress through the strategic issue management process of the 
company. These evolutionary traits in the cognitive space provide an understanding of 
how top management can manage competing cognitive frames simultaneously as sug-
gested by Gilbert (2006): In fact, the results suggest that senior management itself 
changes its cognitive framing of strategic issues throughout the process, thus perhaps 
reducing the cognitive strain of managing multiple, competing frames concurrently.  
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6 Attention Allocation as Determinant of Strategic 
Issue Management System Performance 
This chapter draws together the findings of Chapters 4 and 5, and links the discussion to 
factors affecting the performance of strategic issue management systems. As strategic 
issues are processed within the organisation, they consume varying amounts of atten-
tional resources on the individual, interpersonal and organisational levels. Correspond-
ingly, this chapter details how the attention allocation and sensemaking dynamics influ-
ence the strategic issue management process and its outcomes. The unit of analysis is on 
the decisions made regarding each of the 92 strategic issue topics. 
6.1 Theoretical Background 
In the context of strategic issue management and organisational attention allocation, 
Ocasio’s work has had a substantial impact in extending the fundamental research of, 
for example, Ansoff and Dutton (e.g., Ansoff, 1980; Dutton, 1983, 1986b; Dutton & 
Duncan, 1987a). To reiterate, Ocasio views organisations as systems of structurally dis-
tributed attention (Ocasio, 1997). According to Ocasio, cognition and action of indi-
viduals are not predictable from the knowledge of individual characteristics, but are de-
rived from the specific organisational context and situations that individual decision 
makers are in (cf. Weick, 1969/1979). 
Ocasio defines attention as encompassing the noticing, encoding, interpreting, and fo-
cusing of time and effort by organisational decision makers on both (a) strategic issues; 
that is, the available repertoire of categories for making sense of the environment; 
namely problems, opportunities, and threats; and (b) answers, that is, the available rep-
ertoire of action alternatives; namely proposals, routines, projects, programs, and proce-
dures. The central relationship in Ocasio’s systems view of organisations is the relation-
ship between individual and organisational information processing. This contrasts with 
the earlier perspectives of organisational cognition that have emphasised the shared 
cognitions of organisational members or its top management team (e.g., Walsh, 1995). 
Ocasio proposes three interrelated metatheoretical premises for information processing 
that underlie how a company distributes and regulates the attention of its decision mak-
ers. At the level of individual cognition, the principle of focus of attention links atten-
tional processing to individual cognition. At the level of social cognition, the principle 
of situated attention highlights the importance of the situational context for decision 
makers’ action. At the organisational level, the principle of structural distribution of at-
tention relates to how the company’s economic and social structures regulate and chan-
nel strategic issues, answers, and decision makers into the activities, communications, 
and procedures that constitute the situational context of decision making.  
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At the individual level, attentional processes focus energy, effort, and mindfulness of 
organisational decision makers on a limited set of elements that enter into consciousness 
at any given time. Focused attention facilitates perception and action towards the strate-
gic issues and activities being attended to. Two models of attentional processing can be 
distinguished: controlled and automated processing (see also Dutton, 1993). In the case 
of automatic processing, actions are routinised and habitual. In the case of controlled 
processing, the action of decision makers is triggered by those strategic issues and an-
swers they are mindful of. However, given their selective attention, decision makers are 
limited in the number of strategic issues and answers they can attend to in any situation 
(Ocasio, 1997).  
Focus of attention is triggered by the characteristics of the situations the decision mak-
ers are confronted with. Thus, individuals vary their attention depending on the situ-
ational context. The situational context provides a link between how individuals think 
and decide in a particular context, and how the organisation and its environment shape 
the situations that individuals find themselves in. Also, the dynamics of attention focus-
ing and strategic issue strengthening are related to how an organisation distributes and 
controls the allocation of strategic issues, answers, and decision makers within the 
firm’s activities, communications, and procedures. According to Ocasio, attentional 
processes of individual and group decision makers are distributed throughout the multi-
ple functions that exist in organisations, with different foci of attention in each local 
procedure, communication or activity.  
Simon (1947/1997) uses a similar conception of organisations when he describes organ-
isational behaviour as being a complex network of attentional processes. Also Weick’s 
social-psychological perspective stresses that sensemaking is a social process (Weick, 
1995), occurring in an organisation characterised by “a network of intersubjectively 
shared meanings that are sustained through the development and use of a common lan-
guage and everyday social interactions” (Walsh & Ungson, 1991: 60). 
Because the processing of strategic issues often relies extensively on a wide network of 
participants in the organisation, and because making sense of the strategic issues is often 
characterised by an intensity of resource consumption, the strategic issue processing 
system may become saturated. The choice of appropriate approach to process the strate-
gic issues should be dependent on issue characteristics, thereby mitigating the risk of 
saturation in the strategic issue management process (Kunnas et al., 2006). 
6.2 Hypotheses 
The hypotheses focus on strategic issue management meeting, strategic issue manage-
ment system, and organisation level processes of attention allocation. Figure 6.1 pre-
sents an overview of the logic utilised for building the hypotheses for the analyses.  
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Figure 6.1  Overview of logic applied for hypotheses building 
On the interpersonal level in strategic issue management meetings, the analysis exam-
ines how the strategy meeting was set up, that is, how many topics were discussed in the 
same meeting and how the topics were positioned on the meeting agenda. On the strate-
gic issue management system level, the analysis examines how many parallel topics 
were being processed at the same time in the organisation, and what the overall resource 
consumption of these strategic issues was. Finally, on the organisational level, the 
analysis examines the influence of external organisational shocks, such as an extensive 
organisational change that was carried out in the case organisation. This analyses how 
the nature of strategic issue processing changes from the previous years where no such 
organisational capacity consuming events took place. 
6.2.1 Attention Allocation in Strategic Issue Management Meetings 
The perceived importance of a strategic issue (and a topic) can be regarded as one of the 
most critical characteristics of strategic issues from the managerial point of view. Since 
the actual importance of the strategic issue cannot be known during the processing of 
the issue, but only afterwards once the strategic issue has been clarified, the perceived 
judgment by the management has to be relied upon. Whether the perceived judgment is 
sufficient can be compared to having no judgment at all, which is obviously not a satis-
factory situation.  
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The importance of a topic is affected by the initiation of the topic. In the strategic issue 
management system of the case company, top management played a pivotal role as a 
source of strategic issues. In well over half of the topics, top management was the pri-
mary source. Given that top management has multiple ways to control organisational 
attention allocation in addition to their direct power (e.g., Simons, 1991), strategic issue 
topics initiated by top management are likely to be given a higher priority in strategic 
issue management meetings than topics escalated from the divisions or emerged from 
the strategic planning process. Such elements of the structural context serve as a control 
mechanism for influencing members’ contributions to the strategic discussions 
(Jarzabkowski, 2008; Lovas & Ghoshal, 2000; Simons, 1994). Senior managers can 
thus easily influence which strategic issues appear on the organisational agenda (Bansal, 
2003; Bantel & Jackson, 1989; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990). Therefore, the higher 
the source of the topic, the higher the attention allocation in the strategic issue manage-
ment meetings it is likely to receive. 
The perceived value at stake contributes to the perceived importance of a topic. Topics 
that are seen to have a high loss or value-creation potential for the company are likely to 
receive more top management attention, since strategy formulation should be focussed 
on the most significant decisions of the company anyway (Porter, 1980). Also the per-
ceived urgency contributes to the perceived importance of the topic. If the processing of 
strategic issues is seen as urgent and thus implying immediate potential losses, they are 
likely to receive more managerial attention (Dutton, 1986a). Similarly, perception of a 
threat has been found to lead to greater organisational actions than perceived opportuni-
ties (Chattopadhyay et al., 2001). Therefore, the higher the value at stake associated 
with the topic, the higher its attention allocation in strategic issue management meetings 
is likely to be.  
Strategising often takes place through discussions that generate and shape the under-
standing of the strategic issue at hand (Laine & Vaara, 2007; Mantere & Vaara, 2008; 
Samra-Fredericks, 2003). Interpreting and making sense of strategic issues is one of the 
most fundamental aspects of the strategic issue management process. Because the dis-
cursive structures present in the organisation are inherently linked to organisational 
cognition and attention allocation (Heracleous & Barrett, 2001), strategy can be seen as 
having become formulated (at least in part) through discussion in top management 
meetings (cf. Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2008). Therefore, the more attention allocated to 
the topic in the strategic issue management meeting, the more it is discussed in the strat-
egy meetings, and the longer the meeting notes of important points from discussion are 
generated. 
Since senior management time is a scarce resource (Mankins, 2004; Mintzberg, 1971), 
the structure of the meeting agenda is both a critical attention allocation device as well 
as an indicator of collective attention. Given finite meeting time, the number of topics 
that can be processed in a single meeting is limited. Thus the more important the topic is 
perceived to be, the greater its share of the agenda is likely to be (Yu et al., 2005). 
Therefore, the more important the topic is, the more attention is allocated to the topic, 
and the less other topics are able to make it into the meeting agenda. 
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Employing a similar logic, the structuring of meeting agendas can play a substantial role 
in how strategic issues are processed. In addition to deciding which strategic issues form 
the agenda, the prioritisation of strategic issues within the agenda indicates the priorities 
of the organisation and thus its attention allocation (Döring, 1995; McKelvey, 1976; 
Tallberg, 2003). The less important a topic is perceived to be, the more likely it is, for 
example, to be positioned as the last item in the strategic issue management meeting 
agenda. This reflects a practical approach of dealing first with those strategic issues that 
need to be handled as a high priority, as well as ensuring that there is adequate time (in 
a meeting of preset duration) for the most significant strategic issues. Therefore, placing 
a topic as the last item on the meeting agenda signals a topic of lower importance, cor-
responding to a lower attention allocation in the strategic issue management meeting. 
Higher attention allocation in strategic issue management meetings can be expected to 
contribute to better strategic issue management decisions. Thus, the first hypothesis on 
the strategic issue management effects of attention allocation in strategic issue man-
agement meetings is as follows: 
Hypothesis 1. The higher the attention allocation in strategic issue management 
meetings, in terms of (a) the topic being initiated by top management, (b) the 
perceived value at stake, (c) the amount of discussion notes written on the topic, 
(d) lower number of topics discussed in the meeting, and (e) the topic not placed 
as the last item in the meeting agenda, the higher the ex post rightness of the de-
cision. 
Higher attention allocation in strategic issue management meetings can be expected to 
contribute to better strategic issue management decisions in terms of the impact of these 
decisions. Thus, the second hypothesis on the strategic issue management effects of at-
tention allocation in strategic issue management meetings is as follows: 
Hypothesis 2. The higher the attention allocation in strategic issue management 
meetings, in terms of (a) the topic being initiated by top management, (b) the 
perceived value at stake, (c) the amount of discussion notes written on the topic, 
(d) lower number of topics discussed in the meeting, and (e) the topic not placed 
as the last item in the meeting agenda, the higher the ex post organisational im-
pact of the decision. 
Since the higher amount of attention allocation and sensemaking in strategic issue man-
agement meetings can also be driven by the perceived uncertainty and implementation 
challenge of a topic, management’s perceived strategic issue uncertainty and implemen-
tation challenge are controlled for. 
6.2.2 Attention Allocation on Strategic Issue Management System Level 
While attention allocation in a strategic issue management meeting can be driven, for 
example, by the time available for the meeting and even the order of items on the 
agenda, attention allocation on the strategic issue management system level is more im-
portantly driven by concerns such as the number of strategic issues that are being proc-
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essed and the resources available for strategic issue management task forces, both in 
terms of person-months as well as the organisational power and the task force members’ 
centrality. All of these aspects of systems level strategic issue management represent 
concerns with scarce resources and managerial capacity. 
The number of simultaneously active strategic issues may cause significant coordination 
challenges for the people managing the strategic issue management system. To take ad-
vantage of the information processing potential of a large group of managers that can be 
involved in strategic issue processing (Kunnas et al., 2006), it is necessary to have the 
leaders of individual task forces attend to different things. However, these very differ-
ences are themselves the major cause of failure of coordination amongst multiple strate-
gic issues (Geanakoplos & Milgrom, 1991). Coordination challenges stem from the fact 
that the person managing the entire strategic issue management system needs to be 
knowledgeable enough of individual strategic issues to be able to direct the work, even 
if the actual work on the strategic issues has been distributed to different teams. This 
argument also extends to the top management team who has ownership of the entire 
strategic issue management system. Therefore, the higher the number of topics ad-
dressed in parallel, the lower the attention allocation to individual topic is likely to be. 
Whereas all issues that are regarded by management as strategic issues are likely to be 
given a high priority, there remains quite a large variation across strategic issues that are 
seen as requiring the strongest possible teams with abundant resources, and strategic 
issues that can be handled more routinely. Resource allocation to individual strategic 
issues is constrained by the overall resources available for resolving them. Whereas re-
sourcing to analyse strategic issues can be quite scalable through, for example, the use 
of consultants, coordination challenges are likely to persist (Geanakoplos & Milgrom, 
1991), and increased resourcing may not necessarily improve the rightness or impact 
beyond a certain level. Moreover, senior management time overall is scarce (Mankins, 
2004; Mintzberg, 1971), so involving them on resolving strategic issues is likely to di-
rect their attention away from running the business on a day-to-day basis, thus implying 
significant costs associated with strategic issue processing. Therefore, resource alloca-
tion to strategic issue processing task forces is likely to illustrate the amount of attention 
invested in the strategic issue. 
Furthermore, the strategic issue management team members’ combined organisational 
power and centrality in the strategic planning and management network are constrained 
by the scarcity of senior management time (Mankins, 2004; Mintzberg, 1971). Although 
analysis resources can be added to process strategic issues, senior managers are required 
not only to make decisions on strategic issues, but also to lead the work forward. The 
role of senior managers is exacerbated by the fact that middle managers are often not 
knowledgeable about the organisation’s strategic direction (Aguilar, 1967).44 Senior 
managers therefore serve as a scarce organisational resource, whose allocation to differ-
                                                 
44  This does not take away the role of middle management as critical source of input to strategy work, 
as well as their role in implementing strategies (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Wooldridge & 
Floyd, 1990), but rather suggests that their visibility is more limited than that of senior managers. 
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ent strategic issues is likely to reflect their prioritisation. Therefore, the higher the atten-
tion allocation to a strategic issue topic, the higher the task force power for processing 
that topic is likely to be. 
Finally, most significant strategic issues are also more likely to be coordinated by some 
of the most central, key people in the strategic planning organisation. Centrality has 
been empirically associated with several variables that may lead to superior perform-
ance, such as influence (Burkhardt & Brass, 1990) and cognition (Walker, 1985). On 
the one hand, influence results from the fact that individuals who are central can exert 
more power by virtue of being more linked with a large number of people in the organi-
sation (Ahuja et al., 2003; Pfeffer, 1992). In addition, influence can translate into access 
into high level of resources, much in the same way as formal authority would (Burt, 
1982). On the other hand, for cognition, proximity to those who control relevant re-
sources and information (Salancik & Pfeffer, 1978) can provide access to situational 
opportunities (Ahuja et al., 2003). The structural context can also influence or even de-
termine one’s interpretation of events, perceptions, cognitions and behaviours (Rice & 
Aydin, 1991; Walker, 1985). Finally, network links help construct and communicate 
social norms and expectations (Rogers & Kincaid, 1981). Therefore, the higher the at-
tention allocation to a strategic issue topic, the higher the network centrality of the task 
force used to process that topic is likely to be. 
Therefore, it is hypothesised that these different drivers of attention allocation on the 
strategic issue management system level contribute both to the rightness of the strategic 
issue management decisions and the impact of those decisions: 
Hypothesis 3. The higher the attention allocation in a strategic issue manage-
ment system, in terms of (a) a lower number of ongoing parallel topics,  
(b) higher resource allocation to the strategic issue management task force,  
(c) higher combined power of the strategic issue task force team members,  
and (d) higher organisational network centrality of the task force team mem-
bers, the higher the ex post rightness of a strategic issue management decision. 
Hypothesis 4. The higher the attention allocation in a strategic issue manage-
ment system, in terms of (a) a lower number of ongoing parallel topics,  
(b) higher resource allocation to the strategic issue management task force,  
(c) higher combined power of the strategic issue task force team members,  
and (d) higher organisational network centrality of the task force team mem-
bers, the higher the ex post impact of a strategic issue management decision. 
6.2.3 Attention Allocation on Organisational Level 
Compared to attention allocation in strategy meetings and on the strategic issue man-
agement system level, the effects of organisational attention allocation structures are 
more difficult to observe due to the contextual, stable nature of these structures. There-
fore, it is not surprising that some of the best research on organisational attention alloca-
tion structures has been done as historical case studies on the structural evolution of or-
ganisations (e.g., Ocasio & Joseph, 2005, 2006).  
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The only comparative discontinuity that can be observed in these analyses is a signifi-
cant organisational change, which took place during the window of the analysis, causing 
the organisation considerable additional workload on all management layers. Typically 
a major change is disruptive, time consuming and expensive for the organisation at large 
(Conner, 1993), whereas in the extreme case change can even paralyse organisations 
(Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997). For individual employees and managers, such changes are 
likely to cause tensions and insecurity (Cascio, 1993; Dekker & Schaufeli, 1995; Marks, 
1994; Roskies & Louis-Guerin, 1990; Swanson & Power, 2001).  
In the case company, the organisational change took almost a year of planning, and it 
fundamentally changed the business unit structure of the company. Whereas it is not 
possible to study the different attention allocation changes that the restructuring caused, 
it is possible to study its effects on the concurrent strategic issue management perform-
ance, and hypothesise that due to its attention-consuming nature, a major organisation 
change affects both strategic issue decision quality and decision impact negatively: 
Hypothesis 5. A major organisation change is negatively related to (a) the ex 
post rightness and (b) the impact of strategic issue management decisions. 
6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Dependent Variables 
Ex post decision rightness and decision impact. As the first dependent variable, the 
strategy board’s decision quality was coded on a 5-level scale as follows [2 right; 1 
somewhat right; 0 neutral; -1 somewhat wrong; -2 wrong]. The coding was based on the 
ex post knowledge of the research team of what happened after the decision. Determin-
ing the performance of strategic issue processing is difficult, because although one can 
clearly distinguish successful and failed decisions, alternative histories do not exist. 
Thus, it is difficult to say whether other decision options would have been even more 
successful or whether other decision options would have led to even worse outcomes. 
Moreover, there were also many decisions that were relatively neutral and thus could 
not be classified as clearly successful or clearly non-successful decisions. From a prac-
tical point of view it is particularly important to be able to distinguish between small 
and large successes and failures.  
In order to complement the measure of decision quality, another measure, named the 
decision impact, was specified and coded on a three-level scale [0; 1; 2], where 0 corre-
sponded to insignificant effects, 1 to focused impact on limited scale, and 2 to wide im-
pact and major implications. Decision impact complements decision rightness by pro-
viding additional insight into the amplitude of changes resulting from a given decision. 
In general, in every decision making situation, not only is the purpose to reach the right 
decision, but also to have a sizable impact on subsequent decision making. 
One should also note that the judgments made about the outcomes of the decisions can 
be highly time dependent: for example, what is considered successful by today’s stan-
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dards may be considered unsuccessful some time later in the future. Moreover, even 
though a few years have already passed since the end of the data set, some of the strate-
gic issues addressed have not been conclusively settled yet; at least not in a way that 
would allow for an incontestable assessment even a few years after the fact. 
6.3.2 Independent and Control Variables 
Initiated by top management. It was identified whether the topic was raised by the top 
management directly as opposed to, for example, being escalated from a business group, 
or spun off from the annual planning cycle. This variable was coded with a binary scale 
[0; 1], where 1 corresponded to the source being the top management. 
Value at stake. The perceived value at stake of a topic was determined based on a com-
parison of the estimated impact of the topic to the market capitalisation of the company 
using a scale of [0.25; 2.5; 7.5] where the numbers correspond to a value impact be-
tween [0%; 0.5%] of the firm’s market capitalisation, between [0.5%; 5%] of market 
capitalisation, and more than 5% of market capitalisation.  
Amount of discussion notes. The amount of discussion notes generated was counted 
from the protocols of the strategic issue management meetings, and was defined as the 
word count for the topic. The amount of discussion notes reflects the amount of sense-
making for the topic in the strategic issue management meeting: more ambiguous topics 
are likely to require more sensemaking, generate more discussion, and result in longer 
discussion notes. 
Number of topics in the meeting, topic as the last item of the agenda, and number of 
concurrently active topics. The number of topics in the meeting was defined as a count 
variable describing how many topics were on the meeting agenda, that is, how many 
topics were discussed. Topic as the last item of the agenda is a dummy variable [0; 1] 
taking the value 1 if the topic was placed last on the meeting agenda. Number of cur-
rently active topics is a count variable that indicates how many topics overall were in 
progress in the organisation at a given time. 
Resources invested in the strategic issue task force, combined task force power, and the 
centrality of the strategic issue task force members. Organisational investment in strate-
gic issue processing was determined on a scale of [1; 5; 15] where 1 corresponded to 
“one man’s show”, 5 corresponded to 1…10 people actively involved in strategic issue 
processing, and 15 corresponded more than 10 people actively involved. To create a 
measure of the organisational seniority of the strategic issue management team, the or-
ganisational power of the strategic issue processing task force was determined based on 
the members’ distance in organisational layers from the top of the organisation (sum of 
squares of the inverse numbers of members’ distances in organisational layers from the 
top). Finally, the network constituted by the members of the strategic planning organisa-
tion was also mapped and the network centrality of the strategic issue task force mem-
bers was determined. The network was created so that a link was established between 
all the people that had been involved in processing the same strategic issue over the 
three-year time horizon. Thus, the higher the total centrality of the strategic issue task 
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force members in strategic issue processing, the more core personnel they were and the 
more experience they had in managing strategic issues. 
Organisational change. Due to a significant organisational change (company-wide re-
structuring) in the case company, external disturbance to the strategic issue management 
system must be controlled for. A binary dummy variable [0; 1], was defined receiving 
the value 1 for the year with a major organisation change and 0 without change, respec-
tively. 
Perceived uncertainty and implementation challenge. Perceived management uncer-
tainty as well as implementation challenge at the time of the strategic issue processing 
were also controlled for. The perceived uncertainty was defined as a perceptual measure 
on a three-level scale of [1; 2; 3]. Accordingly, 1 corresponded to a simple lack of in-
formation that could be reduced through additional information collection, 2 to a lack of 
knowledge where such information could be gained, and 3 to a more fundamental in-
ability to predict what is going to happen. Similarly, the perceived implementation chal-
lenge was defined on a three-level scale of increasing difficulty: 1 corresponded to a 
situation where the prevailing structures did not restrain implementation, 2 corre-
sponded to a situation where the prevailing structures and assets posed a barrier to im-
plementation, and 3 corresponded to a situation where implementing change was re-
garded as being highly challenging. 
Finally, dummy variables for the perceived threat, perceived opportunity, sensemaking 
emphasis, implementation emphasis, resource emphasis, market emphasis, business em-
phasis, and corporate emphasis were coded [0; 1]. A separate control variable was in-
cluded for technology emphasis. All these variables were coded according to manage-
ment’s notes based on analysis in Chapter 5 on cognitive space mapping and strategic 
issue categorisation. 
6.4 Results 
Table 6.1 provides descriptive statistics and correlations of the data. All correlations are 
below the 0.70 threshold, indicating that there should not be serious multicollinearity 
problems inherent in the research setting. The highest correlation (0.62) is between the 
combined power of task force and centrality of task force members. This is as expected, 
since the most powerful people also tend to be central in a strategic issue management 
network.  
The correlations also show that the topics initiated by top management are perceived as 
having higher values at stake, are resourced on average more and with more powerful 
task forces, and have more central task force members. Yet, the number of concurrently 
active topics would seem to limit the use of central task force members in the task 
forces, providing initial support for the attention allocation arguments. 
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Ordered logit regression analyses were employed to test the hypotheses, and to gain a 
deeper understanding of how allocation of attention on the strategic issue management 
meeting, strategic issue management system, and organisational levels affect the strate-
gic issue management process and, more specifically, the ex post evaluated rightness 
and impact of the individual decisions regarding strategic issues. All the regressions 
were performed using White’s heteroscedasticity-adjusted robust standard errors and the 
variance inflation factor statistics show no serious signs of multicollinearity. The results 
of the first set of regression analyses are shown in Table 6.2. 
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Table 6.2 Ordered logistic regression results on strategic issue management system perform-
ance with ex post decision rightness as the dependent variable 
Decision rightness
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V
Initiated by top management 0.394 -0.399
(0.637) (0.933)
Perceived value at stake -0.058 0.063
(0.123) (0.159)
Amount of discussion notes -0.001 -0.003
(0.004) (0.005)
Number of issues in the meeting -0.516 -0.853
(0.342) (0.471)*
Issue as the last item of the agenda -1.973 -1.824
(0.690)*** (0.706)***
Number of concurrently active issues -0.797 -0.548
(0.288)*** (0.275)**
Resourcing of the issue 0.047 0.011
(0.059) (0.084)
Combined power of task force -0.969 -1.712
(1.037) (1.212)
Centrality of task force members -0.016 -0.003
(0.036) (0.041)
Year dummy, Major organization change -1.711 -2.368
(0.604)*** (1.014)**
Perceived uncertainty -1.192 -1.275 -1.179 -1.292 -1.249
(0.407)*** (0.513)** (0.466)** (0.496)*** (0.600)**
Perceived implementation challenge -0.662 -0.800 -0.496 -0.665 -0.853
(0.576) (0.616) (0.579) (0.582) (0.649)
Perceived threat -0.097 0.927 -0.529 -0.147 0.582
(1.031) (1.613) (1.198) (1.264) (1.767)
Perceived opportunity -0.975 -1.241 -1.194 -0.572 -1.237
(0.852) (0.847) (1.293) (1.176) (1.783)
Corporate emphasis 0.132 -0.004 -0.566 -0.663 -1.623
(0.679) (0.744) (0.666) (0.784) (0.978)*
Business emphasis -1.115 -1.123 -1.142 -0.899 -1.013
(0.692) (0.670)* (0.765) (0.706) (0.79)
Technology emphasis 1.044 0.935 1.084 1.000 0.817
(1.05) (1.083) (1.175) (1.188) (1.302)
Sensemaking emphasis -0.426 -0.675 -0.320 -0.451 -0.699
(0.487) (0.502) (0.538) (0.531) (0.721)
Implementation emphasis -0.024 -0.124 0.302 -0.240 -0.207
(0.503) (0.527) (0.503) (0.51) (0.565)
Market emphasis 0.799 0.592 1.007 0.828 1.130
(0.453)* (0.475) (0.497)** (0.488)* (0.741)
Resource emphasis 1.596 2.313 1.525 1.257 1.954
(0.573)*** (0.580)*** (0.674)** (0.622)** (0.608)***
Observations 92 92 92 92 92
Wald Chi-Squared 25.63 38.93 49.23 44.84 61.11
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Pseudo R-squared 0.15 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.31
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test of significance
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%  
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Model I provides the base model with control variables only. Model II provides a test 
for Hypotheses 1a, 1b, 1c, 1d, and 1e. No support is found that, when evaluated ex post, 
better decisions would have been made regarding topics that are initiated by top man-
agement or topics where the value at stake is high. Moreover, no evidence is found that 
the amount of sensemaking in terms of discussion notes or the number of topics dis-
cussed in the meeting would affect the quality of the decisions, even though the number 
of topics in the meeting and the amount of discussion notes written regarding a topic are 
negatively related to each other. However, support is found for hypothesis H1e, accord-
ing to which less correct decisions are made regarding topics that are placed as a last 
item in the strategy board’s agenda. 
Model III examines the effect of attention allocation on the strategic issue management 
system level on the rightness of strategic issue management decisions, in line with Hy-
potheses 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e. On the strategic issue management system level, support 
is found for Hypothesis 3a that the number of concurrently active topics is negatively 
related to the quality of the decisions. This would seem to indicate that the system-level 
attention allocation capacity constraints are not in terms of the resources allocated to an 
individual topic, or the power or network centrality of the strategic issue management 
team members. Instead the capacity limits would seem to be caused by the system level 
coordination and strategic issue processing capacities. 
Model IV examines the effects of major organisation level changes that took place dur-
ing one of the three years of the observation period. Consistent with the organisation-
level attention allocation Hypothesis 5a, support is found that external constraints to or-
ganisational attention allocation capacity may lead to lower quality of strategic issue 
management decisions when the decision quality is examined ex post. 
Finally, Model V combines Models I through IV demonstrating that the results remain 
stable even when the three layers of attention allocation structures are jointly included 
in the analysis. In addition, on the basis of the control variables, it can be noted that, as 
expected, the perceived uncertainty at the time of decision is also a strong negative de-
terminant on the rightness of the decisions. In contrast, categorisation with resource-
emphasis would seem to be positively related to decision rightness in a significant way, 
whereas market-emphasis would also have some positive influence. 
The second set of regressions, shown in Table 6.3, examines the impact of strategic is-
sue management decisions as an alternative outcome measure to decision rightness.  
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Table 6.3 Ordered logistic regression results on strategic issue management system perform-
ance with ex post decision impact as the dependent variable 
Decision impact
Model VI Model VII Model VIII Model IX Model X
Initiated by top management 1.816 1.275
(0.643)*** (0.753)*
Perceived value at stake 0.446 0.652
(0.168)*** (0.294)**
Amount of discussion notes 0.010 0.013
(0.006)* (0.009)
Number of issues in the meeting 0.138 0.043
(0.355) (0.484)
Issue as the last item of the agenda -1.937 -2.674
(0.621)*** (0.937)***
Number of concurrently active issues -0.149 0.002
(0.244) (0.318)
Resourcing of the issue 0.239 0.290
(0.064)*** (0.117)**
Combined power of task force 2.589 1.088
(1.782) (2.36)
Centrality of task force members -0.024 0.005
(0.037) (0.072)
Year dummy, Major organization change -2.283 -4.518
(0.561)*** (1.144)***
Perceived uncertainty -0.549 -0.846 -0.671 -0.681 -1.345
(0.363) (0.561) (0.42) (0.397)* (0.687)*
Perceived implementation challenge 0.682 1.650 0.896 0.998 2.668
(0.549) (0.764)** (0.617) (0.649) (0.843)***
Perceived threat -0.073 0.940 -1.350 -0.147 0.584
(1.135) (1.858) (1.628) (1.102) (1.939)
Perceived opportunity -0.245 -1.592 -0.605 0.110 -2.856
(0.885) (1.534) (0.854) (1.092) (1.984)
Corporate emphasis 0.308 0.303 0.070 -0.470 -1.647
(0.6) (0.876) (0.788) (0.724) (1.534)
Business emphasis -0.103 -0.132 -0.210 0.199 0.535
(0.467) (0.533) (0.521) (0.547) (0.599)
Technology emphasis 0.185 0.151 0.737 -0.117 -0.874
(0.601) (0.671) (0.693) (0.753) (0.89)
Sensemaking emphasis -0.233 -1.123 -0.282 -0.206 -1.364
(0.464) (0.665)* (0.516) (0.491) (1.007)
Implementation emphasis 0.393 -0.181 0.488 0.296 -0.332
(0.587) (0.776) (0.66) (0.545) (1.401)
Market emphasis 0.554 -0.360 0.562 0.353 -1.262
(0.473) (0.702) (0.535) (0.535) (1.497)
Resource emphasis 0.349 1.055 0.496 0.036 1.056
(0.501) (0.607)* (0.529) (0.556) (0.635)*
Observations 92 92 92 92 92
Wald Chi-Squared 5.91 32.61 29.45 21.54 65.02
Prob > Chi-Squared 0.88 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.00
Pseudo R-squared 0.04 0.32 0.15 0.16 0.55
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed test of significance
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%   
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Model VII shows the effects of the strategic issue management meeting level determi-
nants as a test for Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, and 2e. Four of the five hypotheses are 
supported. The decision impact is higher when the topic was initiated by top manage-
ment, when the perceived value at stake is high, when the topic led to extensive sense-
making in the strategic issue management meeting as evidenced in the meeting discus-
sion notes, and when the topic was not the last topic on the agenda. The only hypothesis 
that was not supported was Hypothesis 2d, relating to the number of topics in the meet-
ing agenda. 
Model VIII examines the effect of strategic issue management system characteristics on 
the decision impact consistent with Hypotheses 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4d. Model VIII provides 
support only for Hypothesis 4b, according to which resource allocation to the resolution 
of a strategic issue topic contributes to decision impact. No support is found that task 
force power or the centrality of the task force members would have a similar effect. 
Moreover, the number of concurrently active topics does not seem to contribute to deci-
sion impact. 
Model IX confirms, similarly to Model IV, that a major organisation change can have a 
substantial effect on a strategic issue management system performance that depends on 
task force participants from around the organisation. Taking into account that similar 
overarching structural changes take place, for example, in connection with mergers and 
acquisitions, this finding provides important evidence of the negative effects that may 
be experienced as a consequence of a reduced strategic issue management capacity (see 
also Yu et al., 2005). Finally, as a conclusion of the analysis, Model X combines the 
three different levels of explanatory variables into a combined model. All the independ-
ent variables remain statistically significant, although the effect of the perceived value 
at stake decreases somewhat. 
With regard to control variables, the threat and opportunity controls would not seem to 
be related to the performance of the strategic issue management system whereas an em-
phasis on resources would seem to be an important determinant of decision rightness. 
Table 6.4 summarises the results of the regression analyses with respect to the hypothe-
ses. 
Table 6.4 Summary of results of regression analyses 
Hypothesis Supported 
Attention allocation in strategic issue management meetings 
H1 Higher attention allocation in strategic issue management meetings 
leads to a higher ex post rightness of the decision 
H1a The higher in the organisation the source bringing the topic 
forward, the higher the decision quality 
No 
H1b The higher the perceived value at stake, the higher the decision 
quality 
No 
H1c The higher the amount of discussion notes written on the topic, 
the higher the decision quality 
No 
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H1d The lower number of topics discussed in the meeting, the 
higher the decision quality 
No 
 
H1e If the topic is not placed as the last item in the meeting agenda, 
the higher the decision quality 
Yes 
 
H2 Higher attention allocation in strategic issue management meetings 
leads to a higher ex post organisational impact of the decision 
H2a The higher in the organisation the source bringing the topic 
forward, the higher the decision impact 
Yes 
 
H2b The higher the perceived value at stake, the higher the decision 
impact 
Yes 
 
H2c The higher the amount of discussion notes written on the topic, 
the higher the decision impact 
Yes 
 
H2d The lower number of topics discussed in the meeting, the 
higher the decision impact 
No 
 
H2e If the topic is not placed as the last item in the meeting agenda, 
the higher the decision impact 
Yes 
Attention allocation on the strategic issue management system level 
H3 Higher attention allocation in strategic issue management system leads 
to a higher ex post rightness of the decision 
H3a The lower the number of ongoing parallel topics, the higher 
the decision quality 
Yes 
 
H3b The higher the resource allocation to the strategic issue man-
agement task force, the higher the decision quality 
No 
 
H3c The higher the combined power of strategic issue management 
task force team members, the higher the decision quality 
No 
 
H3d The higher the organisational network centrality of task force 
team members, the higher the decision quality 
No 
 
H4 Higher attention allocation in strategic issue management system leads 
to a higher impact of the decision 
H4a The lower the number of ongoing parallel topics, the higher 
the decision impact 
No 
 
H4b The higher the resource allocation to the strategic issue man-
agement task force, the higher the impact 
Yes 
 
H4c The higher the combined power of strategic issue task force 
team members, the higher the decision impact 
No 
 
H4d The higher the organisational network centrality of task force 
team members, the higher the decision impact 
No 
Attention allocation on the organisational level 
H5 A major organisation change is negatively related to ex post decision 
rightness and impact 
H5a A major organisation change is negatively related to decision 
ex post rightness 
Yes 
 
H5b A major organisation change is negatively related to decision 
impact 
No 
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6.5 Discussion and Conclusions 
This chapter discussed the link between organisational attention allocation and the per-
formance of the strategic issue management system. While earlier research has empha-
sised the effect of categorising a strategic issue into an opportunity or a threat, the pre-
ceding analysis shows that attention allocation also more generally plays a significant 
role in determining the quality and impact of decisions regarding strategic issues. How-
ever, contrary to what one would have expected based on literature, the different strate-
gic issue management characteristics, such as task force power or network centrality, 
seem to have quite limited explanatory power for decision outcomes. 
Some of the strongest strategic issue management system relationships would seem to 
be between the relationships between perceived value at stake and resources invested in 
managing the strategic issue, and strategic issue impact. In line with extant theory that 
links perceived urgency (e.g., Chattopadhyay et al., 2001; Dutton, 1986a) – whether in 
terms of threat-perception or potential financial losses – with increased attention to re-
solve the strategic issue, the analyses in this chapter provide further evidence that a per-
ception of high value at stake leads to higher organisational impact (cf. Gilbert, 2006).  
The other significant contributor to organisational impact was resourcing put into re-
solving the strategic issue. Resource investment alone is, however, a rather blunt in-
strument in managing a strategic issue. Large amounts of resources invested may ensure 
a high impact already due to its escalation of commitment effect (Adner & Levinthal, 
2004a, b; Conlon, 1999; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004; McGrath et al., 2004; Staw, 1981; 
Staw & Hoang, 1995; Whyte, 1986; Zardkoohi, 2004) without ensuring decision qual-
ity. Whereas resourcing is influencing organisational impact when processing strategic 
issues, it appears surprising that neither task force power (cf. Aguilar, 1967) nor task 
force centrality (cf. Burkhardt & Brass, 1990; Walker, 1985) contribute to organisa-
tional impact. This could imply that top executives and other senior managers, albeit 
from a corporate governance standpoint (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), might be less in-
strumental in implementing the strategy than assumed (e.g., Aguilar, 1967; Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984), and that middle management’s role in driving impact of strategic deci-
sions would be significant (cf. Floyd & Wooldridge, 1992, 1997; Guth & MacMillan, 
1986; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990)  
One of the strongest determinants of decision quality, on the other hand, would seem to 
be the perceived uncertainty. Because strategic issues are, by their very nature, complex 
and ambiguous, one of the key functions of the strategic issue management system is to 
interpret and make sense of them (Daft & Weick, 1984; Weick, 1995). Those strategic 
issues that are inherently more uncertain than others, are thus likely to pose greater chal-
lenges for the organisation. Therefore, ceteris paribus, more uncertain strategic issues 
would be more difficult to resolve, and thus lead to poorer quality of decisions. What is 
noteworthy, though, is that the effects of uncertainty would not seem to be eliminated 
entirely by the different strategic issue management process characteristics, suggesting 
that process has not been entirely successful in processing strategic issues that are char-
acterised by a great deal of uncertainty. Nonetheless, reduction of uncertainty surround-
 
  128
ing strategic issues is a tall order, so this in itself cannot be regarded as a failure for the 
system overall. 
On the basis of the control variables, it can be further noted that resource-emphasis 
would seem to be positively related to both decision rightness and decision impact, 
whereas the other strategic issue categories would seem to have little statistical signifi-
cance with respect to strategic issue management system performance. This would sug-
gest that in terms of processing strategic issues, categories would explain only a little of 
the differences in decision rightness and impact. This finding is in contrast to existing 
literature stating, for example, that threat-framing would lead to higher organisational 
impact than opportunity-framing would (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984). However, since the case organisation typically tended to categorise the 
same strategic issue into more than one frame at any given time, the company’s top 
management may have indeed been able to maintain coexisting, competing frames (cf. 
Gilbert, 2006). This can have, for its part, reduced the effect of strategic issue categories 
per se on decision rightness and impact, but may have led to an increased cognitive bur-
den for top management. 
The results also provide evidence that strategic issue management is integrally linked to 
the wider cognition of the organisation. Put differently, organisational attentional capac-
ity is likely to be largely constant (or at least highly inelastic), implying that organisa-
tional attention can only be reallocated, not increased. Significant corporate events such 
as large reorganisations (as in this study) or mergers and acquisitions (Hitt et al., 1990; 
Hitt et al., 1991; Yu et al., 2005) can absorb significant amounts of managerial atten-
tion, diverting attention away from strategic issue processing, thereby negatively influ-
encing both decision rightness and organisational impact.  
Extending the findings of Thomas and McDaniel (1990) on top management teams’ in-
formation processing capacity, evidence of limits to the strategic issue processing ca-
pacity in the firm on multiple levels of the system is found. Prior research that has ex-
amined strategic issue management predominantly at the issue level (e.g. Dutton, 1986a; 
Dutton & Duncan, 1987a) has given limited attention to the strategic issue management 
capacity of an organisation, or has dealt with it on a relatively abstract level (Daft & 
Weick, 1984; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987). 
The results provide support for the notion that an organisation’s attention allocation ca-
pacity and its saturation are influenced by practices (i) in the strategic issue manage-
ment meetings, (ii) on the strategic issue management system level, and (iii) in the or-
ganisation at large. The concept of strategic issue management system saturation con-
tributes to bridging the recent attention allocation stream of strategy process research 
(Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005, 2006) with the more established strategic issue 
management research. 
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7 Discussion and Conclusions 
7.1 Discussion of Results 
This dissertation set out to analyse how corporations deal with strategic issues that 
emerge from outside their regular strategy processes. The research took a portfolio view 
of the entirety of strategic issues of the corporation, and examined their development 
over time. In particular, the aim of the research was to increase the understanding of (i) 
how individual strategic issues evolve over time as they are processed in the strategic 
issue management system of the company, (ii) how the cognitive space of the company 
impacts strategic issue processing, and (iii) how attention allocation is linked to strate-
gic issue management system performance.  
Two bodies of knowledge underpinned the present research, namely information proc-
essing and sensemaking dynamics in organisations, as well as strategic issue manage-
ment. For the former, the attention-based view of the company (e.g., Ocasio, 1997) – 
which integrates many of the earlier strands of research ranging from the so-called Car-
negie school on bounded rationality (e.g., Cyert & March, 1963/1992; March & Simon, 
1958/1993; Simon, 1947/1997) to the social-psychological perspective of sensemaking 
(e.g., Weick, 1969/1979, 1995) – serves as the primary theoretical foundation that ad-
dresses the organisational cognition underpinning strategic issue management. For the 
latter, the received literature on strategic issue management links the particular aspects 
of processing strategic issues into the cognitive foundations present in the organisation. 
Working in the backdrop, organisational cognition influences strategic issue manage-
ment in a systematic manner throughout the process, namely scanning (e.g., Aguilar, 
1967; Hambrick, 1982), interpretation (e.g., Daft & Weick, 1984; Dutton et al., 1983), 
and planning for action (e.g., Dutton & Ashford, 1993; Dutton & Duncan, 1987a, b). 
Despite recent advances in the research of managerial cognition (e.g., Gilbert, 2006; 
Kaplan, 2004, 2008; Kaplan et al., 2003; Yu et al., 2005), the extant literature has still 
some gaps, particularly in regard to the longitudinal evolution of strategic issues within 
the strategic issue management system of a company, the cognitive space applied in 
processing strategic issues in companies, and the effects of organisational attention allo-
cation on strategic issue management system performance. It is to these three areas that 
the present dissertation has tried to make its contribution.  
Beginning with a deep-dive into the longitudinal evolution of a strategic issue over time 
in the strategic issue management system of the case company, the analysis followed the 
processing of a strategic issue for a period of more than five years. First, the case clearly 
highlights the cyclicality of strategy making in companies (cf. Hendry & Seidl, 2003; 
Mintzberg et al., 1976), as the case clearly was manifested into four distinct periods 
spanning over five years in time with distinctly different formulations of the problem 
(cf. Dutton, 1983). Second, related to the long duration of the strategic issue in the stra-
tegic issue management system of the company, the case raises the question of the ap-
propriate timing to put the interpreted issue into implementation (as opposed to main-
taining in a monitoring state). Based on the analysis, companies in technology-driven 
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industries with discontinuities (Anderson & Tushman, 1990) with increasing returns 
adoption (Arthur, 1989, 1994, 1996) may benefit from being an early-mover 
(Lieberman & Montgomery, 1988) to avoid being locked out of the industry. Third, the 
case demonstrates how categorisation of strategic issues is not related merely to the 
threat–opportunity dichotomy (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987). Not only did the case ex-
hibit both threat and opportunity categorisation over its lifespan, the strategic issue was 
categorised also utilising the two other dichotomies (markets vs. resources, and sense-
making vs. implementation) in the case company’s cognitive space. Fourth, the case ef-
fectively demonstrates how processing strategic issues is a social, distributed process, 
where weak signals are either further strengthened or filtered out through a social sen-
semaking process, thus influencing how strategic issues end up on the corporate agenda 
(cf. Dutton, 1986b). Fifth, and linked to the previous point, the case provides further 
evidence to the networked mode of strategic issue processing takes place in organisa-
tions. In particular, the study finds further support to the notion that autonomous, self-
configuring networks can contribute to strategic issue management by bringing in ap-
propriate expertise as well as supporting in moving strategic issues into implementation. 
Analysing the impact of cognitive space of the company to the processing of strategic 
issues on a system level, the research sheds more light on both the categorisation of stra-
tegic issues (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988), as well as the 
cognitive space (e.g., Bougon, 1992; Eden, 1992a) that underpins strategic issue proc-
essing in companies. Whereas strategic issue categorisation literature has traditionally 
focussed on the threat-opportunity dichotomy (e.g., Dutton & Jackson, 1987), the analy-
sis suggests that the situation is more complex. Based on the illustration of the cognitive 
space developed based on text analysis, threat and opportunity do indeed serve as typi-
cally occurring labels for strategic issues, consistent with previous research. However, 
the analysis suggests that there may be more dimensions to categorise strategic issues 
than merely threat-opportunity, and that the threat-opportunity dichotomy may not be as 
central as previously thought. In addition, two other dichotomies were present in the 
case company, namely sensemaking–implementation and market–resource emphases. 
And not only was strategic issue categorisation more multifaceted than previously 
thought, the categories themselves turned out to be quite different, based on descriptive 
statistics: For example, sensemaking-related topics not surprisingly tended to have the 
broadest network of experts involved in strategic issue processing, whereas market-
focussed topics were overwhelmingly initiated by top management. 
Since strategic issues tend to be substantially different in their characteristics, they also 
employ different areas of the cognitive space, which subsequently influences how they 
are processed. For example, inherent uncertainty with the strategic issue is likely to lead 
to a sensemaking-emphasis (instead of implementation-focus). In a similarly predictive 
manner, strategic issues that would appear to be focussed on the inside of the company 
would be more likely resource-focussed, whereas outside-focussed strategic issues 
would tend to have market emphasis. Based on their antecedent characteristics, strategic 
issues seem to evolve in the cognitive space of the company as they are processed. A 
general trend would appear to be a movement from sensemaking towards implementa-
tion, corresponding to decreasing levels of uncertainty and implementation challenges.  
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Lastly, linking allocation of attention (e.g., Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005) and 
strategic issue management system performance, the results provide support for the fun-
damental role of organisational attention allocation capacity in the processing of strate-
gic issues. In fact, organisational attention allocation – instead of strategic issue catego-
risation or different strategic issue management characteristics, such as task force power 
or network centrality – is likely to play a more general role in determining the quality 
and impact of decisions regarding strategic issues then had been previously thought. 
Overall, the results suggest that decision impact would be positively influenced by per-
ceived value at stake and resources invested in managing the strategic issue. For deci-
sion quality, one of the strongest determinants would seem to be the perceived uncer-
tainty of the strategic issue, although the effects of uncertainty would unfortunately not 
seem to be entirely eliminated by the different strategic issue management process char-
acteristics. On the general level, the results suggest that organisational attention alloca-
tion capacity is influenced by practices in the strategic issue management meetings, on 
the strategic issue management system, and in the organisation at large.  
7.2 Theoretical and Empirical Contributions 
The present study makes several theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature 
on strategic issue management and the attention-based view of organisations in general. 
Through access to actual and relevant corporate data, the dissertation has been able to 
open up the ‘black box’ of a company’s corporate-level strategic issue management sys-
tem. 
First and foremost, this dissertation puts forward a novel concept, namely the saturation 
of an organisation’s strategic issue management capacity. The concept of saturation 
contributes to bringing the recent attention allocation stream of strategy process re-
search (Ocasio, 1997; Ocasio & Joseph, 2005, 2006) and the research on organisations 
as interpretation systems (Daft & Weick, 1984) with the more established strategic issue 
management research (e.g., Ansoff, 1975, 1980; Dutton, 1983, 1986b; Dutton et al., 
1983; Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987).  
By introducing the concept of attentional saturation, this dissertation extends the re-
ceived knowledge on organisational attention allocation by demonstrating how atten-
tional structures on multiple organisational levels develop over time. In so doing, the 
present research expands the attention-based view of the company by building a sense 
of dynamism into Ocasio’s (1997) framework. To arrive at this contribution, the present 
research employs the logic of progressive coherence (Locke & Golden-Biddle, 1997) 
that integrates the two parallel research streams of organisational attention allocation 
and strategic issue management.  
Figure 7.1 summarises the findings of this study with respect to the notion of saturation 
in the strategic issue management process of the company. 
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Figure 7.1 Summary of theoretical and empirical contributions 
On the strategic issue portfolio level, when examining the performance implications of 
the different organisational processes for managing strategic issues, the research sug-
gests that a company’s attention allocation capacity represents one of the most critical 
determinants of strategic issue management performance. Extending earlier research on 
organisational information processing and attention allocation (Cyert & March, 1963; 
Ocasio, 1997; Yu et al., 2005), the results provide evidence of constraints on the atten-
tion allocation capacity on the interpersonal, social cognitive, and organisational levels. 
The results suggest that the attention allocation of strategy board members in strategic 
issue management meetings, the simultaneous existence of multiple major strategic is-
sues, and overarching organisation-level changes all contribute to an organisation’s at-
tention allocation capacity. This ultimately impacts also the rightness and impact of de-
cisions made, thus demonstrating a linkage between saturation and the performance of 
the strategic issue management system. 
First, practices in the strategic issue management meetings play a significant role as 
drivers for saturation in the strategic issue management system. Meeting practices di-
rectly influence short-term attention allocation; they also thereby impact the ability to 
reach decisions on the strategic issues, and thus act as a key driver for the performance 
of the entire strategic issue management system (cf. Jarzabkowski & Seidl, 2006). In 
terms of saturation, relevant meeting practices are likely to comprise both how the 
agenda for the meeting is structured (Döring, 1995; McKelvey, 1976; Tallberg, 2003) as 
well as how the meeting itself is run (Cornforth, 2001; Herman et al., 1997).  
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For the former, the key attentional mechanism related to saturation would appear to be 
the ordering of the agenda so that all strategic issues receive the required attention in 
order of importance. It should be noted, however, that the number of items on the 
agenda would seem to be an insignificant factor on saturation per se, because the com-
plexity of the decision on a strategic issue in a meeting can vary substantially. (How-
ever, the complexity of the strategic issue itself is likely to increase the risk of satura-
tion, as is discussed below.)  
For the latter, the discursive practices in the strategic issue management meetings (cf. 
Laine & Vaara, 2007; Vaara et al., 2004) would appear to be in a prime position both to 
mitigate as well as to cause saturation. Discourse in the strategic issue management 
meetings is fundamentally related to making sense (Weick, 1995) of strategic issues, 
which is undeniably needed for strategic issue processing. In this sense, discourse in the 
meetings is likely to lead to reduced uncertainty and equivocality about the strategic is-
sue, thus enabling the progress of strategic issue processing. However, should the dis-
course remain stuck (and thereby unable to reduce uncertainty), the strategic issue is 
likely to consume excessive amounts of attentional capacity from the finite supply for 
the given meeting, thus causing saturation.  
Second, practices on the strategic issue management system level can significantly im-
pact on the propensity of the system to saturate. Here the key underlying driver is the 
number of strategic issues being processed in parallel, that is, on the strategic agenda at 
a given time. On the one hand, the company needs to maintain a broad strategic agenda 
so that none of potential strategic issues are overlooked, and so that enough probing for 
the future is taking place (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; March, 1991). On the other 
hand, as top management time and attention is scarce (Mankins, 2004; Mintzberg, 
1971), adding another strategic issue onto the strategic agenda implies redistributing 
attention from some other area, be it another strategic issue or any operational priority. 
The role of senior management is paramount in managing strategic issues, not only be-
cause it is their domain of responsibility, but also because they are often in the only po-
sition to be capable of doing so: Although middle management can play a substantial 
role in making sense of (Dutton et al., 1997; Kunnas et al., 2006) and implementing de-
cisions on strategic issues (Floyd & Wooldridge, 1997; Wooldridge & Floyd, 1990), 
their visibility into truly strategic issues may be limited (Aguilar, 1967). Furthermore, 
the more strategic issues are on the strategic agenda, the more likely coordination chal-
lenges are (Geanakoplos & Milgrom, 1991) both for senior management as well as staff 
functions managing the process. 
Third, substantial changes on the organisational level are likely to reduce the availabil-
ity of attention for other activities (cf. Hitt et al., 1990; Hitt et al., 1991; Yu et al., 
2005), given the disruptiveness of major change overall (cf. Conner, 1993). The experi-
ence of the case company also supports this, since the organisational change took almost 
a year of planning, indicating a sizable project engaging a group far wider than merely 
the senior management. On a general level, since the attentional capacity in the organi-
sation is largely constant, significant occurrences other than strategic issues can substan-
tially reduce the capacity available for strategic issue processing, thereby increasing the 
risk for saturation (cf. Tushman & O'Reilly, 1997). 
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On the level of individual strategic issues, the results suggest that the main drivers for 
saturation would seem to be the perceived uncertainty (e.g., Dutton & Webster, 1988; 
Milliken, 1987) surrounding the strategic issue, the perceived implementation challenge 
(e.g., Bourgeois & Brodwin, 1984; Dutton & Duncan, 1987b; Reger et al., 1994) of the 
strategic issue, as well as the categorisation of the strategic issue (e.g., Dutton & Jack-
son, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988) within the cognitive space of the company.  
The reason why perceived uncertainty and implementation challenge can drive satura-
tion in the strategic issue management system is likely to be related to their role in in-
terpreting strategic issues. In a similar way as that in which the urgency and feasibility 
of strategic issues drive the momentum for change in organisations (Dutton & Duncan, 
1987a), so perceived uncertainty and implementation challenge are likely to play a fun-
damental role in making sense of strategic issues. Therefore, depending on the strategic 
issue, companies have varying capabilities as to how to respond to them (Kajanto et al., 
2004). Based on this notion, the risk of saturation on the strategic issue level is likely to 
be related to the inherent uncertainty and implementation challenge as depicted in 
Figure 7.2.  
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Figure 7.2 Risk of saturation in the strategic issue management system based on inherent un-
certainty and implementation challenge of a strategic issue (adapted from Kajanto 
et al., 2004) 
The highest risk of saturation is likely to occur when the strategic issue is characterised 
by fundamental uncertainty, which makes it virtually impossible for the company to in-
terpret the strategic issue. Therefore, there is a high likelihood that the strategic issue 
cannot only be resolved, but also cannot be removed from the strategic agenda, thereby 
consuming valuable attentional resources of top management. A similar situation may 
also occur with only structural uncertainty and fundamental implementation challenge: 
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even though the strategic issue can be understood, it remains impossible to see the im-
practicality of its implementation. A lesser risk of saturation exists when structural im-
pediments to interpreting the strategic issue exist, even though it can be made sense of, 
given the right approach.  
As for strategic issue categorisation, although the empirical analysis in Chapter 6 found 
that strategic issue categorisation had only limited explanatory power of the differences 
in decision rightness and impact, thereby suggesting that they would not play a signifi-
cant role in saturation. However, the case corporation typically categorised its strategic 
issues into more than one category at any given time. The maintenance of coexisting, 
competing frames (cf. Gilbert, 2006) may have reduced the effect of individual catego-
ries on strategic issue processing, but may have increased the demand for top manage-
ment attentional capacity, thus potentially leading to saturation. 
Saturation is likely to have a negative impact on decision rightness and impact also on 
the level of individual strategic issues. In addition, however, saturation may contribute 
to the cyclicality of strategic issue processing (cf. Ansoff, 1980; Dutton, 1983; Hendry 
& Seidl, 2003; Mintzberg et al., 1976). Since the inherent uncertainty associated with 
the strategic issue can contribute to saturation by inhibiting both the progress of strate-
gic issue processing, as well as its potential removal from the strategic agenda, the satu-
rated strategic issue management system may try to enter into more processing cycles 
than would have been necessary in the first place. Two factors are likely to play a role 
here: first, if saturation in the first place has been driven by inherent uncertainty that 
hinders interpreting the strategic issue, the company may wishfully think that “taking 
another stab” at the strategic issue might solve it (cf. Cyert & March, 1963/1992). Sec-
ond, if the strategic issue management system is already saturated, it may be more prone 
to escalation of commitment effects (Conlon, 1999; Staw, 1981; Staw & Hoang, 1995; 
Whyte, 1986; Zardkoohi, 2004), thus further entrenching the strategic issue into the is-
sue management system (cf. Gilbert, 2005). Unless the multiple cycles of strategic issue 
processing are purposefully stopped, saturation in the strategic issue management sys-
tem is likely to increase continually. 
However, cyclicality is not entirely a disadvantageous phenomenon in strategic issue 
management. By attacking the strategic issue in a piecemeal manner, the corporation 
can potentially structure its response to strategic issues, so that while making sense of 
the strategic issue the investments needed are contained. In other words, the company 
could be seen as buying a real option (e.g., Adner & Levinthal, 2004a, b; Barnett, 2008; 
Kogut & Kulatilaka, 2004; McGrath et al., 2004; Trigeorgis, 1996; Zardkoohi, 2004) on 
the strategic issue. Moreover, by breaking down the strategic issue into consecutive, but 
sometimes parallel parts, the company can better manage its attention allocation in the 
strategic issue management system. Smaller subissues allow the company to increase 
focus on solving particular aspects of the larger strategic issue, and also allowing to tap 
into relevant pockets of internal and external expertise without prohibitively increasing 
coordination costs. Therefore, cyclicality can even be seen as one way to mitigate satu-
ration. 
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Moreover, avoiding saturation by prematurely removing a strategic issue from the stra-
tegic agenda is likely to come only at considerable cost. Not only may the company 
overlook potentially vital strategic issues, killing strategic issues early limits the ability 
of the corporation to carry out probes and explorations (e.g., Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; 
March, 1991) into potentially new business areas, thereby risking the company’s long-
term survival (cf. Schumpeter, 1943/1976; Tushman et al., 1996). 
Second, the present study also builds on the earlier research on cognitive spaces (e.g., 
Bougon, 1992; Brown, 1992; Clarke & Mackaness, 2001; Cossette & Audet, 1992; 
Eden, 1992a, 2004; Eden et al., 1992; Fiol & Huff, 1992; Langfield-Smith, 1992) and 
extends it by developing a new method to analyse the cognitive space of the company in 
relation to strategic issue management and information processing. In particular, this 
dissertation shows how a depiction of a congregate cognitive space (Bougon, 1992) can 
be constructed based on meeting notes through the use of text and network analysis 
methods. 
Through the depiction of the cognitive space of the organisation’s senior management, 
the results contribute to the theories on strategic issue categorisation (e.g., Dutton & 
Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 1988). First, the results extend strategic issue catego-
risation from the extant threat–opportunity dichotomy into a multidimensional construct 
by demonstrating how two additional dichotomies are evident within the cognitive 
space. Second, whereas earlier research has emphasised the effect of categorising a stra-
tegic issue into an opportunity or a threat (Dutton & Jackson, 1987; Jackson & Dutton, 
1988), the empirical analysis shows that also the perceived value at stake and perceived 
uncertainty play important roles in determining the quality and impact of decisions on 
strategic issues. However, contrary to what one would have expected based on prior re-
search (e.g., Julian & Ofori-Dankwa, 2008), many of the different categorical strategic 
issue characteristics would seem to have quite little explanatory power with regard to 
the strategic issue management process practices. Third, the results lend further evi-
dence to Gilbert’s (2006) finding that multiple frames for a single strategic issue can 
coexist at the top management level by showing how strategic issues can be associated 
with multiple categories at the same time. 
Longitudinally the cognitive space provides a view of how strategic issues progress as 
they are being processed in the strategic issue management system of the company. By 
providing a longitudinal view into how strategic issues move in the cognitive space, this 
dissertation contributes to the strategic issue management literature (e.g., Ansoff, 1980; 
Dutton & Ottensmeyer, 1987) by providing a longitudinal view into a portfolio of stra-
tegic issues instead of considered solitary ones at a given point of time (cf. Dutton, 
1986a; Dutton & Duncan, 1987a).  
7.3 Managerial Implications 
Since this study represents one of the most comprehensive empirical analyses of the key 
practices of a strategic issue management system within a large company, it is expected 
to be of benefit for persons running their own company’s strategic issue management 
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systems. In particular, the finding that the different means for managing organisational 
attention allocation inside a company do matter in the successful management of strate-
gic issues does have significant managerial implications. 
Whereas strategic issues by definition often have a surprise element in them, processing 
strategic issues does not need to be entirely ad hoc. However, since strategic issues are 
by their very nature unique, processing them cannot be an entirely mechanical exercise. 
So how much structure is needed, and when does too much structure induce rigidity and 
blocks? Based on the findings of this dissertation, a systematic approach of reasonable 
extent to managing emerging strategic issues is not likely to hinder the process, but 
rather to support it (cf. Brown & Eisenhardt, 1997; Feldman & Pentland, 2003; Getzels 
& Csikszentmihalyi, 1976; Weick, 1998).  
This dissertation suggests nine practical ways of addressing strategic issue management 
both pertaining to individual stages of the strategic issue management process as well as 
process enablers. These recommendations are summarised in Table 7.1, and discussed 
in more detail below. 
Table 7.1 Nine research-based recommendations for improving corporate strategic issue 
management practices  
Recommendation 
Scanning, undirected research and problem recognition 
1 Scan broadly to identify potential strategic issues for the company 
2 Maintain an explicit, prioritised and focussed strategic agenda 
Directed research and gaining understanding 
3 Leverage company internal network to build understanding 
4 Complement internal knowledge by bringing in external participants when 
appropriate 
Planning for action 
5 Engage wider organisation to support implementation 
6 Establish milestones and review meetings to track progress 
7 Be prepared to remove redundant strategic issues from the agenda 
Process enablers 
8 Secure commitment from senior management to strategic issue management 
process with appropriate resourcing 
9 Create toolbox to deal with strategic issues 
 
In the scanning, undirected research and problem recognition stage, companies need to 
broadly scan their environment for any strategic issues so that they can be brought to the 
attention of the decision makers (Recommendation #1). Here the company is faced with 
the challenge of identifying the right strategic issues so that they can be processed in the 
system. Since missing a potentially vital strategic issue is not a satisfactory solution, 
extensive scanning is required. 
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In order to avoid attentional saturation in the strategic issue management system, com-
panies need to maintain an explicit, prioritised and focussed agenda. Ideally the agenda 
should consist of the most critical six to twelve strategic issues of the company (Rec-
ommendation #2). Prioritisation of strategic issues is critical, because if scanning for 
strategic issues is successful, the strategic issue management is fed with a large variety 
of potential strategic issues for the company. However, not all potential strategic issues 
can be processed in parallel, or the strategic issue management system would risk atten-
tional saturation. Moreover, the organisation is also unlikely to be able to implement 
multiple strategic issues concurrently. 
As strategic issues are being made sense of in the directed research and gaining under-
standing stage, the process should flexibly and dynamically leverage the internal net-
works of the company to build the best understanding of the strategic issue (Recom-
mendation #3). Making sense of strategic issues should not only be the domain of senior 
management, although their role is critical in making decisions of them. Teams tasked 
with processing strategic issues should make sure that they access the right resources 
regardless of organisational centrality or seniority, since these do not lead to better deci-
sions per se. 
Internal expertise should be complemented by bringing in external participants to com-
bine the internal knowledge with the best available outside knowledge (Recommenda-
tion #4). External experts can provide additional manpower for processing strategic is-
sues, but more importantly they bring in supplementary knowledge that can augment or 
challenge the existing cognitive space of the company. Through augmenting the existing 
cognitive space, the company can improve its ability to interpret strategic issues, and 
through challenging the company can possibly mitigate the risk of escalation of com-
mitment to any one solution. 
When strategic issues move into the planning for action stage of the process, the focus 
of the process moves into supporting the upcoming implementation of the strategic is-
sues. Therefore the strategic issue management process should ensure that required sup-
port for implementation is built by engaging the wider organisation with the processing 
of the strategic issue (Recommendation #5). In the same way as wide internal and ex-
ternal participation supports interpreting strategic issues, gaining momentum for imple-
mentation is likely to be supported by proactively working with the organisation to pre-
pare for implementation. In most situations this happens side by side with interpreting 
strategic issues, because often the people most knowledgeable about the strategic issue 
also reside in the organisation most likely to be tasked with implementing the strategic 
issue. Engaging parties external to the company can also be relevant in implementation 
particularly in technology-driven industries, where complementary assets are needed to 
launch technologies and products. 
To facilitate strategic issue resolution, the process needs to be structured with explicit 
milestones and regular review meetings at the top management level so that decisions 
on the strategic issues can be made (Recommendation #6). Strategic issues often cannot 
be resolved in a single meeting, because making sense of them requires time. Further-
more, building organisational support for implementing the strategic issues takes time. 
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Proper milestones during strategic issue resolution help in making sure that learning 
takes place, progress is being made and that current thinking is reflected with the man-
agement. 
As strategic issues are resolved, redundant strategic issues must be removed from the 
organisational agenda (Recommendation #7). This is needed to maintain a concise 
enough strategic agenda that is focussed on the most critical strategic issues of the cor-
poration (cf. Recommendation #2). In doing so, killing redundant strategic issues helps 
in limiting attentional burden to the organisation, and mitigates the risk for escalation of 
commitment to any particular solution. 
Also two process-related recommendations emerge based on the research. First, the en-
tire strategic issue management process critically rests on having explicit top manage-
ment (Recommendation #8), as already lamented by Ansoff (1980). The ideal owner for 
the process is the CEO, who is the ultimate owner of the company’s strategy in any 
case, and who has enough organisational clout to make things happen. In addition to the 
ownership of the strategic agenda, appropriate resourcing must be provided both to staff 
functions maintaining the strategic agenda as well as the task forces processing the indi-
vidual strategic issues. 
Second, for the process enablers, companies should create a toolbox to deal with their 
emerging strategic issues (Recommendation #9). This notion rests on the assumption 
that whereas each strategic issue may be unique in itself, they can be addressed with a 
collection of standardised approaches (cf. Kunnas et al., 2006). Depending on the char-
acteristics of each strategic issue, the right tools can be used in an appropriate manner. 
7.4 Limitations 
This section addresses limitations to the research that need to be acknowledged. First 
and foremost, this dissertation has focussed on one empirical context of the case corpo-
ration. Focus on a single empirical context was deliberately selected to open up the 
‘black box’ of strategic issue management practices within a corporation and amongst 
its top management. The case company was also well-suited to study strategic issue 
management practices, given its high-velocity environment that offered ample strategic 
issues to be analysed. Moreover, the case company provided critical, wide-ranging ac-
cess to a unique set of archival data, as well as access to key members of the organisa-
tion to conduct interviews. 
However, this dissertation has tried to mitigate the problems inherent in a single-
company study in multiple ways. Use of multiple methods to uncover and test different 
aspects and features of the strategic issue management system has been used to ensure 
the validity of the results. Multiple levels of analyses have also been used. The analyses 
in Chapters 4 and 5 focussed on the entire strategic issue management system of the 
company, and as such are more dependent on the company context. In contrast, the 
analysis in Chapter 6 is less likely to be influenced by contextual factors, because the 
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unit of analysis in Chapter 6 was an individual decision making situation and not a spe-
cific organisation. 
Second, the analyses of the dissertation rest on an unprecedented access to actual and 
relevant corporate data. This access has been gained through the researcher being em-
ployed in the case company, and thus in close proximity to the phenomenon under 
study. This may, however, be viewed also as a possible weakness, since it raises the 
question of sufficient objectivity in the research. Two particular approaches have been 
used to mitigate this concern (as detailed in Chapter 3). First, two case company insiders 
(the author and another strategy manager with intimate knowledge of the strategic is-
sues) performed the initial classification so as to ensure inter-rater reliability. Second, 
the coded material was further subjected to the review of the other three members of the 
research team to make sure that company-internal biases would not reduce the reliability 
of the data. 
7.5 Directions for Further Research 
Events such as 9/11 have recently revived an interest in the concept of strategic sur-
prises (e.g., Byman, 2005; Parker & Stern, 2002; Winter, 2004) that was quite central 
already in the early work of Ansoff (1975). Strategic surprises are “events that happen 
unexpectedly or expected events that take an unexpected shape” (Pina e Cunha et al., 
2006: 317). The key defining variables of surprises are the “(un)expectedness” of the 
strategic issue and the “(un)expectedness” of the process. Whereas this research stream 
focuses on deepening the understanding of why organisations become surprised, the re-
sults of this dissertation highlight major future opportunities in particular in studying 
strategy practices for managing the strategic surprises that have occurred. 
Consistent with the recent suggestion of Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst (2006), simi-
lar major future potential for integrative work exists between the different streams of 
strategy process research. In addition to the research streams focusing on strategic issue 
management and organisational attention allocation, a major opportunity exists in link-
ing the extensive body of research on organisational cognition also more generally to 
the research on strategic issue management. 
For the particular results of this dissertation, conducting similar research in a larger 
sample of major corporations would enable the validation of further current findings as 
well as adding significant depth to the understanding of organisational context and its 
link to strategic issue management practices. This approach, whilst understandably chal-
lenging to execute, would allow for improved control over the impact of organisational 
context on strategic issue management system performance. 
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Appendix A: Empirical Findings on Strategic Issue 
Management 
Table A-1 Empirical findings on scanning 
Dependent vari-
able 
Independent variable Author Effect Comment 
Amount of scan-
ning 
Type of strategy Hambrick (1982) Not found  
Scanning focus Type of strategy Hambrick (1982) Not found  
Daft et al. (1988) Positive  Scanning fre-
quency 
Perceived strategic uncer-
tainty May et al. (2000) No rela-
tionship 
Transitional 
(Russian) 
economy 
Use of personal 
sources about the 
environment 
Perceived strategic uncer-
tainty 
Daft et al. (1988) Positive  
Use of external 
sources 
Perceived strategic uncer-
tainty 
Daft et al. (1988) Positive  
Use of internal 
sources 
Perceived strategic uncer-
tainty 
Daft et al. (1988) No rela-
tionship 
 
Frequency and broadness of 
scanning 
Daft et al. (1988) Positive Performance 
as ROA 
CEO scanning emphasis on 
external task environment 
under: 
 higher perceived envi-
ronmental dynamism; 
and  
 higher scanning emphasis 
on internal functions 
dealing with innovation 
Garg et al. (2003) Positive 
Company per-
formance 
CEO scanning emphasis on 
external general environment 
under:  
 lower perceived envi-
ronmental dynamism; 
and 
 higher scanning emphasis 
on internal functions 
dealing with efficiency 
Garg et al. (2003) Positive 
Subjective 
evaluation of 
company 
performance 
Environmental 
awareness 
Past company performance Lant et al. (1992) Positive Performance 
as ROA 
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Table A-2 Empirical findings on strategic issue diagnosis  
Dependent vari-
able 
Independent variable Author Effect Comment 
Resource alloca-
tion 
Perceived level of crisis 
of strategic issue 
Dutton (1986a) Positive 
Centralisation of 
authority 
Perceived level of crisis 
of strategic issue 
Dutton (1986a) Positive 
Incidence of ar-
gumentation or 
explanation 
Perceived level of crisis 
of strategic issue 
Dutton (1986a) Positive 
Single organisa-
tion as data source 
Sensitivity to in-
formation 
Threat-consistency (vs. 
opportunity-
consistency) of infor-
mation 
Jackson & Dutton 
(1988) 
Positive Threat-
opportunity di-
chotomy 
Broadness and 
variety of interest 
in strategic issue 
Perceived uncertainty Dutton & Web-
ster (1988) 
Negative  
Broadness of in-
terest in strategic 
issue 
Perceived issue feasi-
bility 
Dutton & Web-
ster (1988) 
Positive  
Extent of variable us-
age in interpretation 
Thomas & 
McDaniel (1990) 
Positive  
Strategic issue labelled 
as positive 
Thomas & 
McDaniel (1990) 
Positive  
Strategic issue labelled 
as potential gain 
Thomas & 
McDaniel (1990) 
Positive  
Capacity of top 
management 
team’s informa-
tion processing 
structure 
Strategic issue labelled 
as controllable 
Thomas & 
McDaniel (1990) 
Positive  
Extent of variable 
usage in interpre-
tation 
Orientation toward 
domain offence 
Thomas & 
McDaniel (1990) 
Positive 
Orientation toward 
domain offence 
Thomas & 
McDaniel (1990) 
Positive 
Domain offensive-
defensive dichot-
omy 
Level of information 
use 
Thomas et al. 
(1993) 
Positive  
Past organisational suc-
cess 
Martins & Kam-
bil (1999) 
Positive  
Level of organisational 
information availability 
Kuvaas (2002) Positive Only partial sup-
port 
Perceived extent 
of controllabil-
ity/manageability 
of strategic issue 
Information processing 
capacity of top man-
agement team 
Kuvaas (2002) Positive  
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Level of information 
use 
Thomas et al. 
(1993) 
Positive  
Past organisational suc-
cess 
Martins & Kam-
bil (1999) 
Positive  
Perceived centrality to 
company identity 
Sharma (2000) Positive 
Interpretation in 
positive-gain 
terms 
Degree of discretionary 
slack 
Sharma (2000) Positive 
Threat-
opportunity di-
chotomy 
Strategic issue labelled 
as controllable 
Thomas et al. 
(1993) 
Positive Action defined as 
product and ser-
vice changes 
Likelihood to ini-
tiate action 
Strategic issue labelled 
as opportunity 
Sharma (2000) Positive Threat-
opportunity di-
chotomy 
Organisational 
performance 
Level of actions taken Thomas et al. 
(1993) 
Positive Performance as 
industry-specific 
metrics  
Perceived cer-
tainty of effects 
of strategic issue 
Past organisational suc-
cess 
Martins & Kam-
bil (1999) 
Positive Only marginal 
support 
Experience with related 
strategic issues 
Martins & Kam-
bil (1999) 
Positive As moderator to 
past success 
Positive bias in 
interpretation 
Amount of information 
seeking 
Martins & Kam-
bil (1999) 
Negative  
Level of organisational 
information availability 
Kuvaas (2002) Negative Only partial sup-
port 
Amount of data 
search 
Information processing 
capacity of top man-
agement team 
Kuvaas (2002) Negative  
Variations in the 
degree of associ-
ating controllabil-
ity with threats 
and opportunities 
Cultural value of uncer-
tainty avoidance 
Barr & Glynn 
(2004) 
Positive  
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Table A-3 Empirical findings on strategic issue selling 
Dependent 
variable 
Independent variable Author Effect Comment 
Top management’s willing-
ness to listen 
Dutton et al. (1997) Positive  
Supportiveness of the culture Dutton et al. (1997) Positive  
Competitive and economic 
pressures 
Dutton et al. (1997) Positive  
Change in organisation Dutton et al. (1997) Positive  
Fear of negative conse-
quences 
Dutton et al. (1997) Nega-
tive 
 
Downsizing conditions Dutton et al. (1997) Nega-
tive 
 
Perceived uncertainty Dutton et al. (1997) Nega-
tive 
 
Context fa-
vourability  
Conservativeness of the cul-
ture 
Dutton et al. (1997) Nega-
tive 
 
Violation of norms for stra-
tegic issue selling 
Dutton et al. (1997) Positive  
Perceived political vulner-
ability 
Dutton et al. (1997) Positive  
Perceived risk 
to own image 
in organisa-
tion 
Distance from top manage-
ment 
Dutton et al. (1997) Positive  
Use of easy-to-understand 
language  
Elsbach & Elofson 
(2000) 
Positive 
Communication of the use of 
legitimate decision processes 
Elsbach & Elofson 
(2000) 
Not 
found 
Perceived 
trustworthi-
ness 
Use of packaging with either 
a legitimating label or easy-
to-understand language 
Elsbach & Elofson 
(2000) 
Positive 
Studied de-
cision ex-
planations in 
general, not 
specifically 
strategic is-
sues 
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Table A-4 Empirical findings on middle management influence 
Dependent vari-
able 
Independent variable Author Effect Comment 
Middle management 
involvement in strategy 
formulation 
Wooldridge & 
Floyd (1990) 
Positive 
Middle management’s 
level of consensus on 
strategy 
Wooldridge & 
Floyd (1990) 
Not found 
Variety in upward in-
fluence patterns 
Floyd & 
Wooldridge (1997) 
Positive 
Organisational 
performance 
Consistency in down-
ward influence patterns 
Floyd & 
Wooldridge (1997) 
Positive 
Subjective evalua-
tion of organisa-
tion’s perform-
ance 
Middle manage-
ment’s level of 
consensus on 
strategy 
Middle management 
involvement in strategy 
formulation 
Wooldridge & 
Floyd (1990) 
Positive  
Strategic type Floyd & 
Wooldridge (1992) 
Supported Miles & Snow 
typology 
Middle manage-
ment strategic 
influence/ in-
volvement 
Formal boundary-
spanning position 
Floyd & 
Wooldridge (1997) 
Positive  
Variability to 
middle manage-
ment involvement 
Strategic type (esp. 
analysers) 
Floyd & 
Wooldridge (1992) 
Supported Miles & Snow 
typology 
Middle manage-
ment implementa-
tion activity 
Strategic type Floyd & 
Wooldridge (1992) 
Supported Miles & Snow 
typology 
 
 
  B-1
Appendix B: Key Events in the Evolution of the Case  
Table B-1 Key events in the evolution of the case 
Month45 Episode 
1 E1. Top management became interested in assessing the impact of new technolo-
gies on the current business. Task forces were set up to look into diverse areas, 
including the novel market segment.  
10 E2. A dedicated sales unit was established within one of the regional entities to 
work directly with customers. 
25 E3. Question on expanding the approach as a company-wide effort was raised in 
top management. 
29 E4. A current state analysis of the extant approach was presented to management. 
Management decided that a company-wide approach needed to be developed, and 
a task force was set to come up with a proposal in a month. 
30 E5. A preliminary approach was presented to top management, suggesting a re-
vised strategic scope.   
32 E6. More developed plans were presented to top management, broadening the 
proposed strategy. Top management decided to launch a feasibility study.   
32…33 E7. Task force analysed the dimensions of the approach, resulting in an assump-
tion of key differentiating factors against competing players. However, neither 
was the significance of the business evident, nor potential strategies yet fully un-
derstood. 
33 E8. Results of the task force work were presented to top management, which de-
cided that the key differentiating factors were to be investigated further. 
34 E9. Results of the task force work were presented to top management, thus con-
cluding the work on this matter. Top management raised the question of which 
organisational entities should be involved in the effort.  
E10. The market stalled sharply (year-on-year decline 15%). 
35 E11. A new task force work on clarifying the approach was kicked off by man-
agement, led by a newcomer to the company to provide an unbiased view. 
E12. Top management revisited the question of organisational involvement, and 
brought a previously passive entity into the effort. 
35…36 E13. Feasibility study of the business was kicked off. 
E14. A separate study analysing customer needs and segmentation was con-
ducted.  
36 E15. An update of progress thus far was presented to management. Management 
concluded that the current organisational structure restricted driving the strategy. 
E16. Work on overall approach continued in task force. Various options were be-
ing developed and evaluated. 
                                                 
45  Time is indicated as months from emergence of the strategic issue. 
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38 E17. An update on the task force work was presented to management. The study 
concluded that the current approach was insufficient, but the market could be at-
tractive overall due to a number of reasons. However, the company’s goal and 
role was far from self-evident. Management assigned a new taskforce to create 
product requirements, liaising with the ongoing task force work, and to report to 
management the following month. 
E18. Task force worked on establishing product requirements. 
39 E19. Results of product specification work were presented to management, which 
concluded that the inherent complexity of the products and related systems could 
act as an entry barrier, However, existing products had shortcomings. Manage-
ment decided that the task force work should continue to look into leveraging ex-
isting products and systems, and report back in a month. 
39…40 E20. Task force worked to assess the company’s capabilities. 
40 E21. Conclusions of the capability assessment were presented to management. 
Some confusion still existed about the level of fragmentation of a part of the mar-
ket. Management decided that strategy for a specific product needed to be formu-
lated. 
E22. Management considered an alternative positioning of the company in the 
novel market, due to difficulties in a previous approach. However, no clear stance 
was taken. 
E23. Task force worked on formulating a specific product strategy. 
41 E24. An update of the specific product strategy work was presented to manage-
ment. They concluded that an independent approach needs to be taken, or the 
company could become sidelined in the industry. Management assigned the strat-
egy to a specific entity for further development and implementation. 
40…44 E25. Task force worked to crystallise the enterprise approach, as prompted by a 
member of top management.  
43…55 E26. The market continued to shrink by another 11% year-on-year.  
44 E27. Preliminary views of a holistic approach were presented to management. 
The development of the market on multiple dimensions was still too difficult to 
forecast, including the role of differentiating factors. The discussion centred, 
nonetheless, on the competitive implications. Management agreed that the work 
should continue, with the next update to be presented in the spring. Going for-
ward, the work was handed over for future development to new facilitators. 
44…46 E28. Multiple task forces worked to develop the approach further.  
45 E29. A strategy proposal was presented to management, who concluded that a 
systems approach was required. 
E30. Top management subsequently concluded that the opportunity could be ad-
dressed only in cooperation with other industry players. Top management dis-
cussed establishing an independent unit, but this decision was not made. How-
ever, the strategy was approved with an emphasis on systems approach and coor-
dination responsibility. 
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47 E31. A new organisational structure was implemented in one of the business 
units of the corporation, now housing also parts of the effort to address the new 
segment. 
E32. Top management discussed the role of a geographical market for the seg-
ment, having realised that the specific market represented a dominant share of the 
total market. 
51…52 E33. Discussions amongst top management raised concerns about the success of 
the current approach. 
52 E34. Management reviewed progress thus far with the approach. Current work 
had been one-sided, thereby neglecting in part the systems approach initially 
called for. A small team was assigned to come up with proposals for solutions. 
52…53 E35. Task force worked to revisit the existing strategy and track progress against 
plans. 
52 E36. Dedicated sales unit (established in month 10) is run down when it is per-
ceived that the market is not ready. 
53 E37. Top management discussed the current strategy for the segment and decided 
that fixing it is a matter for the unit’s management. 
54 E38. Top management initiated a study to create a corporate-level strategy to fix 
the issues in the current approach. The task was assigned to a member of senior 
management. 
55…56 E39. Work on strategy was kicked off, with a large-scale task force comprising 
multiple units. The mandate of the team was to specifically take the customer 
perspective into account.   
56 E40. Top management received an update of the strategy, including initial hy-
potheses and directions for work. 
56…57 E41. Task force work on draft strategy continued, with work focussing assessing 
the attractiveness and relevance of the market as well as formulating tentative 
strategic directions. 
57 E42. Progress review with management. In the discussion, changing the organisa-
tional set-up was proposed as a solution. 
E43. Top management received an update on the strategy. The presentation cov-
ered the attractiveness and relevance of the market, and also included initial stra-
tegic directions. Directions were approved and a team was assigned to formulate 
an implementation plan. 
57…59 E44. Strategy was being crystallised in task force work. The work focussed on 
formulating an implementation plan with product portfolios, go-to-market strate-
gies, and organisational set-up. 
59 E45. Based on the task force’s proposal, top management decided that all activi-
ties are to be located in a single, independent unit. Systems approach remained. 
60 E46. The formation of the new business unit was announced publicly. 
 
